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IflTRODUCTIOI.I
The Commi ssion henewith submits to the Counci l. 'its report on
the MuLti LateraL Trade Negotiations and recommendations for the concLusion
of the resuLts, It is of the view that overaLL, w'ith the exception of
the area of safeguards and wheat and coarse gra'ins, it has very LargeLy
achieved the objectives which the Commun'ity set itseLf at the outset of
the negotiations.
*
**
Part I of the reports sets out in brief the evoLution of the
negotiations and makes an overaLL assessment. Part-_U conta'ins the
recommendations for the conclusion and other action by the CounciL on
the various LegaL instruments which were negotiated. Part III contains
12 sections, each of which :
(i) sets out in more detaiL the resuLts of the negotiations in the
individuaL fieLds, such as tariffs, agrjculture, non-tariff
measures, etc.,
(ii) refers to the mesures to be takenrwhere necessaryrby the Community
to ensure the imptementation of the commitments (1)rand
(iii) reproduces the reLevant LegaL texts agreed upon in Geneva, both
mu Lt i Latera I and bi latena L .
(1) The Commissionrs proposaLs for impIementation by the Community
are contained jn separate documents.
t
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PART I . GENERAL APPRECIATION
Deve Lopment of the negot i at i ons
The Tokyo Round of MuLti lateraL Trerde Negotiations was formaL Ly
launched when the Tokyo DecLaratjon was adgpted by the Ministers of
102 countries meeting in September 1973. Tl're negotiations had been given
politicaL impuLse by joint decLarations of the United States with the
E.E.C., and aLso with Japan, in earLy 1972 and had begun to take concrete
form in the Community when the Counc"iL adoptecl a Gt.obaL Approach for
negotiations in Juner 1973.
FoLLow'ing the Tokyo meeting negotiating machinery was rap'idLy
estabLished but substantive barga'in'ing was not poss;ibLe unti L, f i rst,
the passage of the l'rade Act in Januany 197'5 prov'ided the required
negotiat'ing authority in the United States and, seco;1d, the PresidentiaI
eLection in Late 1et'6 nade it possit?",?g t,eL!"tttn.t?tqred poLiticaL
decisions. In this period the adoption of the negotiat'ing Directives by
the Counci L 'in Februrary 1975 estabLished the Community's negotiating
position.
In effect the reaL negotiation was begun in mid 1977 when certain
major djfferences of view, espec'iaLLy in reLation to the scope and procedure
for negotiations on agricuLture, llere resol',red in discussions between the
United States and the Community. This enabLcid ia detaiLed timetabLe to be set
up for the initiat phase of requests and offers in the areas of tariffs,
agriculture and non-tariff measures, as we[l. as making further progress
possibLe in the development of the muItilaterat non-tariff measure codes.
By mid 1978 negotiations had reached the point of substantiaI
agreement in principle among the major participants on the shape of
the finaL Tokyo Round package. This aqreement was conveyed to other panr-
'icipants by the pubLication in Geneva of a,Joint Me,norandum of Unden-
standing. Although the buLk of tariff negot'iations, both in industry and
agricuLture, and the major part of the codes had been compLeted by the
end of that year, it was not unti L AprtL 19'/9 that aLl remaining issues
nad been finaLLy agreed and negotiators were abLe to initial the Procds-
verbaL inconporat'ing the nesuLts for refererrce-.to governments.
I
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Since ApriL time has been needed to finaLize the detaiLs of
concessions that had been agreed, espec'ially as regards tariffs and certain
codes in which specific obLigations are env'isaged (eg Lists of purchas'ing
entities, product coverage of civi L aviat'ion agreement). Discussions and
negotiations r^lere aLso continued with deveIoping countr"ies in certa'in areas
to ensure that speciaI treatment was given to their interests wherever this
was found to be feasibLe. A Tariff Protocol was initialLed in JuIy and this,
togethen with the suspens'ion of negotiations on the issue of a new safe-
guard cLause - when no generaILy acceptable agreement proved possibLe -
constituted in effect the end of formaL negotiations. A further suppLement-
ary Tariff ProtocoL is foreseen in November to atlow more participants to
deposit their lists of tariff concessions (inter aLia AustraLia).
The remaining task is now the impLementation by the participants
of 'the agreements through thei r internal Laws and reguLat'ions.
o
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PART I
OveraLL assessment of results
The concLusion of the MuLti LateraL Trade Negotiations, the most
ambitious and far-reaching ever Launchedr'is a rnajor achievement. Its
significance Lies only partIy in the programme of tariff reduct'ions, the
staged impLementation of which wiLL, subject to a reassessment after five
years/ cover most of the 1980s. In current difficult economic circumstances
a neduction worLd wide in tariffs of about one-third, onIy marginaLLy Less
than the results of the Kennedy Round, is a substantiaL resuLt, consider"-
abLy better than coutd have reasonabLy been,expected.
The major s;ignificance of the negotiat.ions howeven lies in agree-
ment on a series of codes and other LegaL texts - sLtch as on customs
vaLuation, subsidies and countervai ling duties, goverrnment purchasing,
standards, and imporl: licensing - which taken together with the machinery
of enfoncement of ea:h code irt terms of committees r:f signatonies means
a considenable updating and strengthening o{'the G.A.T.T. The way has
ther"eby been cLeared for aLLow'ing the G,A.T"T. to continue to pLay a major
roLe in reducing uncertainty for tnaders an<l promoting trade flows. It is
of qreat imoor"tance furthermore that the ruLes of the G.A.T.T. wiLL
.jenercrLL)r appLy to aLl among the deveLoped countnies. Substant-
iaL progress has aLso been made in ensuring gneater stabiIity and better
market opportunities for agricuLtr-rnaL products and in end'ing the warfare
which has raged intermittentLy over the Last two decades over the impLi-
catjons for wonld trade of the Commun'ityfs common agricuLturaI poLicy. The
agreements reached ernd the generaL consultative mechanism to be set up
will substantiaLLy r;ontribute to the stabiL'ity of n'orLd markets whiLe
avoiding any threat to the pr^incipLes and nrechani sm of the common agri-
cuttural poIjcy.
In the case of the deveLoping countries while it should not be
expected that they ,are entireLy satisfied urith the outcome, aLL that has
been reasonabLy possibLe to meet their demands has been done, without in
most cases any reasonabLe reciprocity on the part of those more advanced
developing countries that are in a pos'ition to grant it.
{t
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Above aLL, the success of the Tokyo Round means that the major
trading countries of the worLd have turned their backs on the protec-
t"ionism which has threatened over the Last few years and which wouLd have
enguLf ed the wor Ld even more v'iruLent Ly than in the ear Ly 1930s 'if these
negot jations had f ;ri Led.
In the Comm'issionts viet^l the package which has emerged is lair,
baLanced and acceptabLe. The Commun'ity stands to gain a good deaL. Not aLL
the Communityrs aims have been secured, but a substantiaL degree of greater
access to the Amelican and, though Less so/ to the Japanese and other
markets of the deveLoped countries have been secuned.
With the United States major agreements have been arlived at,
both in the industrial and agricuLtural sectors, The United States
customs tar^iffs wiLL have fewer peaks and in the non-tariff fieLd the
United States wiLL come into Line with the GATT, part'icuLarLy in neLation
to the criterion of "materiaL injury", for the appLication of counter-
vai L'ing duties, abolit'ion of the American SeLLing Price and FinaL List
systems of vaLuation/ eLim'ination of the djscriminatory fiscaL system
of wine gaLlon asserssment on alcohoLic beverages,and sign'ificant changes
in the appLication of the Buy American Act.
Japan was not wilLing to respond, except on some points, to
the EEC's specific requests reLating tcr processed agricuLtural products
and industr iaL products subject to high andlor unbound duties (textiLes,
Leather products, footwear). Therefone, in order to obtain an acceptabLe
baLance it has proved necessary to make centain withdrawaLs from the
Community's offers, But overall the Japanese industriaL tariff wilL
be substant'ialLy reduced and bound, and Japanese adherence to the codes
and other arnangements is a positive contribution to be weLcomed.
Canadars contribution in the tarif f f ietd 'is substant'iaL,
more so than in previous rounds of negotiations. ALthough its acceptance
of the code on customs vaLuation wi LL be deLayed, it can in due course
be expected to adh.ere to aLL the codes. In the fieLds of agricuLture
and fish some advantageous reciprocaL deals were concLuded,
I
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In the case of Austra li a whi te substanti;i I concess ions were
exchanged in the f ieLd of agricuLture, the finaL offer of new b'indings on
tariffs was disappointing so that AustraLia w'i Ll continue to maintain h'igh
tariffs, mostly unb,cund, and its adherence to some of the codes rema'i ns
uncertain.
NevertheLess, even if these resuLts are not so satisfactory,
the poLitical'importance of an agreement which settles a number of out-
stand'ing matters of disagreement shouLd not be underrated'
In its difficuLt externaL situation, [e11--lgi-ta c, has made a
weLcome effort to r:ontnibute to a successfuL outcome of the neootiations.
South Africafs offers are insiqnificant'in scooe and that country
moreover continues to unbind a Larqe number of concessions without offerirrq
vaLid concessions in return.
ALthoLtgh in generaL State tradinrg countriel wi LL benref it f rom the important
concessions made by the Community in vanious fieL,Js, the Commission does not
consider that the Community i s obta'ining neciproca L benef its, Hungary has
withdrawn part of its tariff offer, and those made by Czechoslovakia and
Romania reLate to customs taniffs, whose :significance can oe questionec"
Romaniars offer irr the non tariff sector is of no substantiaL interest.
None of these countries has acceded to the Communityrs request to increase
purchases of certain categories of products from contracting parties (1).
I
o
I(1) For resuLts with developing countrie$i see Later subsection of Part I
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Tariffs (1)
The settLement on industriaL tar"iffs which has emerged is LargeLy
consistent with the Community's object'ives. Taken togethen with the eLimin-
ation of aLL tariffs on imports of commercial aircraft, engines and other
parts under the agreement on commer"cial air"craft trade, a tariff cut of
about one th'ird has been negot'iated, covering over 100 bi LLion dolLar of
trade (1976 statistics). ALthough substantiaL, the overaLL depth of the
tari ff cut goes Less far than the Kennedy Round. Among
developed countries an important step has been taken in the direction of
harmon izat)on whi lst maintaining the Common Customs Tari ff as an impor"tant
cohes'ive eLement of the Community as weLL as affording Community producers
a not insignificant overaL L LeveL of protection.
The use of the "swiss fonmuLa" has had the effect that higher
rares of customs duties have tended to be reduced mone sharpLy than Lower rates"
As a result of this harmonisation effect, cuts in tariffs on fjnished and
semi-finished products are generaLLy deeper than those on na!', materiaLs,
thereby neducing the pr.obLem of tariff escaLation which preoccupies in
particuLar the deveLoping countrjes. Two further consjderat'ions in particuIar'
I shaped the tariff cutting formuLa. The fir^st was that in the current difficuLt
economic s'ituation tariff reductions wouLd be more easi Ly absorbed if
staged over a number of year"s. Thus the arnangements as a ruLe provide for
eight annuaL cuts starting in 1980. The second consideration was that in
view of the difficuLty of predicting economic cond'itions over a Long period,
it wouLd be sensibLe to considen at a certa'in point of the staging what to
do about the remaining reductions. So the provision inserted by the E'E.C.
in'its tarill scheduLe annexed to the Geneva tariff protocoL aLLows it to
neassess the situation at the end of the first five annuaL stages to see
whether it is in a posit'ion to move to the second phase.
lll'ithin this tariff framework increased access to the mar'kets of
the Communityts major trading partners wilL be assured with over"aLL reci-
procity and a substantiaL element of harmonisation (in particuLar in the
U.S. tariff on chemicaLs and to a lesser extent on textiles). 1f th'is
generaL assessment on the harmonization of tariffs aLso appL'ies to Japan,
his is not the case of some deveLoped countries such as AustraLia, South
Afr"ica and, aLthough Less so, New ZeaLand, where tariffs wi LL nemain
, 
high and often free of bindings and therefore adjustabLe upwards at w'iLL.
t
I
(1) for detai Ls see Part I1I, section 'l
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In th':se cases where our partners were not jn a positjon to ofler
fuLL reciprocit't, the Community has attempted to adjust its own concessions
on items of int,lnest to them so as not to exceed a strict baLance (for
detaiLs see Part III, section 1 deaIin9 with tariffs and section 6 on air-
cr^aft),
So far, 20 Tokyo Round participants (1) have estabLjshed the'ir
Lists of concessions: taken together tfrese run tc thousancs of p.i-qes"
A supplementary protocoI Later this year wi LL aLLow more part'i c'i pants to
subm'i t thei n Lists and wi tL in due coursie be submitted to the Counc"i I for
concLus'i on.
t
Effects of the taniff cuts 
.in the Community's own rescurces
Estjmates of the effects of the tariff cuts on the Community's own
resources have been made with the heIp of a simpt.ified econometric biIateraI
trade modeL. tJithout the cuts, customs duties wouLd be expected to grow by 11 %
in 1980, by 9,6 % in 1981 and by 8,2 7. in 198it.
It is difficuLt to be precise as t<l the effect of the tariff cuts on
these rates of growth at any particuLar date owing to the variables which can
infLuence the caLcuLation. For exampLe, tarifl'cuts in important sectors such as
chemicals and textiles will be impLemented Later than for other sectors, the
generaL tariff cuts based on a formuLa do not appLy to agricuLture, which aLso
fotLows a different timetabLe for impLementation, and caLcuLations based on the
overat I average reduction conceaI wide variat'ions for di fferent products with
different impontance in trade. Furthermone, the finaL effect on these resources
wiLL aLso be infIuenced by the additionaL demilnd for imports created by the tariff
cuts.
In parail.eL with the tar)ff negoti at ions, the
articLe XXVIII reneqotiations on the withdrawaL or modi
Un'ited States of concessions on ceramic di nnenware,
texti Les and the conversion of certain :;pecifi c duties
These nenegotiations are described in a separate report
concLusion by the Counci L.
Commi ssion conducted
f.ication by the
t he so-ca L Led Prato
into ad vaLorem rates.
w'i th a view to
best estimate is that the annuaL
1980, 1981 and 1982, mentioned above,
1 % to 1 1/2 %. This suggests "losses"
:in 1981 and 220 to ?70 'i n 1982.
I
In the L'ight of these factors the
growth rates of customs duties for the years
witl each be reduced by a fr'gure in the range
of 50 to 70 MEUA in 1980, of 130 to 170 MEUA
(1) Argentina, Aust ria, canada, czechosl.ovaki a, EEC, Fintand, Hungary,IceLand, Jamaica, Japan, New ZeaLanct, Romania, south Afr.ica, 5p"in,Sweden, switzerLand, yugoslavia and united states. Bulgaria, whichis not a contracting party, has aLso deposited a list oi.ont"rr.,onr.
t
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I
Agriculture and fisheriesl
The overall results obtained- nay be analysed. in the light of the objectives
drich the Community had set for itself at the beginning of these
Negot iations:
(i) for agriculture the Comrnunity had first of all advocated a speeific
approach to the Negotiations (as regards procedure and nethod),
uirereas our parbners preferued to negotiate a4riculture and industry
in the sa^rne r^xay. The Corununity nas finally able to have its viel'{s
accepted: the specific nature of the ag:ricultural negotiations
was recognized, an Agriculture Conmittee was set up and it formulated.
an approach to the negotiations whlch nras specific to agriculture.
This recognition of the specific nature of agriculture has nnad-e it
possible not to calL into question the Comnon Agricultural Policy.
It al-so enabled. rules to be laid down to ensure over the nert few
years a nore orderly developrnent a^nd expansion of world. trade in
agricultural products and to establish the bases for greater
international cooperation. Lastly, it enabled the obligations
O entered into r:nd.er the General Agreement to be shared. more equitably
among the contractLng parties.
(ii) tne Community had recommended that international arrangements be
established- by product for cereals, beef and veaL and" miLk products.
This approach was also accepted by our partners. Although no
concrete result has been obtained" for cereals, the principle of
the aqreements has not been caLLed into question and the internationaL
,..unn"r"nts for bovine meat and mi[k products represent major progress
in reLation to the Low LeveL of international cooperation in these two
sectors befor^e the negotiations.
I
fSee Part IIf, Section 2 fov the details.
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(iii) The Comnunity had. stressed that it could not allow the principles ancl
nechanisns of the Common Agricultural Policy to be called into
question d.urir:rg the Negotiations. The CAP v,ras not called into
question and. the basic principle behind-, and' operation of, its
nechan-isms, including those most open to attack by o1r partnerst
such as levies and refund.sr remain intact.
(iv) ffre Commission is arare of the fact that the Corununity has had. to
nake specific concessions on a number of agricultural products
drich are sensitive for certain nennber countries, in order to reach
a final result. It roust be consid.ered", however, that the Connunity
obtained. najor tariff and non-tariff concessions in agriculture
from its parbners, and as a result ths're can he significant develolnents
in its exports of agrifood.stuffs.
The Commission therefore considers that the objectivos rfiich the Connunity
had set itself have }elrgely been rnet and. that the outoome of the
Negotiations in the agricultural sector is ac,ceptabl<l not only because
a balance has been est;ablished with the Conrnunityrs partners, but also
because the Community mechanisns have been adjusted. t;o the ertent reguired.
to ensure a baLance at Conmunity l-evel with regard to the internal interests
at stake.
a
a
t
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Non tari[_L_measures and deci sions of Lhe f rgmewo_]:k,gIqup ( 1)
One of the major achievement of the Tokyo Round has been the
estabLishment of new rules, mostLy in the form of codes which 'impnove
and bring up to date the institutional fnamework of ruLes and procedures
that govern t,lorLd trade in this fieLd, These codes wi LL heLp to remove
or reduce and bring under better surveiLLance a number of non-tariff
barriers. In this sense it can be said that whereas the six orevious
rounds of negotiations u,ere mainLy negotiations within the frame of
existing ruLes the Tokyo Round deaLt with the basic ruLes themseLves.
0n non tariff measures, the Commun'ity's objective was part ly
to eLim'inate practi ces eLsewhere not in conf ormity w'ith the G.A.T-T.
and damag'ing to Communityrs exporters and partLy to ensure that as far
as possible areas of interest to Communityrs exporters such as customs
vaLuation, technicaL barriers and government purchas'ing be governed by
equitabLe muLti Latera L Ly agreed ruLes.
o
The
code and t he
t he operat i on
aLL deveLoped
codes on customs vaLuation, on Liqe!!ing, the new antidumping
code on subsidies and countervai Linq measures wi L L cLarify
of exist'ing G.A.T.T. provisions end heLp to ensure that
countnies accept the same obLigations.
The codes on techni caL reguLations and on governrnent procure-
ment innovate and suppLement existing ruLes and introduce new disciplines
in fieLds which were not covered up to noh, or onLy partLy" The G.A.T.T.
has so far had LittLe experience in these fieLds and much wiLL depend
on the impLementation and management of the net,t ruLes. The code on
technicaL reguLations in particuLar can be expected to make an important
contribution to opening up those mankets excessiveLy reLiant on the use
of standards as a trade poLicy instrument by providing a means of tackLing
unnecessary obstacLes to trade and improv'ing access to certification
systems.
a
(1) For detaiLs see Part III, sections 41 51 61 7r 8,91 10,11 and 12-
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The glrgngement on air"craft is bas'icaLLy an agreement to ensure
duty'free tneatment in this sector o?)?3i;.":;t to the Commun'ity with
anci Llary prov'isions to take account of the panticuL,ar characteristics of
production and trade 'i n this area. The agreernent on rreasures to di scourage
the importation of counterfeit goods, aLthough not amongst the Communityrs
initiaL negotiating objectives, t^ras promoted by the l!.,nited States and is
of common interest.
Most of the texts agreed upon in the f r anlgwork group a L Low f or"
vanious kinds of preferentiaL tneatment and tf lexibi Lity in G.A.T.T. prov'isions
for deveLoping countries. Tbese were agreed rpon'in consideration of their
demands with a view to giving them the econom-ic assistance which seems
appropliate at this stage. Howe'ier these texts aLso encourage the more
advanced Ldcrs graduaLy to assume mone G.A.T.T.obLigations aLong r^rith their'
econom'ic deveLopment. The texts aLso deaL with a number of basic G.A.T.T.
ruLes such as the cormercial measures for braLance of payments purposes,
with the procedure fcr consuLtat'ion and dispr-lte settLement and they are
intended to make their openaticn more cLear,
The nesults acliieved in aLL these l''ieLds, 'in a highLy diff icuLt
worLd econom"ic environment, constitute a cons;tructive and coherent reform of
the international tr"arJing systern which shouLcJ enabLe it to respond more
effectiveLy to the nerlds of the 80ts. The Conrmunity r;houLd give them its
fu L L suopo rt .
I
o
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The deve Lop'ing count r i es
The deveLoping countr"ies have obtained major benefits as a resuLt of the
muLtiLateraL negotiat"ions, tron the overaLL nesuLts and from the Communityrs
spec'ific concess'ions. These benefits incLude not only taliff cuts/ particuLarLy
for tropicaL products but aLso offer increased security, both commenciaL and
LegaL/ as a resuLt of the agreements on non-tariff measures and the codes,
the arrangements concerning agricuLturaL products and reform of the LegaL
str"ucture. The third part of this report contains more specific information
on thi s matter.
In accordance with its negot'iating di rect'ives, the Commission, f or its part,
endeavoured to take into account, as far as possibLe, the interests and
probLems of the deveLop'ing countlies, particuLar"Ly the Least deveLoped, in
aLL the sector"s of the negotiations. It aLso took special account of the
'interests of the deveLoping countlies with whom it has speciat reLations,
among others the A.C.P., particuLarLy through meetings in Geneva and through
sessions of the E.E.C.-A.C.P. commerciaL cooperation sub-committee heLd'in
BrusseLs.
0n 1 January 1977, without asking for any contribution in exchange at that
stage of the negotiations, the E.E.C. impLemented its tariff (MFN and GSP)
and non-tari f f of f er" (notabLy the status quo commitments regard'ing certain
internaL charges) in the speciaL, Frior"ity sector of tropicaL pr"oducts. For
the year" when it was brought into operation, this offer reLated to a voLume
of Community imports from the beneficiary countries (excLuding the A.C.P.
countries) of the orden of S 4 000 miLLion (of which I 3 000 miLL'ion correspond
to the reductions made on the basis of the M.F.N. cLause, in particuLar for
coffee) (1977 f igures).
As regards industriaL tariffs, the one-third reduction in the industriaLized
countriesrcustoms tariffs constitutes a s'ignificant new step in tariff dis-
mantLing from which the deveLoping countr"ies wiLL benefit in the near future
of in the Longen term. This redr,rction which, for the E.E.C., re Lates to a
trade voLume of the order of 6 5 000 miLLion, wiLL jnevitabLy erode the prefer-
ence margins nesulting from the G.S.P. to a certain extent, as weLL as the
advantages which the A.C.P. states and other preferentiaL countries enjoy,
but as it is not uniform, since the E.E.C. had adjusted certain reductions
in an effort not to affect the G.S.P. and certain associated countries, and
aLso as the concessions wilL be appLied in stages, the erosion process wiLL be
progressive and seLective.
t
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In the splrere of norptariff neasures, in act.dition t;o the advanta6es arising
from the general provisions contained in the codes, the d.eveloping countriers
nil} benefit from the various provisions according special and
d.ifferential treatmentl greater flexibilit;y, dero65ations frorn cerbain
obligations in the oodes, teehnical and. financial erssistance, special
neasures for the least d.eveloped. countries, etc.'.
One of the significa,nt results of the Tolqyo Round. jls therefore the inclusion
of an explicit leg;al provJision for the GSP, dtich
will also serve as a basis for the exchanger of prellerences between
d.eveloping countries and for other forms ofi' d.ifferential treatment for these
countries, notably more favourable special treatnent for the least developed.
countries; this result, rdrich is in respon$re to concern so often expressed
by the d.eveloping countries, repTesents a positive stage in the
d"evelopment of inte::national trade relatior:rs,
Although no figures can be given in the norl-tariff sphere. for the benefits
obtained by the d.evelopirg countries, these benefil;s will in the long
term prove as inpori;ant as the more easily identifjlable benefits arising
frorn the trad"itiona.,L negotiations on tarifll's Er"nd the removal of other
barriers to trade.
The progress made o:: results obtained in certain spheres of the
negotiations d.o not,, it is true, go nore tllan part of the way toicard.s
fulfilling the devel-oping countriesr very lligh exp<lotations, parbicularly
in the sphere of qu.r.ntitatirre restrictions ancl cert;ain prod.uct sectors.
The constraints on 1;he developed countries, howeve::, rftrich are faced. with
the need for the rapid- reorganization of cerrtain per,rts of their
manufacturing indusi;ry and, in rnarqr cases, r*ith high sectoral unernplo;,ment,
have not always allor*ed them to carry liber:,alization any further.
Moreover, some of the specific problems whi.ch arose in spheres such as
customs value and. atrti-dumping measures have not al-l been solved., notably
because some of the requests from the d.eve}oping ooirntries touch the
very core of the problems which these codes:r are at'tempting to solve and
would have changed their nature completely.,
4
'See on this subjecl; each of the sections d.ealing lrith the various parts
of the negotiations.
I
a
a
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The deveLop'ing countries'roLe in, and contribution to, the negotiations has
been very uneven. [,lhereas a few developing countnies were weLL represented
in tenms of the'ir acquaintance with the dossiers and in terms of numbers,
many others did not rea L Ly succeed 'in coping w'ith the intense, varied and
often very technical negotiations conducted in Geneva. The most advanced
deveLoping countries, moreover, d'id not aLways recognize that in the interest
of their oh/n economic development, the opportunity of the Tokyo Round shouLd
be taken even if onLy to initiate a process of progressive commitments concern-
'ing their own trade measures, which ane often too protective and hinder their
economic deveLopment and the expansion of trade among those countries. Since
the uniLateraL non-tar"iff and, above aLL, tar^iff LiberaLization measures which
certain deveLoping countr"ies announced as a contribution have not in most
cases been bound under G.A.T.T., they do not bring any guarantee of penmanence.
LastLy, the Least deveLoped countries, which ane onLy at the thneshoLd of
their economic deveLopment, couLd not reaLLy derive much benefit in the short-
and medium-term from trade negotiat'ions of the Tokyo Round type, since their
economic interests Lie in other types of internationaL action.
Acceptance of the resuLts of the Tokyo Round by the deveLoping countries remains
an open question. Up to not^l/ onLy Argentina has initiaLLed the Procds-VerbaL
of 12 ApriL and only Argentina, Jamaica and YugosLavja have initiaLLed the
Tariff ProtocoL of 13 JuLy. Since that date Korea and Uruguay have deposited
their concession Lists which will be annexed to a suppLementary tariff pnotocoL.
Some other countries have announced their intention to put forward lists
(Isra6l, Brazil, India, S'ingapone).
A number of deveLoping countnies (among them Argent'ina, India and South Korea)
intend to sign some codes. In any event, it is in the deveLoping countries'
interest to do so in order to be abLe to participate from the outset in the
administration of these codes.
Last Ly, it is to be noted that, at the Tokyo Round, CoLombia and the Ph'i L'ippines
negotiated thei r accession to the GeneraL Agreement. ProtocoLes have been
estabLished to which the tariff concessions exchanged are annexed (see aLso
Part III, secti on 3, deveLop'ing countnies).
t
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Negot'iating objectives not fuLLy reaLised
One major area in which the Communit;y's object'ives have not been
satisfactor"i ly achieved 'is that of revision rrf the saf eguard cLause
(Art. XIX of G.A.T.T. )
Initi aL Ly many part'ic'ipants had doubts about the need f or any
changes as r^reLL as opposing viev'rs on the nature of such changes. DeveLoping
countries for exampLe, Long nour"ished the ho1:e that they might be exempt
from safeguard measures aLtogether. There h,ene aLso attempts to broaclen
the scope of the negc,tiation to'incLude aLL manner of measures which were
considered anaLogous to safeguard action and couLd have pnotective
effects. Although sonre feLt that it was not reaListic to expect govern-
ments to submit to sign'ificantLy tougher procedures and discipL'ines in
so sensitive an area of econom'ic poLicy, the majority view sLowLy
deveLoped in favour of making the somewhat vague Language of ArticLe XIX
more precise coupLed with much stronqer procedures fon internationaL
review and surveiLLarr ce of such actions.
The Community'rs response to this evoLution was to adoptr'in June 1978,
its own objective of seeking to have seLective actions cLearLy recoqnised by 
'EEC partnens in GATT. In this way it was feLt that the safequ_ard cLause in
future woutd correspc,nd mone cIoseIy to the needs of the s'ituation,
espec'iaLLy where d'isruption and injury was the resuLt of aggressive market-
ing by onLy one or two supptiers; and on this basis the Commun'ity was
wi LLing to contempLate additionaL discipL'ines and procedures in this area.
The concept c'f seLective action was initiaLLy unweLcome to aLmost
aLL par"t'icipants other than the Nordic group and some other European
countries. Neverthele,ss it was finaL Ly possibLe to persuade other
deveLoped countries to support the princjpLe of a new agneement inc[ud'ing
ruLes fon seLective action; and some progress was made with deveIop'ing
countries who began to see that, by this course, action couLd where appropri-
ate be Iimited to a few, highLy competitive suppLiers in a position to in-
crease exports veny nap'idLy and that the majonity wouLd in effect be exempted
f rom
I
,
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the effects of the action.Oppos'ition nonetheLess remained totaL from
more advanced deveIoping countries in As'ia, who cLearLy feLt themseLves
threatened by any change; and the strength of support for the m.f.n.
princ'ipLe in the G.A.T.T. was shown by the demands of such countries
(with some support from other" parti cipants such as Japan, Canada,
AustraLia and to some extent the U.S.A.) for procedunes to prevent
abuse of seLective measures which wouLd effectiveLy have Limited the
scope for action to an unacceptabLe degree.
It has not been possible so f ar to f ind the basis for a mrrtrr:l lv
acceptabLe solution. The insistence of deveLop'ing
countries that seLective action be authorised, prior to its appLication,
by an internationaL committee and just'ified against a series of very
tough nequirements couLd not be accepted. Simi LarLy the'ir refusaL to
admit seLective act'ion in emergencies (criticaL circumstances), even
where a degree of prior biLateraL consuLtation had taken pLace, was aLso
unacceptabLe. And even if these issues had been resoLved, some contentious
probLems reLating to new discipLine for export restraint arrangements,
the appLication of the new cLause to agricuLture, and U.S. Legislative
pr"ovisions on the LeveL of injury and of causation of injury wouLd stiLL
have had to be agreed.
InformaL discussions are to
can be found.
Quantitative Restri ctions
continue to see if, Later, common ground
The Community was faced in the area of Quantitative Restrictions
with strong pressure from many other part'icipants to agree to a generaL
phasing out of the few remaining restrictions of individuaL Member States
according to an agreed timetabLe. Our negotiating objective uas, whi Le
resisting th'is gLobal approach to the probLem which wouLd not have taken
satisfactory account of sociaL and economic circumstances invoLved, to offer
the LiberaLisation of a substantiaL number of remaining restrictions on
condition that this couLd be achieved under satisfactory conditions espec'iaL-
Ly'in regard to highLy competitive suppLiers such as Japan. The Communityrs
offer aIong these lines has not been jmplemented, Largely because satis-
factory assurances utere not forthcoming and because in reLation to Japan
which wouLd have seen the principaL beneficiary, the overaLL baLance of
recipnocity'in the negotiations lvas considered unS.a!'isfactory.
I
t
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ImpLementat'ion of the resuLts
The Commission proposes to the Counci L that
resuLting from the Tokyo Round accor"d'ing to
ation with the ArticLe 113 Committee.
PART ]
the Community accept the agreements
the scheduLe worked out in consuLt-
t
The agreements set the date for their entry into force. This date is 1 January
1980, except for the agreement on government pnocurement (1 January 1981) and
the agreement on customs vaLuation (1 January 1981, bttt 1 JuLy 1980 agr"eed
with the USA). These deadLines are not hard and fast, LegaLLy speaking, because
the possibiLity remains open for the agreements to be accepted at a Later date.
However the U.S. LegisLation (Tr"ade Agreements Act 1979) which impLements the
agreements 'initiaLed Last Apri L makes it obl'igatory for" the Pr"esident to
accept before 1/1/1980 the ant'i-dump'ing, subs'iclies/countervaiLing and standarrJs
codes fai Ling wh'ich the LegaL provision adoptr::d by Congress for the 'impLement'-
ation of these agreements (which incLude in particuLan the introduction of the
'injury criter.ion for counterva'i L'ing duties) wiouLd not enter into force. Funther-
more, the President can only accept the series of agnr3ements covered by the
Leg'isLation (1) if they have aLso been acceptt:d by the E.E.C., Japan, Canada
and, in the case of the c'i vi L ai rcraf t agneement, Swe,Cen. However acceptance
by the U.S. would sti LL be possibLe, subject tc) cer"tain condit'ions, 'if onLy
one of the majon partners had faiLed to acceptl in time.
The Commission has aLways recognised the importance for aLL major
part'ies to the lvl.T.N.s to give fulL and accunate effect in their domestrc
LegisLation and iadministr^ative practice to the ruLes and obLigations set:
out in the various non-tar iff codes and other LegaL texts. The Commission
has agreed that before recommend'ing the finaL conclusion of the M.T.N.
package, it wouLrl ver"ify the impLementation by'its pantners (2).
ImpLernentation by the U.S. was of particuLan concern to the
Community, since the Geneva codes themseLves wil"L not have direct force of
Law in the U.S., and therefore, before'impl-ementat'ion, had to be transLated
into U.S. Law:,a pnocess which r"equirecl approvaL by Congress. Given some
protection'ist forces in Congress, it wa::; f eared that Congress m'ight not
accept on might t ry to tnlater down the sr"rbstance of some of the concessi ons
made by the U.S. negotiators in Geneva. For thi:; reason, the Commission
foLlowed very cLr:seLy the drafting of the tJ.S. impLement'ing LegisLation.
The countervai Ling code is not covered by the U.S,, Legi sLation.
Section VI of Part II of the present report refers to what the Commission
proposes in this respect for the Communitvrs otJn'i mpLementatioh.
a
(1)
\ a)
i
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The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 h/as approved by the House of
Representatives on JuLy 11, 1g7g and by the Senate on July 23 and signed
by the President on JuLy 26.One of the most importantr.if not the most
immediately visible, consequence of the approvaL of this legislation by
Congress is the fuLL U.S. part'icipation in a consolidation of new muLti-
LateraL trade ruLes and a formal recogn'ition by Congress of U.S. internationaL
internationaL trade obLioations. This is a very significant step forward.
Although the U.S. impLementing Leg'isLation is not in every nespect
drafted as t^rouLd have been desirabLe, it is the Comm'issionrs judgment that
on the whoLe it refLects the Letter and sp'irit of the M.T.N. acconds. In
particuLar it does not conta'in anything that appears to prevent the U.S.
administration f rom fulf i Lling its obL'igations under the codes. Concern'ing
the important issue of "materiaL injury" in the context of dump'ing and
countervai L'ing duties it meets two of the most 'important objectives of the
E.C. in these negotiations : (i) incorporation of a i'materiaL injury" test
in the U.S. countenvaiLing duty Legislation (ii) by the use of the same
wording for antidump'ing, strengthening of the injury test in U.S. dump'ing
Leg'isLation on injury.
ALthough the definition incLuded in the U.S. Leg'isLation is not
couched in the positive terms which wouLd have been preferabte, the tegis-
Lative history does expressLy excLude the "more than de minimis" injury
concept used by the InternationaL Trade Commission in a number of its past
dec'isions.
The LegisLation now in pLace does not by itseLf guarantee the
fuLf i LLment by the U.S. of their obligat'ions. A number of key prov'isions
ane open to vary'ing interpretations. Thene wiLL aLso be further reguLations
sti LL to be issued governing proceduraL matters 'in the appL'ication of the
agreements. It is therefore of utmost'importance to the E.C. how these
obLigat'ions are interpreted and appLied'in practice. The Commission intends
to mon'itor cLoseLy the effects of the new LegisLation on Amenican pract'ice
to see that the aqreements reached in Geneva are observed.
I
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TheGover..lmentofJapgnintendstcrlsubmittheTariffProtocoL
and the Codes to the D'iet for approvaL as socrn as possibLe (1)' If the Diet
givesitsapprovaLatasess.ionbeforetheerrdoftheyea?,actioncouLd
be taken by the Government f rom 1 January 19lii0. If , as appears more L'i keLy,
however., the D.i et does not give 'i ts approvaL unti L March 1980, there wouLd
then be an eLement of considerabLe uncertainty on the date of Japanrs
acceptance aLthough it is possibLe that some soIution to this probLem couLd
be found,
1,'1hen consideling the M.T.N. texts, the Diet wouLd aLso deaL with
the steps to.impLement Japan's announced'intention tc, make certain acceLer-
ated tariff cuts.0r the L'i keLy t'i metabLe the first c,f these autonomous
reductions would be appLied from 1 Aprj L 198{1.
The Comm'i ss'i on cons'i ders that whi:e there nay' tar constitutionaL
reason, be some deL;ry in impLementing, there is Littt.e reason to doubt
that it wiLL take pt.ace.
The new Canaclian Government in powejf'since the eLections of May 22,
1979 decided to acc()pt the resuLts of the MTI\.
As to the'implementation of tariff reductions responsibLe minjsters
announced appropriaLe procedures to permit Canada to commence tariff reductions
on January 1, 1980. Given the importance of the MTN reduct'ions, a biLL,
modifying the Custons tarif f act, rvi l.L be presented 'Lo ParLiament. 1f
ParLiamentrs schedule inrouLd not aLlow completion of the process before
January 1, a [,,lays and Means Motion couLd be introduced and then impLemented
on a provisionaL basis pending approvat Later.
As to non'tariff agreements, netnr legisLation has been announced for
those texts that de,:L with unfair or injurious imporli prectices. As to
customs vaLuationr'the ministersr statement emphas'izes that Canada has a four
year period, besides other conditions, before it wiLl|. be required to apply
this Agreement, but it aLso makes cLear that new Leg'isLation will be necessary.
Concerning Government procurement, import L'icencing procedures and
technicaL barriers'to trade, Ministers note that no LegisLative action is
requi red, but some changes to reguLations and administrative procedures.
(1) The remaining agneements such as the framework group resuLts, the dairy
and meat products agneements, requ'ire onLy to be approved by the
Gove rnment .
)
a
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CoNCLUSION AIID IMPLEMm{TATIoN 0F AG@MTIVTS
INTMDUCTION
G
In this part of the report, the Courmission presents to the Council"l
the full list of texts applicable to the Commrrnity resulting fron
the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Section I);
the internal d.ecisions and measures which it recomrnends that the
Council a.dopt with a view to conclucling the negotiations (section II).
The Commission also invites the Cor:ncil to lay dor,m the procedures for
Comnunity participatlon in the committees and" bod.ies set up by certain
of the agreements negotiated- at Geneva (Section IlI).
This is followed. by discussion of the implernenting measures designed- to
give effect to the agreements at internal Community 1evel (Section IV).
I In conclusion, the commlsslon proposes that the council:
1. establish proced.ures and timetables for completion of the acts of
acceptarrce of the agreements, which r+rill be legally binding on the
Cornrnunity vis-b-vis its partners (Section V);
deterrnine the a.rrangements for publicatiori of the agreernents in
the Official Journal of the E*ropean Comnulities (Section VI).
SECTION I
List of texts licable to the resulti
fn this section the Comrnission has confined. itself to presenting a
list of the texts, with brief comrnents on each. All have already
discussed- in the series of communications presented to the Council
the negotiations.
ful1
been
during
;
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The nature and. purpose of the various texts enshrining the results of
the lllls as they concern the Commwrity are analysecL in detail in Part III,
which also sets out the actual texts in full.
A. @lnstrune+Is
fltrese consist of the terts initialled in Genev€r on 1-1- April by the
Corunission representative and the d.elegates of various other countriesl,
subject to the purely formal comections made since t,hen, and by the Geneva
Tariff Protocol (tglg), which was opened f,or rignatur,e on 11 July and
initialled for authentication by the Comrnission representative on 13 July
and by the detegates of third countrj., 2.
There is also a text o:n trade in counterfeited goods which has not yet
been initialled as the negotiations carne to arr end on,Iy recently.
llhere are two t;rpes of instrunent: firstly, a number of rnultilateral
agreements and arrangements opened. for ind.ivid.ual accraptance by the parties,
which must therefore be concluded by the Cor:ncil (subrsection 1); and
secondly, d"rafts of decisions, nesolutions and decLarations which are to be
approved by the oontrar:ting parties to the General Ag:neement, and need not
therefore be conclud,ed but siraply approved. in princip.te (subsection 2).
llhese are the drafts nr:gotiated. in the Framework Grouic, and a text on the
Multilateral Agricultu:raL Framework.
Other multilateral lega1 instn:ments were negotiated. :Ln the MII'Is franework,
viz protocols of accbssion to GATT for Colonbta and. the Philippines subsection 3).
I. @:nts and arra.ngements
1[tre agreements and" arrangements mentioned below, which are repxoduced. in
Part IIl of this report, are in the main presented in the version tfcertified.n
by the GATT Secretarial;, md belong to the GLI series,,
rArgentina, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canrad.a, Czechoslovakia, Finland.,
Hungary, Japan, New Zealand., Norway, Spain, Sweden, fiwitzerland,,
United. States, ffiC, Romania.
2
'Argentina, Austria, Brrlgaria (not a contracting part;r to the General
Agreenent, so its lis1; will not be annexed. to the hotocol but will appear
in a separate instrumelnt), Canada, Czechoslovakia, ffiiC, tr'inland., Hungary,
Iceland., Janaica, Japan, New Zeal-and, Norway, Romania,, South Africa, Swedent
Srrit zer1and., United. Sl;ates, Yugoslavia.
]
a
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Other agreements and amangements are given in the version in which they
were "initialledtt, taking into accor:nt the purely formal corrections ma.d.e
since. These texts bear MfN or L/ series numbers.
Some of the texts (anti-d.r:nping and. customs valuation cod.es and dairy
products arrangement) also exist in nore than one versionl these are
noted in the comments accompan\)ring the analysis of the agreernents in
Part III.
Certain issues still outstand.ing with sone participants may call in due
course for a special Council decision.
The Geneva Protocot (tglg) annexed. to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and" Trade contains the results of the nultilateral tariff negotiations.
By arrnexing their lists of concessions to this Protoool the Community
and the cowrtries which took part in the Tokyo Round will give their
undertakings on tariff cuts force of law under the General Agreement. ftre
list of the Commrmityrs new ooncessions is among those so annexed.. Ttre
Protocol wirl be open for e.cceptance, bx signature or otherwise, by the
participants in the Tolryo Round r:ntil 30 June 1980; it will enter into
force on l Jarruary 1!80 for those having accepted. it by that d.ater md
for the other participants, when they have accepted..
The Commission proposes that the Counci L concLude this ProtocoL.
I
The coneessions
cowrtries, will
presented to the
Ihe ama.ngements
the markets and
of certain cou::tries, notably Australia and some d.eveloping
be includ.ed. in an Add.itional Protocol which will be
Council at a later date for conclusion.
on certain agricultural products are aimed at stabilizing
preventing excessive price fluctuations.
t
The fur341g-e!q-e-rl:L-Leger4rng-B9v!ng-Eg Gw/zSg) represents the negotiating
partnerst d.ecision to improve their laaowled-ge of the market and. narket
trends by rneans of inforrnation and. consultation rnachinery, and" to improve
narket access through bilateral arrd plurilateral ooncessions. 
- 
An
International Meat Council is set up with these aims in view.
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The Connlssion proposes that the Cor.rncil conclud.e the Anangernent (text
reprod.ucect in Part III, Section 2).
The fnternational Dairy Amansement (trtnfpf/e Annex A+3 as anend.ed by
vW/ne/w/49) alns to improve international cooperation, fIIg!-4iP by
setting up an Inter:rational Cor:ncil to assess the situation and. outlook
for the world. narket for dairy products; the Cowrcil is empowered. to
id.entify solutions to remed;r the situation :if necessary.
The Arrangenent also lays down certain price disciplines, and inproves
market access by means of the concessions contained in the bilateral
agreenents on the cheese sector.
At the moment there are two versions of this agreern,ent, one of whi.ch has
been initiallect only by Hrrngary and Ronania, who also initialled. the
first version.
The Commission proposes that the CounciL concLude the Arrangement in the
version which has been wideLy accepted (see Part Ij.I, Sect'ion 2).
AEreenent on Technical Samiers to Tra.d-e (Ct'l/Z7O); this includes a number
of nrles of conduct for parbicipating cor.mtries cor:.cerning the fonnulation
of stand.ard.s, testing, and certification of confornity with stand.ards. It
rill encourage nore rrniforu standards, in particular by gaining w"id"er
acceptance for international stand.ards, and reaffirns that the adoption of
stand.ard.s nay not be used as a d.isguised mea,rrs of provid.ing add.itional
protection for the p'artiesr ind.ustries.
Tkre Agreenent also reqrrires the parties to take such neasures as nay be
availabLe to then to ensure that loca1 governncent authorities and
norFgovexnmental bod.ies conply i'rith the provisions of the Agreement,
The Coruniseion p"oposes that the Council conclude this Ag-reement.
I
I
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(ot't/Zl Z) requlres the part icipating
oorlrtries l$Sf-"+" to provlde suppliers btctcting for certain public contracts
with the sa,ne treatnent as d.onestic suppLiers (national treatnent) and.
suppliers of a^ny other party to the Agreement (non-<llscrinination). It thus
ertend.s the ecope of these C,eneral Agreenent rules to a,n area of trade which
had fornerly been expressly 6xclud.ed.
Ihe Agreenent provid.es that a certain number of the contracts anarcled. by the
central- government entities covered by the Agreenent are subject to its
provisionsl they d.o not appLy, however, to procurement by regional and. 1ocal
authorities. lBrere is a speciaL amangenent with the llnitetl States ainecL at
preventing the cunent level of preference ln contracts awarded. by such public
authorlties from risi-:rg aborre a certain linit. lllrere is also provision for
a review of the scope of appLication of the lgreenent three J'ears after its
entry into force.
{he Comission proposes that the CounciL conoLude this Agreenent'
ltre Aeg:e.e,npp3-olr Tra"de jEr Ci.rril. Aifcraf,t (An/Zll) provid.es for:
the elinination by 1 Ja^nuary 1lB0 of all custons duties ancL sluiLar
charges of a"rqr kind. Levied. on the i"lrportation of prod.ucts used. in
civil aircraft, as lfstecl in an ainex to the agleementr ild on repairs
on civil aircraftl
Z. the application to trade in civil" aircraft of the Agreenent on [bchnical
Sagiers to [bade and the Agreenent on Subsid.ies Cor:ntervaili-ng Measures;
3. undertakings on official intervention in the sale or purchase of civil
aircraft;
4. the prohibition of guantitative restrictions and. inport llcensing
requi-renents which would. restrict inports of civiL aircraft in a nanner
inconsistent with GATT provisions.
I
1,
o
Si.,i., {jumnission proposes that the Council concLud.e this Agreenent.
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be A.greenent on Inten>retation a.nd. Anplication of Arl;icles VI. XIII aJrd. FCTII
@t on lbriffs ard Ibq$je (Sutsid.:ies/Countervailing Measures)
(Ol"t/Zll) contains d.ef:Lnitions ancL rules of procedure aimed. at ensuring the
uniforn interpretation and. application of the provisions of the General
lgreenent relating to r;ubsidies ancL their effects on internatlonal trad.e
(lrticles W, XIn and. )OUII).
It includes weLL-d.efinerd. injury eriteria as a corditlon for the imposition of
countervailing cLuties on subsid.izecl. iuports, and. requ5rres the clenonstratlon of
a cause-a.nd..-effect relertionship between the subsiclizedl inports a^nct the injr:ry,
llhe Connlssion proposec' that the Cor:ncil concl.ud.e thisr Ag3eenent.
Ihe Agreement on Implenrentation of lrticle 1l-I of the Cleneral Asreenent on
Ibriffs a^nd bad.g (enti.-nupud @rw/n@w/ZJ2 Rev. 1 as a,mendect by u/2i8)
-
upd.ates the 1958 anti-d.unping cod.e. It lays d.own a consistent set of rules
for contracti:eg Fartieer seeking satisfactory solutionsr to d.unping wltbin the
framework of the Genera.l .0greenentr I
It improves the transparency of proced.ures, and. Lays d.own criteria for the
cletermination of injury' and its c&lls€r
At the monent there are two versLons of the .Agreement, one of whlch is
supported. only by Czechoslovakia, Ilwrgary and. Ronania, ntrich have also
initialled. the other version.
Subject to the resuLt of the cument talks on the al.terreative version, the
Comission proposes that the CounciL concLud.e the wid.elJr-approved. version of
the .Agreenent (reprod.ucecl in Part III, Section B).
t
a
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llre AsreFment oq Imeort J4censjlq'Roce.d.ures (CW/ZAA) i:rvolves undertaking
to conply with certaj:r rules on automatic and non-automatic licensingr t'rhich
are mainly ained. at sinplifying the admi-nistrative proced.ures and practices
used. i-ra international trad.e, and ensuring their transparency arid. fair a:td
equitable application and. nanagenent.
ltre Commission proposes that the Council conclude this fureement'
l[?re Agreement on Iuolenentation of Article \III of the General Agreement on
(Ywx/w@w/22) Rev. 1 as a,nended by
Wltt/Wt{W/252) is d.esigned. to ensr:re a nore uniform application of the general
principles set out in ArticLe VII of the General Agreenent. Its ain ls to
establish a s;rsten for d.etermini:rg the vaLue of good.s for customs purposes
which is fairn i.€. based" on commercial practice and i:acorporating the best
features of the various systens ln current use, uaiformr i.e' based. on five
nethods of valuation neeting simpLe crlteriar and neutral, ir€r prev€nti:eg
the artificial raising of customs values for protectionist purposesot
At the nonent tbere are two versions of this Agreenentr one supported. only by
Argentina, Spain, Czechoslovakia, Ifturgary antl. Romaniar the latter three countries
havlng also initialled. the first version. Talks are continui:rg in Genevar nainly
with sone d.eve}oping countries concerned, to try anil resolve the renai-ning
problens.
Subject to the resuLts of the talks on thee.l.terna*1ve vorsion, the Oomnission
proposes that the Council conclud.e this .0greenent"
lltre Ape.eeuent on llbasures to d.iscor:ra.ee the Inportation -of Counterf,el-L 'Gqqlg
----r - l-. ja
$/qgll) is aesigned. to cliscoura6e iaternational trad.e in such goods.
;
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The oontracting parti.es therefore r:nd.ertake to do ever;rthing possible r:nder
the .0greenent to prevent the saLe or resale of cor:nterfeit good.s.
The Agreement does not af fect the Leq'isLation of ther Contracting Par ties ret.at'ing
to industriaL pncpenty r"ights.
Given that this Agneerment has at present been made onLy on a bi Later aL basis;
between the E.E.c. and the United States/ arrd that cliscussions are continuirrg
to obtain the support of othen participants, the Conrmission wiLL not present:
proposa Ls to the Counci L f or conc Lud'ing th'is Agreemetnt unti I a Later date.
2. Dnaft d.ecisions. resolutions and- d.eclarations o:f the contracti-ne parties
the terts prepared by the trbamework Group (Umrt/rn/O) Uave their basis in
paragraph ! of the Tolkyo Declarationn which carlls fo:r nimprovements in the
internationaL framewo:rk for the conduct of wr:r}l tx'arierf. the participants
in the negotiations irlentifieil. a nunber of j"*:s;ues, freLllng wrd.er five
headi:rgs a,nd reached" ir" consensus on a comprelnensive solution. llhis conprises:
i. provisione grouprld. under the head,ing nlifferential a,nd nore favourable |D
treatnent, recip:rocity and. fuller participation of d.eveS.oping countriesrl
(ro:nts t and 4);
ii. a Draft Declarat:ion on trad.e measures taken for baLance-of-paJments
pur?oses (roint :za);
ili. a *ert entitled r'tsafeguarcL action for d.evelopnent prrposestt (foin* et);
iv. a Draft ll:rd.erstand.ing regard.ing notification, oonsultation, d.ispute
settLenent and. surveillance lfoint :);
vr &n ilnd.erstand.ing regald.ing eic,port restri.ctions md. charges (foint 5).
'lhe gtrestlons of the .Legal forn a.nd the entry J:rto force of tbese texts, which
are to be adopted by l;be contracting parties, have yet to be settLed..
Itrre Cornpission proposes that the Councll approve the su.bsta^noe of these
terts (reproduced. in Part III, Section 12). ;
I
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Bre ilhrLtilateraL A.sicultural trba.ruework is in the forn of a reconnendatlon
(UfV 27) by the negotiating parties to the contracting parties for the
cstablishrnent of appropriate consultative nachinery with functions to be
tlefined..
Sre Comission prqposes that the Cor.urciL give approval to the prirrciple of a
Decision to that effect by the contracting parties (text reproduced in
Part IIf, Section 2).
f. Protocols of accession to the Geneta-l-Ageqment
Accession protocols for Colonbia a^nd. the Phltippines were negotiated in the
fra.nework of tbe ItlTNs.
llbey are sta^railarcL GATI accession protocolsr ed have annexes setting out the
two countrtest tarlff concessions.
t lhe Comission prqposes that the Council concl-uiLe these protocoLs (see
Part III, Section 1 ).
lGgotiations for the accesslon of lflexico are still urder way.
;
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B. Bilateral ameene:nts and. exchansee of le1llers
Und.er the MINs the Co:mnunity also negotiated, rrith ce:rtain of its partners
a series of bilateral agreenents, partly in tlre forn of exchanges of letterst
to clarify their reciprocal rights and obligat,ionsl. llhese agreernents are
listed beLow under twc head.ingF 
- 
general anrl agricultural.
The Connission proposrss that the Council app:pove these agreements and
exchanges of Letters.
ffiNERAL
A.1 Agreenent reacherl in Paris on 1) Jwre 1979 between oertaj.n participants
in the Agreenent on T:rade in Civil Aircraft (iXECr Canada, Japan, Swed"en,
United States) on rec:Lprocal consuLtation rights in ciese of withd"rawaL of,
tariff concessionsg
4.2 Exchange of letters wj.th the United States on possible ertension of
restrictive procuremerrt practices in the USA arui rese"ve by the European
Conmunity on its appl:Lcation of the Agreement; on Government Procr:renent in
this connection.
ASRTfiJLTU-RAL SECTOR
8.1 Arrangenent between the United. Sta*es arrd. the Comnwrity concer.ning
cheeses and letter rel.ating to that Amangeme,nt;
8.2 Exchange of letters between the Connunil;y and tire Unj-ted. States concerning
the poultry sectorl
8.3 Exchange of letterrs between the Comnunit;y and. the lJnited" States concernj-ng
rice I
8.4 Exchange of letterrs between the Communit;y and ttre United. States concerning
the elinination of the Wine 0a11on Assessnent I
8.5 Exohange of letters between the Comnr:nity and. thLe United. States concerni.ng
high-quality beef;
8.6 Exchange of letters between the Community and th.e United. States concerning
fresh, chilled and. fro,zen beef ;
1Th" t"*bs of these exchanges of letters are reprod,uced. in Part IIf ofthis reportr either in Section 2 
- 
Agriculture and fisheries 
- 
or in other
sections according to the non-tariff field-.
a
a
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B,? Exchange of letters between the Community and. Canada concerning
' *ality vrheat I
3.8 Arrangement between the Commrrni-ty and Canada concernlng cheesel
8.9 Menorandr:m of Understand-ing (results of bilateral negotiations between
the Delegations of New Zealand and the Connunity) witir the following attachments:
1. New Zealarrd.rs supplementary tariff offer nade in response to specific
requests fron the Conrnunity;
2. New Zealalad import licensing offer made in response to specific reqtrests
frorn the Community;
3. Joint d.iscipline anangenent between New Zealand and the Comnunity
concerning cheesel
4, Arrangernent between New Zealand. and the Conmunity concerning beef.
8.10 Agreed record dated 29 l{ay 1979 ot conclusions reached" in bilateral
negotiations between the Connunity and Australia, with the following annexess
1. Australian concessions to the Cornnunity,
2. Australian concession on rrfancy cheesettl
8.11 Anangement concerning beef between the Argentine Republic and the
Connunity;
8.12 Anang€ment concerning beef between the Eastern Republic of Uruguay
and the Comrnunity and. letter relating to that Amangement I
8.13 Arrangernent concetning beef between the Hungarian Peoplers Republic antt
the Conmunity;
B.'|.4 Arrangernent concerning beef between the Socialist Republic of Ronania
and the Connunity;
8.15 Anangenent concernj-ng beef between the PoLish Peoplets Republic and.
the Connunity.
C. Other docr:ments establishgd. d.uriJlg the negotiations
During the negotiations various docurnents were d.rawn up whichl in contrast
to the nultilateral and bilateral- instruments referred. to in points A and"
B above, invol-ve no undertakings on the part of the Conmr:nityi
o
I
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These terbs are listed" below;
The Comnission proposes that the Council take note of the terts listed" in
Section (i); the ot.her terts, in Section (li)r a,re being presented for
the CounciLrs info:m,ation:
(i) Terts to be not,ed by the Cor:ncil:
A.3 Letter to the U:aited. States concerning the neerl for an effective balance
of rights a1rd. obLigations between participants in t.he Agreement on Technical
Bagiers to Trade anrl a declaration by the E\ropean Cornmunity relating theretol
A.4 Letters address,ad to certain participants in t.he Agreenent on Trade in
Civil- Aircraft (Canada, Japan, Switzerlandr Sweden, USA) relating
to the interpretatio:a of the tem nnilitary aircraftfr in the IEC tariff;
A.5 Letters between the ffiC and the Unlted States ,olarifying the interpretation
to be gtven to oertaln concessions offered by the Buropeant Comrnunity and. by
the United. States in the lists amnexed. to the Agreernent on Trade in Civil
Aircra,ft;
A.6 Letters to Canarla concerning the Canadian rese:nvation to its List of
entities annexed. to -bhe Agreenent on Government Pror:urernent (possible withdrawal I
of the Canadian Depa.:rtment of the post offioe) ancl :neservation by the Comnr:nity
of its position if the balance of advantages in this agreernent shoula be
nodified by any such withdrawall
4.7 Letters between the E\uopean Conmunity and the United. States relating
to the interpretatiorr to be gtven to article 6.2 of the Agreenent on
TrrFlementation of Arl;icle VfI of the C'eneral Agreenent on lleriffs arid.
Trade (oustons valuai:ion) I
A,8 Letters between the European Cormunity anct the United States concerning
the application of tire Arnerican Selling Price nethoil of valuation to certain
chenical products in the period. prior to the abolitj.on of this systen on
1 July 1980;
o
]
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8.16 Letter dated 2{ July fron the United States to the Connission
concerning interpretation of the brief insert in the Subsid.ies Cod.e
cLarifying Article :firf (3);
3.17 hovincial statenent of intentions with respect to sales of alcohoLio
bevera6es by provinciaL narketing agencies in Canad.a and letters relating
to that statement I
B.1B Conmunication fron the Swiss trbderaL Authorities d.ated 6 September ig79
concerning the nonopoly d.uty on Cognac and. Arnagnac and. acknowled.genent of
receipt d.ated 1{ Septenber 1979.
(ii) ferts presented to the Council for infornation:
4.9 Letters from the Commission to certain participants in the Agreenent
on Trade in CiviL Aircraft reLating to further discussion of the product
coveraqe of the aqreement in the futune;
4.10 Agreed minutes of d.iscussion between participants in the Agreenent on
Trade in Civil Aircraft relating to the clarification of certain cruestions
in connection with this Agreenentl
A.'l1 Letters between the E\.rropean Community and Japan clarifying certain
points in the Japanese offer a^rurexed. to the Agreement on Governnent fuocurement:
A.12 Letter fron the Connission to the United States on the subject of
future proposals to be nade on the definj.tion of kraftLiner (4B.Ot C II)
in the EBC tariff;
A-13 Letter fron the Commission to the United States on the subject of the
duty free tariff quotas applicable to coniferous prywood" (44,15) in future
years;
t
t
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8.19 Exchange of letters between the Conmission and the United States '
concerning tlistil.Led spirits ;
8.20 Letter dated 27 Jtt]-y 1979 fron the Courniss:Lon to the United. States
concerning the Coromunityrs concession on table grapes.
f
t
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SECTION 1I
The decisions and measures relating to the conclusion of the negotiations
A, Legal basis of the deciqions and
According to the Comrnissionr the Comrnunity has, overall, the necessary
powers to subscribe to the international connitments contained in the
instruments which it is proposed that the Council ad.opt' without a^r1y
need for the Member States to participate too.
these powers derive from Article 113 of the EBC Treaty' combined, in the
specific case of the tariff concessions relating to ECSC prod.ucts, with
Article 72 at the ECSC Treaty. Sven though some of the instnxrents rnay
have an effect in other areas, their actual purpose is to regulate
various aspects of international trad.e, this being aJr area which
und.eniably falls within the sole powers of the Cornmwrity, under the
heading of trade policy.
B. List of the decisions and neasrrres which the Commission recomnend.s
that the Council adopt
1. Decisions concerning the conclusion of the ageenents
The Connisiion recommends that the Council adopt the following d.ecisions:
i. Decision approving the nultilateral agreeraents (1) mentioned
in Section I.A.1. (see Arueex I);
ii. Decision approving the bilateral agreenents nentioned in
I.B. (see Annex II);
iii. Decision approving the Protocols on the accession of
Colonbia and the Philippines to the GA[T, as mentioned
in Section I.A.3. (see Anner III).
I
I
(1) with the exception of the Agreement on Counterfeiting, see page 28.
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2. 
.Ggg;ll--lg.gisions statine the Connuni.tvrs approval of the future
decisj-ons. resolutions and statements to be, adopled by the
Contractins Parties to the GATT
[tre Cornnission proposes that the Council express lts agreement, by
inclusion in the list of its decisions, on the terts drafted by the
Legal Fbamework Group and on the tert concerning the nultilateral
agricultural frarnework, nentioned in Section I.A.2.
3. Council Decision noting the non-contractual negotiation doer:-urents
fhe Commission proposes that the Council note, by inclusion in the
list of its decisions, the non-contractual documents referred. to in
Section I. C.(i).
a
a
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SECTrj[I rI]
pR0cEnuRES FOR TIIE CCI{MUNITTTS PARTICIPATION IN TIm AIXVIINISTRATIITS
BODIES PROVINT]D FOR 3'T THE ACREU'IIn{TS
The majority of the wiuLtiLateraL Agreements estabLish Committees made up of
nepresentatives of the signatories which are responsibLe for certain functions
in the management of the Agreements. Procedures for consultation and for
dispute settLement are aLso incLuded" These pnocedures are either those in the
GeneraL Agreement'itseLf to which the Agreements make neference or of a more
spec.ific character but nevertheLess derived from the G.A.T.T. procedures and
pract'ices whjch have been deveLoped from them.
The Connission consid.ers that the Conmunityrs participation in the
administraiive bodles provlded for by the agreements referred. to
in point I.A.1. should conform to the practice hitherto followed
by the Cornrnunity und.er frtr, and that in particular:
the Menber States should. take part in the bod.iesr work on
a basis which would. all-ow their presence to be identified
within the Connunity d.elegation;
(ii) the positions to be adopted by the Conraunity in these
bodies shoul"d be d.etermined in accordance with the
custornary procedures at coordination meetings to be held
beforehand; due account would be taken of tbe specific
interests which ar:y of the ltlenber States night put
forward; if i.nsu::mountable d.ifferences of viewpoint
emerged at the coordination neetings, the Conrnunity
representatives would adopt a ftpend.ingfi position r*ithin
these bodies, until a solution was found. within the
Article 113 Comittee, the Perna.nent Representatives
Conrnittee or, where appropriate, the Council.
(iii) the coumon position will be expressed within the bodies
by the Commissionl Menber States d.irectly and specifically
affected by the natter und.er discussion would be able to
intervene, where appropriatel their statements would have
to fit into the context of the conmon positi.on deterui.ned
beforehand and would be designed to support a^nd develop
this position.
\1/I
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SECTION W
l,leagr.rres concgning the internal implementat:Lot glthe agreeme.nts by
the Connunity
W virtue of their oonclusion by the Conununity, the agreenerrts will be
birding on the Connurnity institutions and the ldember States (.O,rtiote 228(2)
of the EFC treaty), which will thrrs be obliged to o,bserwe their provisions.
It appears fron d.ecj.sions of the Cor:::t of Justice that the provisions of
international agreements conclud.ed by the Corrnuuity prevail in the event
of conflict over nrles of irrternal law and. confer on interested. parties
the right to rely upon then before the courts where such provi.sions are
self-executing.
Most of the multilateral agreements that emerged. fron the Mrltilateral
Trade Negoti-ations srtipulate that the parties accep,ting then vrill have
to ensure, not later than the d.ate on which the said. agreements enter
irbo force for them, that their 1aws, regulations a,nd adninistrative
proceclures are compa,tible with the said agreements"
These principles form the fbamework within which thre Connrrnity institutions
and. the competent au.thorities of the Member States will have to take measures
to ensr:re the interrnl i:nplementation of the agreeurents signed. by the
Comunity, where the,se agreements entail precise 1egal obligations and
conseguently requir€, changes or additions to the anangemerrts in force
internally.
Accord.ing to the Conunission, nary provisions of the agreenents will not
entail arry special internal implementing measures. Sone of them sinply
d.eflne objectives or'rlles of conduct for the public authorities, for
which no internal legislqtive provisions are needed but to which the
Comnunity institutic'ns and the Member Statesr authorities will of course
have to ad.here. The,re are other provisions :L-4 t}re agreements which are
I
o
I
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Section fV
perfectly conpatible with the
would. be r:ecessary.
internal provisions in force and so no changes
On the other bd, there are provisions in the agreements which, in order to
be inplenented in a clear and effective nanner, will call for special measures
of interna.l Iaw.
In separate docu.urents the Comnission is proposing to the Council the
Comrurrity measures it thiriks necessary in this connection, particularly in
ord.er to bring into alignrnent with the agreenents certain provisions of existing
Comnunity law (for exa.nple: alignnerrt of Council Regulation (mC) l[o U03/68
of 2'l June 1166 on the rraluation of goods for sustoms pnrposes with the
provisions of the Agpeenent on lnplementation of Article VII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs ard rlbad.e).
Irrdications of the Commrnity neasures put forrnard. by the Coronission are given
in the d"ifferent sections of Itrt IlI of this reportr
The Council will have to act on these proposals in goocl time so thatr in
accord.ance with the agreernents, the measures in question can be ad,opted not
later than the time when the agreenents enter into force for the Comunity
following their acceptance.
The Comnission rese::ves the right to present to the Council at a iater date
f\rrther proposals for aqy Comraunity irnplernenting rneasures that mlght prove
necessary in the light of experienceo
I
I
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T'ORMALIIIES AIID DEADL]:IMS TOR ACCEPTAI{CE OF TT{E AGRMXIIENTS LECATLT BIIIDING
-
0N fiq colg{ulrjfY
A. Acceptance fornaiities
1. I6r1ti1ateral a€rerements
Fbllowing adoption by the Council of the acts ooncerr:ri-ng the conclusion of the
a,greements, the Connur:rity will have to sign an jlstrunnent of acceptance. tr'or
the Director--GeneraL of the GAflI this fornali.ty will constitute the Connunityrs
acceptance of the agrerenents and will nea^n that it isr bor:nd. by then at
international leveI.
Itre tlecision referrecl. to in section II.3.1 contains ar provision authorizing
the Presiil.ent of the Cor:ncil to appoint the person aurthorized. to bind the
Conmrnity.
2. SilateraL a&eem€,nts
&e bilateral agreenerrts take the forn of exchanges of letters.
ttre d.ecislon on ths s6rncLusion of these agreenents, referred. to ln section
IIr 3.1o authorizes th.e Presid.ent of the CounciL to appoint the person
eupowered. to take whatever neasures nay be reguired. to glve practicaL effect
to the Comr:nityrs und.ertakiags in respect of *he rtatters covered. by the
a6reements.
B. Acceptance d.eadlines
The factors which are relevant to the deadlines for acceptance are set out at
the end of Part I of th'is report, under the heading "fmplementation of the
resu lt s".
I
3
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SECTION VI
PUBL ICATION ARRANGINMITS
['he Comnission proposes that all the multilateral and bilateral agreenents
it presents to the Council for conclusion be reproduced in the 0fficial Journal,
except for the lists of its partnerst tariff concessions (some 4 5AO pages).
These will be published" by the GATT Secretariat.
o
I
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Annex 1
COUNCIL DECISION
ON THE CONCLUSION OF TI{E MTITIIILATMAI AGREM{E}NS
RESULTINC FROM THE 197349 TIIADE NECOTI.O$IONS
IHE CoUNCrt OF THE EITROPEAN CoMMUNTIrES,
Itraving regard. to the Treaty establishing the Ebropean Econonic Connunity,
and in particular Artiole 113 thereof.
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the Etropean CoaI and Steel
Connunity, and in par4icular ArticLe 72 thereof,
Iiaving regard to the Reconmend.ation fron the Comnission,
Hhereas the nultilateral trade negotiations under t.he G.ffIT opened pursuant
to the Ministerial Declaration adopted in To\yo on 14 Septenber 19?3
resulted. in the following multilateral agreementsl
Geneva (lglg) hotocol to the General Agreenent on Tariffs and. Trade;
Arrangenent regarC.ing Bovine Meat;
fnt ernat ional Dai:ny Arrangenent I
Agreenent on Technical Barriers to Trad.e;
Agreement on Gove:rnnent hocr:renent I
Agreement on Tradre i.n Civil Aircraft;
agreement on rnte:npretation and application of articles vr, )ffr and"
)CKIII of the Gene:ral .Agreement on Tariffe and Trild.el
Agreement on Lnplr:mentation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade;r
Igreement on Inpo::t ticensing Proceduresl
Agreoment on lnplementation of Article VII of th<l General Agreement on
Tariffs and. Trad.e;
a
o
;
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Hhereas all the reciprocal ooucessions and. undertakings negotiated by the
Connpnity and the countries participating in the negotiatLons, as enbodied
in the above nultilateral agreements, constitute an acceptable resultt
HAS DECIDM AS FOTLOI{S:
Arti.cle J
1. The Geneva (1979) Protocol to the General .Agreement on Tariffs and
Trad-e is hereby approved on behalf of the E\ropean Econonic Comnunity
and the European Coal and Sbeel Comrnrxrity.
2. The following agreements are hereby approved. on behalf of the
Errropean Econonic Connunity:
Arangenent regard.ing Bovine Meatl
Int ernat ional Dairy Amangement I
Agreennent on Technical Bamiers to Trad.e;
Agreement on Governnent kocurementl
Agreenent on Trade in Civil Aircraft;
Agreement on Interpretation and Applioation of Articles VIr XUI
and. )OGII of the General .0greeroent on Tariffs and Trad'e;
Agreement on Inplenentation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and. Trade;
lgreenent on Import Licensing hoceduresl
Agreement on Implementation of Artiole VII of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and- Trade;
3. The terbs of the agreements referred. to in this Article are annexed.
to this Decision.
Artlcle 2
The P:resid.ent of the Council is hereby authorized. to desigrate the person
empowered to take such steps as are required by the agreements refemed
to in Article 1 in order to bind" the Conrnunity.
o
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Arurexj?
COUNCIL DECISION ON THE CONCLUSION OF TIM tsILATERAI, AG}?EEMENTS NTSIIITING
FF:01{ Tifl 1973-79 TRAIE NEC0TIATTCTNS
Ttm COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAT COIf}{UNITIES,
Having regard to the Treaty establishi.ng the European Economic Cornmr.rnity,
and. in particular Article 113 thereofo
i{aving regarcl to the Recommend.ation from the Commission,
l'{hereas the 197)-79 trade negotiations resu.lt;ed. :in mu}tilatera.l- ag:'eements
whi.ch were approved on behalf of the Commun:i.t;.y by the Council- Decision
cf n......orrroci rchereas, furthermore, gomer of the reciprocal concessions
anci. uldertakirrgs negrtiated. by the cornmunit;1 a;ra certain countries
participati-ng in the nepiotiations are ernbod.:Le,d in bilateral agreementsl
hlhereas the reci-procrrl concessions anEl- und.e:r"takings contained in those
bilateral agreements represent an acceptable result,,
HAS DECINED AS }'OLLOI{S:
Arti.cLg_L
The following are her:eby approved. on behalf of the trluropean Econornic Commun:i_ty:
Agreement r"eached. in Paris on 1J June 1pJ! tretween oertain participants in
the Agreement on Trade in civil Aircraft (mlc, canaila, Japar, sweden,
United States) on reoipres6fccnsuLtetion ligh.ts i"11 gase of withdrawal of
tariff concessionsl
Exchange on letters rrrith the Uni-bed. States on possib,le extension of restrictive
procurement practicesr in the USA and reserve by the European Community on
its application of the Agreement on Governnen.b Procurement in this corurection:
Amangement between the United States and the Cornmrurity eoncerning cheeses
and letter relating to that Alreement;
o
o
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Exchange of letters between the Community and the United. States concerning
the poultry sectorl
Excharrge of letters betr*een the Communiiy and the United. States concerning
rice I
Exchange of letters between the Comrnunlty and the United. States concerning
the elimination of the Wine Gallon Assessmentl
Excharige of letters between the Community and. the United" States concerning
high-quality beef;
Exchange of letters between the Comrnunity and the United States concerning
fresh, chilled and frozen beefl
Exchange of letters between the Conrmunity and Canada concerni"ng quality
wheat;
Arrarrgement between the Comrnwrity and Canad.a concelning cheesel
Memorasd.um of Understand.ing (results of bilateral negotj-ations between the
Delegations of New Zealarid and. the Community) with the following attachments:
1. New Zeala"ndf s supplenentary tariff offer mad.e in response to specific
requests from the Conrnwtity;
2. New Zealand. import licensing offer made in response to specific requests
fron the Community.
3. Joint d.iscipline arrangenent between New Zeai-and. and the Comnunity
concerning cheese.
4. Anangement between New Zealand" and. the Corununity concerning beef.
Agreed record. dated. 29 May 1979 of conclusions reached. in bilateral
negotiations between the Conmunity and Australia, with the following arnexes:
1. Australian concessions to the Corununity.
2. Australian concession on ftfancy cheeserr.
Amangement concerraing beef between the Argentine Republic atd the Couununity;
Arra.ngement concerning beef betreen the Eastern Republj.c of Uruguay and the
Cornnunity and letter relating to that Amangerentl
Amangement concerning beef betweentre Hungari-an Peoplers Republic and the
Conmwiity;
;
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Arrangement concerning beef between the Sociatist Republic of Rona.nia
and the Conmunity;
Arrangement conce.rning beef between the Po,lish Peopler s Republic an6
the Conmr:nity.
Article 2
The Presid.ent of lbhe cor:ncil is hereby authorize<i to d.esignate the
person enpowered. 1;o taJce such measures as are neoessary to give effect
to the und.ertakiry3s entered. into by the Comnr.uritlr in the areas covered.
by the bilateral ergreements listed in this Decisjron.
I
o
;
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Annex 3
COINICIL }ECISION ON THE CONCLUSION OF TIM PROTOCOLS FOR T}iE ACCESSIO}I
OF TI{E NEPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA A]{D TI{E NSPUBLIC OF T}tE PH]LIPP]NES TO
THE GATT
fi{E CoUNCIL 0F TI{E ELIROPEAN CCNIMUilTTTES,
I{aving regard to the Treaty establishing the E\ropean Economic Connunityt
a^nd. in particular Article lIJ thereof t
Whereas the Republic of Colonbia and the Republic of the Philippines have
entered into negotiations with the European Econonic Comnunity a^nd with
the other Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trad.e with a view to their accession to that Oeneral Agreenentl
Whereas the outcone of these negotiations is acceptable to the Communityt
HAS DECIDED AS trCILLOWS:
Article I
lihe Frotocols for the accession of the Republic of Colombia and of
the Repubtic of the Philippines to the General Agreenent on Tariffs
and Trade, the texts of which are aJlnexed. to this Decision, are hereby
concluded on behalf of the European Economic Corununity.
Article 2
[he Presid.ent of the Council is hereby authori.zed. to d,esignate the
person empowered, to sign the Protocols referred to in Article I in
order to bind. the Conmunity.
o
I
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TARIT'F ]{EGOTIATIONS
1. The Connunit,vts ob.iectives
Part flf
Secton 1
The common customs Tariff (ccl), which to star:t with was based on the
arithraetic meafl of the customs duties of the f'our customs zones of the
Comnunity as originally constituted, underwent cuts d.uring the Dillon
and Keruaedy Round negotiations and. was subsequently renegotiated. as
part of the exercise conducted within GATT under Article XXIV(6) when
the Custons Union was created. and the Cornnunit;y was enlarged. fn so far
as industrial products were concerned it was a reLat:ively low tariff,
with a homogeneous st:ructure and alnost entirely bou:nd. F\rrthermore,
because of the extension of the network of fre,e-trad.,e s€?senents conclud.ed
by the Connunity with various partners (nm^e,, Med.ite:nranean countries,
ACP) and the introduc-bion and inprovement of the GSp, this tariff applies
only to part of the HlCrs imports, basically those coning from d.eveloped
countries, state-trad:Lng countries and in part _ in the GSp context _ to
imports of sensitive products from norFassociated. developing countries.
The EECrs exports, however, continued. to cone up aga]-nst tariff bapiers 
-
which were often high 
- 
on the principal narkets of our d.eveloped. partners.
Though zero or relatj.vely low d.uties often applied t;o prod.ucts which were
not na.nufactured in ttre country concerned. or prod.uced. by a highly
conpetitive domestic i.ndustryr our partnerst customs tariffs inposed on
certain products artd- erven entire sectors high duties that provided. protection
which was all the nore, effective in that it was selective and had by and
large renained' intact despite & succession of tariff negotiating conferences.
rn addition, with the exception of the United states the d.egree of bind.ing
und'er GATT of our partnersf tariffs varied. consid.erably and d.id not offer the
d.egree of legal protection accord.ed by the Connunity.
rt is therefore not surprising that the corumrni.ty, basing itself on its
experience in the preceding round.s of negotiati.ons, argued. for the application
of a fo::nula which cou,ld. be applied as generally as pr3ssl|1e, and which,
while significantly rerlubing tariffs, wouLd. at the sane time
o
O
I
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harnon:ize thern. This harnonization, blr levelting out the d.ifferences
in the various tariff profiles, was to create fairer terms of trade, while
the problens of reciprocity would have to be settLett during the negotiations.
These objectives, elready contained in the overaLl approach, were spe1.t
out in the Corurcil Directives of 1O February 1975. At the aarne tine, in
view of the profounci changes in the international econonic situationl the
Comnunity considereci that the negotiations shoul-d be conducted in such a
vlay as to contribute to full enplo;rnent for its workers ancl to its
econonic developnent"
2. The negotiations
Unlike in the case of the preced.ing negotiating rorxrds the technlcal aspects
of the tariff negotiations wrder the MINs lrere very thoroughly prepared,,
thanks to the work done W the GAIT Secretariat under the directlon of
the Tariff Stu{y Group. This tine an enormous anowrt of information on
tariffs and inport statistics covering all the d.eveloped countriee was
assenbled. on tape.
The Tolqyo Deolaration stlpulated, only in this fielcl, that the negotiations
on custons d.uties shouLd be cond.ucted" ttb;r enploynent of appropriate
fornulae of as general application as possibleff.
Pending the entry into force of the Trad-e Actr which gave the United- States
President extensive powers in tariff nattersl, the Tariffs Group set up ty
the TNC was able to make only nodest progress on certain prelininary
aspects, such as the d.efinition of basle d.uties. The d.iscussions on
the reduction fornulae rapidly highlighted very substantial differences
1^ttitity to abolish
by up t,o 6$o.
o
I
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as to the approacheer envisaged. The commu:r:ity, Jer,pan, switzerland
and the ScarrdinaviarL countries brought up thre rnatterr of harmonization
arrd to that end put forward. various formulae. Ther united statest
rvhile not refusing el modicum of harmonizatiott, arglLed. for an
approach which was essentially linear and arn-bitiousr in terms of the
degree of reduction. Canada stated. that it was mainly interested in
elininating 1ow d.utj.es and. achieving free triade in forestry products
and non-ferrou-s net€rls. Australia and Soutln Africra stated thatr in
view of the structure of their economies arrd tradel they were in favor:r
of a product-by-prod.uct approach.
In Septernber 19??, lLowever, the Couununity anrl the tinj.ted States reached
agreenent on a:r approach to be used for cond:ncting the negotiations'
Basically, the conpromise involved. the following points:
i. use of the fornnula proposed, try the srariss Delegation; this
algebraic formula stipulated- reductions which met the objective
of harnonizatj.on in that the higher the initial dutiesr the
bigger the out;s;
ii. the objective of an average cut of the order of 4V';
iii. the possibilit;y of total or partial ex,3eptiorrs to the fornulal
iv. the staging of' the cuts over a period. of B yerars as from
1 January 1!BCr, the cornnunity specifying that; tbe start of the
sixth stage ccruld be deferred. if the eeonorric eireunstances at
the time justified so doing'
fhe nain d.eveloped cror.rrtries agreect to this r:onproniset which was nott
however, officially formalized within the Ta.riffs Group.
In Jaluary 1978t ther main partners lodgeci their prerlininary offers of
tariff crts. The Clomnunity stated that it was pr€rpared to apply
a
o
a
t
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the Swiss forrnula with a coefficient of t61 to the whoLe of its tariff,
without aqJr a(ceptions, giving an avera€e red.uction of {V/o. It reserved
the right, howeverr to adjust its offer in the light of an assessnent of
the quaLitative ancl guantitative value of its partnerst offers so as to
achieve ad.equate reciprocity. The llnited. States ancl Japan aLso lodged.
offers basecl on applicatlon of the Srdss fornula with a coefficient of
14r trut with a list of exceptions. Canada applied a conplex formula
d.erivecl fron the swiss fornula, also with exceptions. The Ebropea,n
cormtries generally followed. the Coununityru approach.
An analysis of the offers nade by our principa} partners showed that,
while anor:nting to red.uctions of 4V/" o, more on average, they d.eviated.
significantly fron application of the agreed fonnula and these deviations
ran counter to the objective of harnonization ancl af,fected. the Connr:nityts
export interests. The United. Statesr offer contained. a large nunber of
proposaS.s to abolish low cluties or nake bigger cuts in then than were
called. for ty the fornular whiLe nan;r duties were nade subject to total
or partia3. exceptions (speciar steels, ballbearings, nmerous textire
productsr glass and gLass!{are, titaniun, footwear, ceranic tiles, lorlves,
gloves) and these duties !{ere generally high. In addition, for d.utieg
of nore lhan 216/o the United.. States coul-d not apply the Sr+iss fornula in
fuLlr since there r,tas a 5V/o cetLing on the naximun red.uction. Canadatsl
offer involved, althor:gh to a Lesser extent, the same phenonenon of
bigger red.uctions than in the fornula
1Th" 
'snisstt fornula is as foLLows:
il;K = final d.utyu=ffi r inwhich x=basicd.uty
rhe r.ower the coerricient,"*;"T;;iilt;il: ::.*-i:lermined'
For exanple, 1V/. a*y: coefficient 14 t 5.8/o
2poti"l orrer lodged ," 
""ilifi"i;?3, 
tf*ru;!;"' 
o,, 10 Aprir 1s78.
f,
*
.rl'
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for certain average cluties and exceptions for certain high duties (nunerous
textile products, glasswarel clocks, special eteel-s, donestic appliancest
footwear, certain chemicaLs). The Japanese offer ltas presented in the
forn of sgbstarrtial red.uctions, but starting fron legal rates significantly
higher than the rates appliecl., so that the real reduction was Less than
Z6"i furthernore, very low or zero reductions were envisagd for nost
textile productsl nearly all hicles, skins and l-eather, certain chenicalst
etc.
Thus, while presenting to lts partners requests for lnproveroent of their
offers, concentrating solely on the protlucts which they had nade exceptions
antl which doncerned its exports, the Connrrnity transrnitted to aL1 its
partners at the end of April 1978 a l-ist of possible withdranals. It also
arned itself, internal.lyl with a tfconclitionaLtr list to serve as a
bargaining,weapon in case its partnerst offers were not inproved. but
lowered instead.
Bilateral discussions with the nain partners over the periocl tr'ebruary-July
1!JB produced no improvement in their offers, Only Japan presented an
inprovement in June, rhich was consid.ered. inadegu.ate, for although the
reduction rate was increased to aror:nd. 25/" tne inprovement waer gtralitatively
of little interest as it reLated. to average or low duties and proclucts of
which the ffiC was not the principal supplier, whereas the requests for
inprovenent were virtualLy ignored..
I:r July the Connission therefore transmitted to the GAflI Secrertariat, for
circulation to all participants, a revised tariff offer which incorporated
the possible withdranal-s a,nnounced in April and certain prod.ucts on the
cond.itional list which interested Japan in particular (e.g. Dotor cars).
lt
ifi
l
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A phase of intensive bilateral negotiations got r:nder way in the autunn
of 1978. The negotiations with the United States were complicated by
the fact that the latter subnitted. a very confused offer on chenicals
subject to the A.nerica"n Selling hice' involving both conversion of
duties and offers under the MTt{s; this offer was considered unacceptable
by the Connrurity. !,Ioreoverr the United States enbarked upon
renegotiations under Article XXIIIIII concerning ceranic products, hato
woven fabnics a.nd the conversion of a'large nr:mber of specific or nixed
duties into 4lglg rates. At the end of Noveober 1978 they
announced. substantial adjustments of their offer ln the tertilest
chenicals and steel sectors. Reaoting to this a,nendment of the US
offer the Connission infomed its principal partners that it would be natrtng
withdrawaLs in the tertile sector (cond.itional list) a.nd. threatened. to nake
cha,nges ln other sectors. l[!he negotiations got bogged down ln the first
few nonths of thig year with the two partners concent:rating on priorlty
sectors or products: paper and electronics on the US side; chenicals,
steelr footwear and ceramics on the Connunity side. Tertiles were d.ealt
with separately in order to obtain reciprocal inprovernents. An 
-
ad referendun agreenent involving both inproveuents and certain
withdrawaLg was reached at the beginnlng of April. Ilhis agreenent was
onLy on cuts egu^al to or beLow the fornula, with the United. States
reserving the right to withdraw cuts above the fornula. In faot onLy
sone of the latter were wlthdrawn and here the formuLa cut was apptied.
Itith Japanr attenpts to obtain an inprovenent in that oountryfs offers on
products (agricultural a,nd. industrial) subject to duties whlch were high
and./or unbound. ended. in faiLure. Tlre two parties therefore oonfined.
tbenseLves to reoording the state of tbeir respective offers, with very
slight inprovoents on elthen slde. Laten, when Japa.n had withdrarrn
sone of its offers (fo[owing US rithdrawals of offers above the
fornula), tbe Connunity was in trrrn prorapted. to nake certaln a.d.justnents.
the negotiations with Ca.nada end.ed in agreoent at the begiruring of
Aprll' essentially on the basis of the prevlous offers. llhose conducted
rith Australla were not oonpleted. until l{agr.
i
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Finalization of the tarlff negotiations on the basis of provislonal
Iists drann up in nid.-Apri1 was scheduled for the end' of Jwrer but
oarne up against certain difficulties. lfirile the drafting of a
fariff Protocol did not raise too na4r problens the procedur:e for
cheoking the lists turned out to be more conplex tha.n anticJ.pated.
the difficul.ties arose basically in connection vrith the United
Statest listr which contained na.nJf arnendments a.ndr aboVe allr a
quantitative and. quaHtative d.etenioration in the tertile sector'
orrlng to the offer being fo:mulated in tenns of ad. valorem <luties
on products liable to mixed duties. Before giving
lts agreenent to finalization of the negotiations the Connission
therefore withdrew certain offers in the textile sector. $re
Protocol rras open for acceptance on 11 July. On 13 JuIy the
Connission representative affixed. his signature ag authenticationt
subject to oonclusion by the E\ropea.n Connunities.
In ad.dition to the Connunity list, the Lists of the folloring
countries a,re annexed to the lbriff Protocol: Argentina, Austria,
Canada, Czechoslavakia; Egrptr Finla.nd, Hungaryr lceland, Jaraaica,
Japan, l{ew Zealand, Norway, Roma^niar South Af}ica, Sneden,
Snitzer1and., the United. States a.nd Yugoslavla.
llhe Austral.ia.n a.nd certain developing countriesr Lists w111. be
annered to a.n add.itional protocol which should be open for signing
by nid-l{ovenber.
a
t
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J. Overall rezuIts
It is difficult to caLoulate the overall tariff cut resuLting fron
the toiqro Round. the GATT Secretariatrs esti.nates regarding ten
d.eveLoped inport narketsl put the cut at around a third. if tt is
oaloulated on the basis of custons revenue. llhis regultr horever'
takes into acoount reduotions oalculated on the basis of the lega1
rates for Japan a.nd. Canada. If the cuts for those two countrles
are calculatecl. on the basis of the appLied rates the overall tariff
reduction cones to a*owrd. 2f/o.
the tariff concessiong are to be i-nplenented ln eight egua,l annual
reductlons starting in 1980 ocoeptl as a g€neral nrle, in three
sectors - textiles, steel a^nd aircraft - a,nd for a number of products
specific to each of the participa.nts ln the negotiations. Ihe
Agreenent on aircraft is to taJce effect on 1 Jarruary 1980 while the
concessions on textiles a"nd steel riII be lnplenented in sir equal
annual red.uctions beginning in 1982.
I At the end of a prellninary stage of five years the Connwrity will
exa,nine whether it is able to pass on to the second three-year stage.
the other participants hav,l also reserved their rigtrts in this eornnection.
The tariff cuts resrrlting, fron the negotiations include an importa.nt
elenent of harnonization as pointed. out by the GATII Secretariat:
ttln addition to the overall tariff outt the harnonization effect of
the Swiss formula should also be consid.ered an inportant achievenent
of the negotiatlollsr o. The differences in the national tariff levels
were d.ininished considerably. Finally, nention should be made of the
consolidation of a nr:rnber of tariff lines at the prevailing dutlrfree
rates.
...." As to industria] sectors, the deepest cuts have been concentrated. in
non-electrical nachineryr wood. prod.ucts, chenicals and transport
eguipment while Less-than-average reductions are being nade in the
textiles and leather and rubber sectors.tr
I lAustria, Canada, E\:ropean Comnunities, Finla^nd., Japa,n, New Zealand.,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States.
I
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lhe C ni11 aut ltg lnduetrial tariff W 25.#' vis-b-vls countlles
wltb rhiob Lt does not have a speolflo trade agreoent. After the
Sotyo 8ormd. nost dutl es (54 of dtrtiable Lnports) rr|ff be between
rt *a t$i 16.4o of dutiable inports nIIl roaLn subieot to dutLee of
betreen tfi A 1fr, sd,2.$ of inports rtlI bo subjeot to dutles
of betreen 1fi and.2$. ort of a total of 2 1oo dutlable tartff
Ilnes on\r onl rilL rem+ln subject to a duty of nore tban 2$
(lorrles subjeot to a duty ot 24)t 30 riII be tiable to dutles of
bctreen 1fr eg,ld,24. sd 150 will be llabLe to duties of betrcen
t6 ana \fr. |&e blggest cutg for tbe SC are in tbe airoraft
sector (tUe onfy scotor rhene suetons dutLeg dll be aboHshcd.) and
ln the ohenLoalg and. non-elcotrical nachLnery gootorg. In niew of
the econonlo a,nd social oondl,tions in oertal.n industrles there rare'
horevcrl relatively lor roduotl.ons or rutne at all for footwea,rn
notor cars and lornlest f,ertillzersr certa"Ln plastios and eLectronio
c@poaents.
United. States
&e United. Stateg nlll. reduce its Lndustrial tariff t0r 2815 f" rt)
if offerg above the fornula are takEn i.nto account and. W 26, B /" (t)
13 only that part conesponding to the fornula is incLuded in the
oase of oonoeesiong above the fornnla.
After the fokyo Rormd nost (64o) of the Unlted. Statest dutlable
i.nports fton all countries ril1 be liabIe to dutLes of lEss lrbaln, fi,
Custos duties riIl be abolished on i.nportg rorth lf OOO nilllon2
ln 1/16. Unitect States inports Llable to dutles in the 't4 to lyft,
tfr to zVft and ZV/" to 34 Uactcets tr.iU account for $ of total
dutiable inportq a,nd those subject to a duty of more thasr 34 r+fff
b€ of,.the ozder o? t,5 $
|he US concessLons were prinoipally in the airoraft, choloale,
non-ferrous netals, na,ohinery and. paper s€ctorg.
11h1" resuLt includ.es the abolition of oustons duties in tbe
4ircraft sector. Crud.e petroler:m is not taken into aCcount i-n the calculation.tOf rbioh ;! goO nillion for aircra^ft.
i
a
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Jflran
Japa,n will reduce its industrial tariff bV 4B/" on the basis of its 1egal
d.uties at I January 1)12 and 2Jf" on the basis of the rates applied in
1977. After the Tokyo Rou:rd the majority (neart1 6V) 1 of Japan's
duties will be 5f" o, less; 73 fi of imports will remain liable to d.uties
of between 1O"i, and. 1Jf", and.tr$fe,o duties between 1Jf" and,2Ofr. Imports
llable to duties in excess of 2@" will account for O.5/" of d.utiable
irnports. {he biggest cuts agreed to by Japan concern aircraft and
machinery.
Canada
gana.da will cut its tariffs by about 39 f" on the basis of its 1egal rates and by
about 34 /, on the basis of the rates applied. A majority (almost 44 %) ot
dutiable imports will be liabIe to d.uties of between 5/, and. 1O/", and' J6f,
to duties between 1Of" and" 1J/', However, 10% of d.utiable imports will
continue to be liable to duties between 2O% and 25/". The biggest cuts
are in the field of aircraft and nachinery.
The other developed. country partners with v"'hich the Comnunity negotiated 
-
Australia, New Zealand and. South Africa 
- 
offered. contributions only on a
rather limited number of prod.ucts, so the overall incidence of the cuts
will be negligible. fn the case of Australia and Neiv Zealand., however,
there ui1l be a greater degree of binding.
A Results by country
The results achieved" vis-d-vis the Communityrs main developed. partners
are as foIlor.is:
4"1 The United. States
o
This is the Communityfs
fi 4Q 17 ;::i1lion- worth of
frcr;r ihe EEC.
Iargest trading partner, and in 1976 i.t imported
dutiable ind.ustrial products, 25'/" of which came
I
'1^_
ualcuLatect
*Non-oi1.
on the basis of duti-able imports.
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The average bilateral ind.ustrial tariff reduct,i,cn is eLbout a th:-rd on either
side ( includ.ing aircrallt and offers above the fcrrmla)|. In working out the
reduction, if the part of the offers which goers beyond, the result arrived at
by application of the llornula is exclud.ec1, ther ,average bilateral reduction
comes to about 3L /", irrcluding the abolition of aircreift d.uties.
The ffiCrs major aim of tariff harmonization, a responrie to the large number
of US duties over 1! % *rd 20 f", has been largely achi.eved. The US tariff
will admitted.ly sti1l oontain high duties, since many of these were on
textiles, which in the main were not covered. try the rerd.uction formula.
Nevertheless, substantial concessions have been obtained. even in this sector.
The proportion of US imports fron the EEC srrbleet to iluties over 10 /" w:-LI
fall from 16.3 /, to 6l1', whil-e that of imports subject; to duties over 20 /o
goes d.own from {. B /" tct I.2 /o. After the negotiations only 185 head.ings,
rather than ?56 as nowr will renain above 20 dJI.
Results of great signillicance for the Conmrnit;y have been obtained. in certain
sectors.
i{ith regard. to chenical.s, in add.ition to an average bj-lateral- red.uction of O
the order of 35 /" on et.tiner side, the abolition of ther Arnerican Selling Price
(ASp) is one of the ma;ior achievements of the bilatereil negotiations i after
translating the rates relating to prod,ucts subject to the ASP into equivalent
d"uties, the ffiC obtainerd cuts in the very high effecti.ve duties (+O y" t,o 50 /"),
bringing them down to trelow 20 %. The uncertai.nty arlsing fron the ASP as to
the amount of d.uty to be paid. has been eliminated.
In add.ition, Itfuturetr produicts, i.e. ones not importerd into the United States
before I January 1978 or not manufactured in t;he Unlterd States before L l{ay L978,
wi-ll be liable from 1"iuly IpBO for the final r,ate conced-ed (t).
In the case of textiles, the cut in the US tar.i:ff for EEC goods ts 2'1.5 %. hu
red.uction applies to a number of fairly high duties wlLich were virtually
making trade inpossible. In this sector the Community has cut its duties vis-a-
vis the US by 22.6 /0.
(f) Ocoept for dyestuflls, where the cffe.red rates will. be fu11y applied in
five annual stages from the dabe of entry i:ato force of the customs
valuation code.
C
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As regard.s steel, v,rhere dutiable US imports from'lhe EEC are four times
EEC inrports from the US, the US has cut its duties on Commrnity good-s
by29.54" apart, from some legal exceptions concerning special steels.
This red.uction continues the process of harmonizat'ion in this sector
which began und.er the Kenned.y Round..
In the paper sector, rvhere there r;as strong US pressure for a substantial
cut, the Comnnrnity red.uction vis-&-vis the US is 28y',.
As regards other sectorsl the US has offered substantial tariff
reductions on machinery, transport equipment, ceramics and glass" It
has also offered useful cuts in the following fields:
(i) jewellery: rerluction i.n duty of over 2f J
| /:: \1.rr7 furniture: cut of about 5A 'fr'
Details of various US concessions of value to the Corumrnity rii-ll be given
in the breakdown bY sector.
The US concessions will take effect in accord.ance t';ith the schedule
d.escribed in the overall resultsl i.ee1 g€11€r3.11y spealcingr phased in
over B years: 1 Jarnrary 1)BO for aircraftl generally 6 years from
1 Janua::;l 1)82 for textiles and steel - -.'rith postponements or accelerated"
inpleme.:ntation for some prod.ucts and, for others, where cuts exceed
24 points 
- 
such as certain chemicals and textile products - phasing-in
over a pe:rior1 longer than B yeals to comply with a clause in the
US Trade Act rn'hich specifles a maximrm reduction of 3 points a year.
t
t
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4.2 J.ap?n
Particularly with rergard. to Japan, the aim in the 1;ariff negotiations
was to achieve a hi.gh level of harrnonization and of real improvement
in market access fol Comrsu.nity exports. I'lfforts were therefore
concentrated. on securing reductions in fiel.ds rrhich were protected. by
very high duties, artd on getting cuts on the duties effectively applied
in 1)ll, whereas ther Japanese ri/ere calcula*ing thei,r reductions on the
basis of the 1)12 letgal rates, Faced i;ith Japanrs refusal to concede
the Communityts priority claims, the Community r.ea,iijusted its own offers
to exclude, partialJ.;r or totally, sensitiver plodilcl;s from Japan.
Cverallr the balancer of ad.vantage in the rec:iprocal ind.u.strial offers,
in terms of tariff statistics, l-ies r,gith the EI;C: the',:eighted average
reduction in Japan?sr indusLrial duties ( t?? "base) r'is-3,-vis the
Community is of ti'.e orCer otl ;:J/,, whe:.eas l"h.,e equir,r.alent Conmuni-ry
reduction vis-5-vis .iap;rn is about 20!. Ii.oruever, these reciprocal
tariff cuts apply tc a ..iiateral trade bal-a,n,:e heal.ily tilted in Japanrs
favourr gi'u"ing Jirpa,rL'Lhe arivanta.ge in terms of actuLal customs receipts.
In terms of qr:a,iita1,ive results, Japan can a.Lso be seen to have retained.
high dutiesr lione of'r','hich are no-l bound, in such srectors of interest to
the commrnity a.s foctwear', leathergoods and r:ertairL textiles. Their
ag:'icultural eoncess,ions faII well short of lvhat might reasonably have
been expected (see chapter on agricultural negotiations).
Japan has rnade particularly significant concessions in the fielci o1'
aircraftr computers and office equipment, electrica,l machi.nery, cars and
toys. Honever, they should be seen in the context of the other barriers
to trade.
Japants concessions r,rill take effect r:n the l:asis of the legal rates over
an eight-year period. However, the japanese authorities plan to appry
the reduction au.tonomously, for all or some of the tariff headi-ngs on
which they have rnade concessions, on the rates
actually appli.ed.. fn some cases, they are even envisaging
ll
o
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autonomous improvements. However, Japan is looking for a similar gesture
from the EEC in return, in the form of faster implementatj.on for some of
the products of export j.nterest to it.
The implementation
r 
^O^1 April 1pU0, with
some cases.
4.3 Canada
of
an
Japanrs tariff cuts will probably start frorn
initial reduction of ZfB on the applied. rates j-n
o
Tkre Community is Canad.ats second largest supplier, accounting for 12.5 %
of the US {22 5OO million of Canad.ian imports for 19T6 (1), behind the
US (7A % of impor"ts).
the Etr wanted a red"uction in line with the Swiss formula, leading to cuts
in and harmonization of the high Canadian d.uties, and an increase in the
number of bound. hea.dings. fn the previous negotiations, Canada had.
benefited. from its partnersr concessions wj.thout offering satisfactory
reclprocal amangements. It had thus kept large numbers of high duties
and unbound" tariff headings.
In the Tokyo Round, Canada made a satj-sfactory contribution to the tariff
cuts by reducing a number of high d"uties and increasing bindings. These
concessions apply in the main to manufactured products.
In'view of the nature of its exports, Canada wanted d.uties on forestry
products and paper and. in the non-fenous metals sector to be substantially
cut or abolished aLtogether.
Canadar s Eebruary l97B tariff offer was based on a variant of the Swiss
formula, reducing the harnonization effect and comprising, yis-i-vis the
^- ^4E.cu, apoua z) 70 partial or total exceptions, 6O /, otters based. on the fornula
arrd. 1J /o offers above the fornula. TLre exceptions, howevet, were concentrated
on duties of 20 /o or over, while the offers going beyond the formula
; (f ) ntrtiaUe non-oil imports.
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concerned- duties of the order of 'L//o, with an a\rerage Cans.d.j-aJi tariff
incidence on ffiC goods of LJ.!/,. The offer includ"ed ma4y high-duty
exceptions in the field of terbiles, ft:rnitu.re, footwear and chenicals,
while ploposing to bind mmerous autononous red.uctions or suspensions
which had. often been decided on as a means of lowering prices in the
absence of arry domestic production. The ffiC 1;herefore acljusted. its
Janrary 1fl8 offer, f'or want of improvemerrts :Ln the Canadian offer.
Following ad"justments and improvements on either sid.el Canad.a offered
concessions anountirg: to u 3I%' reduction in :Lts tariff vis-d-vis the
ffiC, while the Comrnurrity offered a out of aborrt 3ffo2vis-d-vis Canada.
In the nachinery sect,or Canada offered najor r:oncegsions. Numerous machines
were offered at Lflr, 9.4 or even zeroi vacurul cleaners and fridges hrere
cut frora ZQ" +o IZ.Y), data processing equiprnent tct j.fle or zero from
rates of betweenJ-q. and 2@o. Other products, such as cars and car parts,
were red.uced. fron Lfl,t, to 9.5o. Bicycles fell from 2lffo to t3.4"3; skis
and. some accessories from ZV/" to LI4"; precious stones fron 2flo t,o l-3.flfoi
and. wallpaper from l'fl. to 7.flo.
l-tThe bound rates in Part II of Canad.ars list of concessions were based
on Part II boundL rates for the United. Kingd.om and lrela.nd., and on Part
"bourd. 
rates for the other Member States.
llncludirrg the abolition of duties in the air.craft gector.
'Inplementation as fron I Jarnrary 1983.
I
o
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Concessions were also nade by three other d.eveloped. partners 
- 
New Zealand,
South Africa and Australia 
- 
but in the form of product-by-prod.uct offers.
4,4 New Zealand.
New Zealand. offered concegsions (reductions or bind.i.ng) on its industrial
tariff for products representing imports from tbe Conmunity worth about
US $150 nillion in 19?6, the Conrnunity being the rnaj.n supplier of the
najority of the products involved. The weighted rate of reduction on these
concessions is about {$o. The value of the Comuunityts industrial offer
to New Zealand. is linited, since the courrbryrs interests are mainly in the
agricultural field. The Courmission considers the overall balance acceptable"
4.5 South AfYica
South Africats contribution, on a product-tf-product offer basisr covers
81 headings. Sone of these correspond. to trextt head.ings in the South African
tariff. South Africa says that the offer on a quarter of these head.ir:gsl.r talces the forn of binclirrg the absence of preferences-.
South Africats concessions affect yl of that courrtryts irnports from the
Comnunity.
They have not naterially inproved. its level of bind.ingr which was Low at
the outset.
It sbould also be polnted. out that for mar5r years South Africa has been
negotiating with the Comrunity under Article )OilIIII to mod.if! its concessions.
Although the Conmunityfs offer has been ad.justed. as far as possible ln the
light of the South African offer, there is still a clear inbalance, nad.e t{orse
\r the continual withdrawal of concessions.
:
a
'l
Efrrbound preferences generaLLy enjoyed by the Ltrrited Kingdon'
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{.6 Australia
The tariff negotiations with Australia were complicatecl by that countryrs
repeated changes of line. Australia had a relaubively high tariff, largely
unbound, and wanted. to offer its concessioner on the bresis of the rates applied
at I Jarnrary 1973, before the Zflo autononous rerd.uctio:n mad.e at the end of
1973. Having in trb.rch arrd April llJB put forward. its initial offers on
particular products, Australia offered in July 1$J8 t,c apply a Sviss-type
fornmla, with certain exceptions (tertiles, footwear, domestic appliances
and cars), subject to :reciprooity, particularly in thre agricultural sector.
At the end- of the nego'tiations, since it had failed to obtain reciprocity,
Australia reverted to ;en offer covering particular products.
itevertheless, the Commission nanaged to secure certai:n improvements in that
offer, which covers in'ports which totalled. some $30O million f'ob in L977-78,
conpared. with a Cornrnun.ity offer in the industrial seo:bor worth $240 nillion
cif in lyl5. This off,sr, which has not yet been fornia.lly lofued with GA1II
and will need to be annexed. to a supplenentary protocol, is nad.e up partly
of reductions, and, partly of bj.nitings of current, or sonetines ceiling,
rates. It will boost the level of Australiars bind.irgs, which will nevertheless
renain modest (about Zffr of all industrial imports from the mC).
Australiatg concesgions inclucl.e chenical products (pharnaceuticals, perfumes,
plastics), ceramic tiles, nachinery (motors, punps, d.:lsh-lrashirrg nachines,
tractors ancl agricultu:nal nachinery), electronieg (cornputers, generators,
transnission equipment,)r ad med.ioal and. measuring apparatug.
;
t
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4.7 State-trading countries
fn view of its position as regard.s the role of the tariff in state-trad.ir:g
countriesr the Community did. not present those countries with tariff
requestsr but instead tried unsuccessfirlly to secure increased" scope for
exports of certain products6
Hungary presented. a tariff offer based. on the application of the Sr,uiss
formula, but proceed.ed" to etipulate certain exceptions and withd"rawals.
Czechoslovakia also lofued a list of concessions includ.ing withdrawals
and cornrerting some Epecific rates into ad- valoren cluties; the Community
d.id. not negotiate with Czechoslovakia.
The same applies to Ronania, which annexed. a list of tariff concessions
to the Geneva kotocol. On that occasion the Cornrmrnity stated that the
annex d.id. not alter the position it had ad.opted on Romaniats customs tariff
at the time of that countryts accession to the GATT, and subseguently in
the working party responsible for reviewing the tariff, which had. not yet
completed. its examination.
The Oommunity also reserved. its position with regard. to Bulgariats list of
concessions. Bu1garia, though not a contracting party, circulated. a
statemert to which was annexed. a list of tariff concessions.
Polancl clid- not locige a tariff offer, as GATT has not yet exarni.ned. its
tariff.
In view of the lack of reciprocity fron state-trad.ing countries, the
Connunity cl.ecid.ed. to withd.raw from its tariff offer a rmmber of products
of which those countries are the nain erporters. State-trading countries
will nonetheless benefit from the tariff reductions granted by the ffi on
other products without making argr real concessions in return.
PAR'I' ITI
Secti-on 1t
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NB : A supplement giving a sector-by-sector breakdown will follow.
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AGRICIJITURE $TD FISHORIS
A.,VIULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS.
l. Orains Agreenen'l;
llhe objective fixed by the Comunity and its partne,rs had been to conclude
a ride-ranging grairrs a€r€enent, but the lin:Lted fl.eribility of oertain
erporting oorntries uith regard. to the basic pmblems at iesue (prices,
etocks) and the, in sorne cases ertreme, dena:nds of certain developing
csnntries conoerning; tbe sa,ue subjects nade :it inpc,ssibl.e for the Conuunity
anct other countries that were preparecl to adrcpt an intermedtate position
to reconeiLe the diJferent viewpointo"
llhe Unitecl l{ations Cionferenoe responsible fo:r negotiating such a new
arrangenent adjourrrc,d on ld FebruarXr this yeiar with:out havi"ng been able
to reach agreenent. It nevertheless neconmrEnded the Intemational tfheat
Council to ertend the present Arrangement (*rictr hals since been done) and
to pursue its work rdth a view to the resump'bj-on of' the Conference in the
near fr,rture in the c;ontext of the preparatorlyr Comittee established. in
June this year in London" fn this fortbcon:Lng work, the Conuunity shoulil
denonstrate the samel fixmness and also the sam€ op€rn+indedness that it
showed. at the Confer.ence with the objective of achieviag an Inte:reational
Agreenent covering eill grains and of working to finuL a compromise between
the various i-nterests involved..
It should. also mal<e known its intention, pending the establish.nent of a
new agreement, of cc'operating sith other ex.porters, in particular via a
sustained exchange of infornation, in orderbo achieve a more satisfactory
balarrce on the world" market.
a
a
;
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2. Dairy Pnoducts Arrangenent
The fntemational Aruangenent which has been worked. out (see text of the
Amarrgenent in .Anner ) inclucLes information and cooperation pr.ocedurce
(in tne ovent of ctifficulties on the world narket) for all dairy products
and, a series of agreenents on price d.isciplinos for nilk ponder, nilk fats
(tutter and butteroil) and cheese. lfhe nain aountries rhich produce,
inport ancl eryort dairy products have stated that they are preparecl to
participate.
The tert of the Arrangenent hae not yet been finalizedl in its entirety,
certain developing countries having at the Last nirnrte propoeed, amendments
to the tert approveil by tho d-eveloped countriee. If neceseary, the
Comunity will have to erpress its readiness to arrive at a solution enabling
all the interested. parties to ta.ke part ln the ^0.rrangement.
It should. also be notecl &at this Arrangement is supplenented. by bilateral
arangenents on cheese negotiated. between participating countries,
particularly betr*een the Conuunity anct its customers andr/or suppLiers
(see country-by-country analysis) 
"
3. Arrang'eqent regar.tling bovine neat
'fhe .0,rrangenent on bovine meat is based, on nachinery for the exchange of
info:mation and on nachinery for uultilateral oonsultations in the event
of clifficalties on the world market (see tert of the Arrangenent in
.Anner- ). the nain exporting ancl inporting countriee wiLl partieipate.
Tbis .0.rrangenent, like the clairy products Arrarrgement, ie supplementecl by
bilateral arrangements negotiated. betueen tbe main cor:ntries, notabl-y
between the Conuunity anil its custoners and suppliers. It should bring
about a better balance on the world narket and prevent the serious crises
that have arisen in the past.
o
i
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8" GffERAL 4R!4$GlUry"
1. Uglgl=I9""]-iqricultura] !'raaewgtk,
the clirectives givon by the Council in Fellruary LSr?, recognizetL that it
was necessary in t)re agricultural sector to streq5bhen the existing
arrangenents and nraehinery for improved. infornation on the narket sltuation
with a vlew to achieving inproved coordineltion of the policies pursuecl and
to naintain in GAT'f a specific fonrn for the exan:lnation of agricultural
problens.
The establishnent ,cf an Interrrational Agriculture Conzultatj.ve Connittee
was ther€fore proposed. in December 19?8, '*rut the rtifficrrlties connected,
with the drafting of its brief bave prevented arr;r progress beyoncl the
acloption of the folloring Reoormendation fron the lll{e to the Contracting
Parties:
rlt is recornnenderl to the Contracting Parties to :further develop active
cooperation in the agricultural sector witbrin an eppropriate coneultative
framework.
It is tber"efore r.econmended to the Contrac't;ing Parties that the definition
of this framework and its task be worked out as s'oon as possible.'
The tliscussions on the precise terns of rolierence to be given to tb.le
consultative bod.y will resume between now €rnd the nert neeting of the
Contracting Parties. The Connission will rork to engure tbat this bo{yt
rrhich should neet within OA!flf, is allowed the maxiuum flexibility in its
rork and discussions.
2. E:rport subsi*ies
Celbain exporting countriee wished initiall.y to establish for agrictrltural
subsid.ies binding disciplines identical to those in the industiiaL scctor
(prohibition).
The Couruaity
provisions of
subsid,ies
was able to win acceptance for the naintenanoc of the present
ArticLe $1(3), rhich recogni.zes the possibil-ity of applying
a
o
antl in order to
interpretation
tert in .0nner
(with a clarification of its terns),
avoid. a:ry ilorbt as to the oonteate of the Coile andl its a
the United States has sent a letter to the Comunity (eee
B .n6 ).
I
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{he results of the negotiations in this sector have nade i't. possible to
avoid any calling into guestion of the rcffrnd. mechanj.sm (iritfrerto challenged
in eAYf) and at the sane tine has reduced. the risks of confrontation vith
our partners on this subject. In the Connissioafs view, this result is
satisfactory since it enables the Comuunity to eoueolidate it* agricultural
export policy.
3. Other general- cod,,es
0f the other cod.es concerning agricultu.re, r"eference should be sraCe to the
Agreement ou t'nchnical" baniers to trad.eo rhich has sade it possible to
consolidate the ha,tuon:-za'tion work und.ertaken in other international fo:r.rms.
The d"isciplines that have been intraduced, (inforwatien, consultation) ehould.
facilitato the Cornnunityrs e4ports of agri-f'ootl"stuffa.
c" ]lt.A.iIRAt_ ARRANGEMET!TS
The objective of the bilateral negotiations nas to try to resolve, uader
the best possible conditions, the problens which the Comunityts agricultural
exports rere enconntering and, at the sane tine, to put an end to a series
of inport clisputes between the Cormunity ancl its partaere .
The results achieved rrith each custoner or supplier country are set out
below:
I. rgF'q$' r'tl'!i:lf:
In tbe negotiations with the United" States (rhich ie its largest custoner),
the Comunity!s objective was to give priority to resolving the question
of the possible application of counterwaili-ng &uties (rhich represented a
gtore or less peruerrent threat to Cornrmrnity exports) arrd. to inprove the
conditions gove:raing the inportatiom into the liritecl Statee of products
oxportecl by the Conuuni.ty.
o
I
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trhe Uniterl States hal in ninil to irpose on th.e Connrrnity exhorbitant
disciplines to restrict its refuncl policyr th.e adop'bion of a linear
reduction forsula right across the Comunityrs agrirnrLtural tariff end.
the getting of cei-li:ngs for (or even in certerin eases the elinination of)
the inport leqy (on rice, meat, poultry, eggsrr etc.).
(") The Comunity obtainedl satisfaction en "fuhe najrority of its requests
and obtained. najor csncessions on most of ther major srrbjeets of tliscoril
that bad arisen in t.be past.
(i) ns regard,s cheese, a considerahle exter:rsion o:f olm export possibilities
has been achie'ued. A nrmber of tgrpe of che,eses can be erported'
rithout ar5r qtrantitative restriction (eroft ch.eesea, goatts cheeses
arrtl sheeprs cheeses). Fer the other typen o:f cheeees, the quotas
have been incneased fron 28 500 t to,43, 500 t. lfloreover, refturds cact
be granted in rrspect of our exports and on crertain eheeses the
crrstons duties have beon reduced (tta.Lian typ,E) (see lnnex B 1) .
(ii) fn the spirits seotor, it has proved possible to eLini.nate one of the
uost inprotant non-tariff barriers, whi.ch had been fought without
success in the past, nanely the t{ine Oaullon .Assessnent (see
.Annex 94 ) as well a,s the tariff c:onrnte:r*easures imposed on
cognac at the 'tine of the rrchicken warrr' .
(iii) fhe United States has also agreed. to th,e reuoral of the tariff
surcharges on ,flertrin and. etarch imposed at tlhe sane tine.
(iv) lastly, it has been agreed that the Corruunity can resune ite tra&itional
exports on beef and. veal (ni.ninun 5 OOCI t) (s,ee Annex a 6j
(t) The offers whic,h the Conmuni.ty nade in return :for these concessions
fell well short of t.he initial demands nade t'y the lJnited States and, in
most oases, Comtrni{y pro&rcers have received" compoasation in the context
of the narket organization Be&sul€s" t'he ccrncessircns made by the
Comrnity irrvolve 'sbe following proclucts:
I
o
;
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(i) fn the poultry sector, the ffiC agreecl to keep seasoned uncooked
turkeys or turkey crrte in heading tro 16"02, but it ra,s agreed that
con$lLtatione rsulcl be initiated" if inports of all turkey neat
exceeded the arrerage 1eve1 achieved. in L977 encl 19?8. In adclitiont
the technical coefficients for turkey cuts harre been slightly lorered
(see A:mex B Z).
(fi) fn the rice sector, the neErest tbat tbe leqr be bound" r*as rejected
but the ffiC has agreed to abolish the comective amount betveen long-
grain and r"ou:ad.-grain rice, a step that was necessarxr in any cvent
to nestore the baLa^nce between the two t;rpes of procluction in tbe
Comunity; intc:mal neasures havs beon takea in the contert of the
annual prlce decisions to encourage the production of round.-grain
rice (see Annex B 3).
(ii i ) For tabLe grapes a tarif f cut (18 "/" to 10 %) t,ias aEreed but onLy for
the "Emperon" vartety, with phased impLementation on 4 years and a
specific safeguard cLause.
(iv) X'or prunes a tariff p:ductj-on of four points was accepied. instead of
the ten points requested by the lJnited Statee; arly effects rhich
this neasure might have on the cormpetitive position of Conuunity
proclucers has been offset under the narket organization amangenents
by a correspond.ing increase in the preniu.n.
(v) For tcbacco the price thresholci has been abolishetl and the tariff
heading has been itivided into two subheadings by t;ryes of tobaoco,
t
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This tariff classifioation will reduce import charges, particularly
for highen-quality tobaccos, which do not eonpete d:LrectJ.y with
Conununity production. To avoid. any repercussions on the conpetiti"ve positioll
or income of Cornmuni'ty producersr the preniun, granted to producers
has been increased.
(") Limited tariff reductions have been grar.ted in respect of other
products, (preserved. fruit, offal). In ad.d.itionr e:rport facilities
have been granted. for 10 000 t of high-qua1it,y cuts of beef a,nd. veal
(see Annex I 5).
The United. States had also made requests coneerning, inter alijrr orangest
fnrit juices, lemons, grapefruits and almonds. Despiie strong pressure
from the United. States, no concession was all-owed by the Comrnunity
in these sectors that are highly sensitive both for certain Member
States and for the Communityts Mediterranean policy.
^ 
nnl,TtTlnZ . tr''ClA lr ;- J rlal
In the negotiations with Canad.a, the Communityrs objecti.ve was to obtain
guaranteed access for its cheese and, in the alcoholic beverages
sector, to put an en.d" to the discrimination jLn Canada between foreign
and nationaL suppliers and- between the various foreign suppliers
themselves.
Canada for its part was seeking improved accoss to the Corunrnity market
for Ched.dar and a number of tariff red.uctions involving fishery
products, certain be,rries and whisky. Canada also reiterated its
dena.nds concerning qluality wheat as framed irr the 1962 and' 1973
Article XXIV (6) nee;otiations.
The results obtained- with Ca^rrada are as foLlr:ws:
a
t
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(i) With regard. to cheese, an arra.ngenent was concluded in the fornr
of ;ur exchange of letters (see Annex III (b) 3) u.nder which:
caurada will bind. the present 1evel of the overall quota of
45 million pounds (approximately 20 000 t) an6 will reserve for
the Cornmunity a bound proportion of 5$ (approximately 12 OuO t);
as regard.s Chedd.ar, the EEC is placed in the same position as
other suppliers;
The Commirnity has undertaken to import, 2 IJO t (approximately
6 rnillion pounds) of mature Cheddar subject to a minimum price
(1?o u.a./roor.g; and a Iev-y of 10 u.a.f lOOkg;
Consul-tations will be held. on the functioning of the arrangementl
There is a formula for reciprocal improvernents after 1982.
(ii) With regard to alcoholic beverages, there is an exchange of letters
(see Ar:nex B 17>. containing a d.eclaration of intent by
Canadafs provincial governments providing, in respect of all
products, for nondiscrimination between foreign suppliers;
for spirits, the discrimination between domestic products and
I imported. prod.ucts will be abolished, over eight years and, in
respect of wine, vernouth and champagner the present d.ifference
between domestic products and imported. prod"ucts wi-l1 be frozen
and a minimum price introd.uced" for imports of wlnes.
(iii) Canad.a has given up its denand.s concerning quality wheat and has
nerely requested, in an exchange of letters (see Annex B 7).
that this guestion be examined- in 1982.
In these circumstances, the Commrrnity has given a favourable reply
to a nr:-mber of Canadats requests for tariff offers concerning certain
agricultural products (berries, whisky, naple syrup) and certain
fishery prod.ucts.
I
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3. }IEW reALAND
Nen Zealand protects its agriculture not only by high customs duties
but also by quantitative restrictions, whichr are appliod on virtually
all agriculturaL products. Thie is why the Conmun,ity was aiming above
alL to get New Zeala.nd- to abolish its quantitative restrictions or
progressively improve access, notably for products of the agri-
foodstuffs industry aJrd for alcoholi.c beverages.
New Zealand for its part was hoping to obtain fron the Connr:nity
guaranteed access fcr miLk products (particu.larly lbutter, cheese
and casein) and. sub;stantial tariff concessions for other prod.ucts
such as sheepmeat, ;fishery products, apples, etc.
the results which the Corurounity has achieved in its negotiations with
New Zealand. are generally well-balanced. They comprlse (see Annex B 9).
(a) on the part of New Zealand.
complete liberaliza,bion of inports of beer and champagne;
ad,ditional 1icences for almost all the prod-ucts of the agri-food.stuffs
industry of j.nteresi; to tbe Community;
considerable tariff reductions (average red.uction of 42.fl,) for the
sane range of agri-Jlood.siuffs.
(t) on the part of the Con,ianrnit.v
an agreement on cheerse enabling New Zealand" 'to erport a total quantity
of ! l0O t, made up of 6 500 t of Cheddar in'tended. for direct consumption
arrd 3 000 t of cheese intend.ed for industrj.a.L processing (nalnly for the
naflufacture of proc€,ssed cheese); a fixed le,iry is to be applied to these
irnports and a nninimu"m price must be respectetl by New Zearand.;
New Zealand will als,o benef,it, to a certain extent, frorn the tariff
concessions which th.e comm'.rnity has granted to other partners.
The other speeifie requests have not been rnel;.
.l
I
:
l
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4. AIFTITALIA'-
Ttre conrounity, being a$are of the fact that the only agricultural
pr.oducts it can e:cport to an ag3icultural coi;ntry such as Australia
are processed. pxodrictsr endeavoured to obtain fron AustlaLia iuproved
access for products of the agri-food-etuffs industry and alooholic
beverages.
Australiafs objective was to obtain fron the Cornrn:nity considerable
concessions on cheese and beef and veal and also sizeable tariff
reductions f,or certaln fresh, d.ried and preserved fruit (peaches,
apt:icots, poars, apples, prunes), sheepmeat and honey. Austraila
d"id. not accept that agriculturaL concessions should be made to the EEC"
The negotiations with Australia theref,ore proved to be particularly
d-ifficult but led in the final a"nalysis to a balanced result. This
agreement nay open the way for fresh cooperati-on between Australia
and the Comrmrnity. The Commission is convinced, no?eoverr that thj"s
agreenent, modest though it is, is of considerable political importanoe.
It puts arr end to the succession of nisunderstand.ings and assorted
d-isputes which have built up between Australia and the Community over
four or five years. The resuJ.ts are as follows (see Annex ts 10).
('i) With regard. to cheese, an agreernent :ras reached. involving
concessions on both sid.es;
Australia bound. at a substantially reduce'l level- - inCeed-
a* (f, for certain types (t'FbJlcy cheesesrr such as Camembert,
Bria, Stilton, Roquefort and goatts cheeses) - the customs
d.uties levied on imports of all the cheeses exported. by the EEC.
i:i:'etu.rn for this commltment, the OEC has undertaken to grant
ir,scer$ for 3 000 t of cheese (including 2 )00 t of Cheddar).
A fixed" lerry will be charged and Australia has wrdertaken to
;"espect a minimum import price.
t
o
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(ll) Australia har; granted the Comnunity considerable tariff
reductions, rrotably for products of tlhe agri.-food.stuffs industryt
covering nearly 54" of the volume of" the Congnwrityts erports
to Austra1ia,,
These concessions are all the more i.mportant as they involve
Australia in the process of binaing its tari'ff d-uties - a
process it had hitherto sid.estepped..
(i:.i) In a bilater;r.l agreenent concerning beef anc[ vealr the Community
has given thel follow'ing commitments:
The Comncunity hag undertaken to enter into consultations with
Australia should. Australia not benel"it from the increase in
the GATT quol;a for frozen beef and ve'al (:-ncrease from
38 500 t to j)0 000 t of boneless meat);
Ibr special cuts of high-quality beef' aund v€ra1 Aus*rralia has
been allocaterd. a share of $ 000 t irL the overall quotal
In view of the ti;ile it takes to irarnsport f,r'ozen beef and" veal
frorn Australj.i: "in the Comrnunity a ,SCurlay ad.rramced-fixing of the
lerry has beerL agreerll
Coopera'uion j.s envisaged with Austral;ia wittr a view to
estatrlishing the estimate for beef anrl veal intend.ed for processing
arrd ti:e.r'e is provision under the estimate fcrr a suspension of
the levy irna::imurn qSfr);
(:.") As regards buffalo meat, the Commr.rnJ.t;y is oprening a tariff quota
of 2 ZJA t wi.thout a variable levyr' at a ra'te of zfl, alvalore-n.
I
I
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5, ARGfl{TINA AND ItnUffitAY
Since Argentina and Uruguay are considered. d.eveloping countriee, they have
alrea{y benefited under the MlNs from the ad.vance implementation by the
Comnnrnity of its offer on tropical products.
In the negotiations with these countries, the Comrnrnityrs objective was
to get them to make a suitable contribution in line with their level of
econonic d.evelopment.
For their partr these turo countries, both major trad.itional rneat exporterst
sought guararrteed access to the Conmunity.
Argentina granted the Conarnrnity ccncessions on cognac and on Scotch whislry
arrd Irish whiskey, while Uruguay rnad.e concessions on cogrnc, ligueurs and
Irish whiskey.
The Conmunity therefore concluded anangements on beef conprising (see
Annexes a 11 and B 1Z)i
for both countries, an exchange of letters provid"ir:g for:
cooperation in preparing the estinate for beef and veal intended for
processing and, in the contert of that estimate, suspension of the ler,qy
(rna:rirnum qy");
advance fixing of the le'r,6r to take account of the transport tirne between
South Ameri-ca and Eirrope;
for special cuts of high-grade beef and veal a share of ) 0OO t for
Argentina and I OO0 t for Umguay.
o
t
-78- AGRI.IIl.2
6. STAIE-TRXDING COU]ITI'RIES
fhe Comrmrnityrs objective in the negotiations with tire steLte-trading
countries, given the .Limiied influence of the taril'f aspect in those
countriesr inport dec:isions, was to get them to ente:: ir"to a quantitative
and progressive import conmitmerrt.
trbr their part, the state-tradir:g countries presentecl considerable lists
of requests to the Community covering almost the whoile range of the products
they export to the Community.
All the state-trading countries refused to enter into a quantitative
comnitrnent tovards thr: Community and the Conrnrn:i"ty wls therefore unable
to consid.er their reguests.
Negotiations were, however, conclud.ed r.ri.th Poland., Ronania and. Hungary ln
the 'beef and veal sector via an exchange of letters, the terms of whioh are O
alnost id'entical to that agreed with Argentina. 'rhe improvenents mad'e to
the arrangements gove:nning the importation into the Oonmrnity of bovine
animals intended for :fatteningr in add.ition to satislffing the state-trading
countries, should also be in iine with the interests of the Member Statest
particrrlarly those thirt are short of such aninals (see Annexes B 13' B 14
ard. B 15) .
I
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7, JAPAN
ft had. been hoped. that, to reduce the Comnunityts considerable trad"e deficit,
Japan would make a special effort in the MINs particularly in respect of
pigpeat, milk proilucts (cheese, condensed nilk) agri-foodstuffs and aleoholic
beverages. A substantial reduction in customs duties had. been reguested in
certain of these sectorsl in the case of alcohoLic beverages, the najor objectit
was to obtain the removal of the di,scrinination embodied in certain d.onestic
tarces and. increased access for certaj.n gualities of pigrneat.
The only reguests made ty Japan to the Comrmnity were concerned. with fisheries
and" preserrred rnandanins.
trbom the strictly arith.netical viewpoint, the Conrnunity obtained more
concessions from Japan in the agricultural sector than it conced.ed. to Japan.
However, fron the qualitative viewpoint, Japanrs concesei-ons, which to a
large ertent consist sinply in the bind.ing of the customs duties currently
applied, are not satisfactory to the Connudty. 0n the guestion of the
taxes 
- 
the d.iscrininatorly taxing of alcoholic beverages (the major obstacle
in this sector) 
- 
Japan consid.ered. them to be d.omestic measures that were not
negotiable in the international negotiatiorrs. Japan also refused. to ertend
the import licences granted. for certain qualities of pigmeat.
In these circr:mstances, and also in view of the particular sensitivity
of the fi.sheries sector, the Cornrnrnity d.id. not concecle the Japanese reguests
relatirg to this sectoro It d.id, however, accept Japanrs request regard.ing
preserved nard.arins. The ind.irect benefits Japan will derive from the
concessions nade by the Corumrnity at the reErest of other countries aJPe ninor.
I
I
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B. SOI}1T] A-bRICA
Ibom South Aflnica, which is a considerable erporter of agricultural
proclucts to the Corru:rr.-rnity, the Community was.Iooking; for substantial concessions,
tariff and nori-tarifJ' (guantitative restricti,cns), Ilor agri-food.stuffs and.
for alcoholic bevera€iesi
South Africa had asked. the Cornmunity for concessions concerning in
particular fresh fruj.t (grapes, apricotB, pears, peerches, pineapples and
citrus fruit) and. prerserved fruit (particularly peaches aill pineapples)
and Boberg wine.
The progress nnad.e in the negotiations tras not such er,s to enable the Community
to make direct conces;sions to South Africar Ind.eed., the bal.ance sheet of
initial agricultural concessions revealed from the outset a very narked.
imbalance to the Comnrunityrs d.isadvantageo S,outh Allrica is a major
beneficiary under certain concessions rnad.e by the Conrmnity at the request
of the United States (concerning tobacco, preserved" fruit and vegetables).
Despite that, South llfrica reguested additioniel conoessions from the Cornrnunity
on tirured peaches aniL Boberg nine, without wishing to offer adeguate
concessions to balanoe the situation. It was not possible to resolve the
problem of this imbal.ance with South Africa a:nd the Conrmnity therefore
refirsed to conply wi*h South Africafs requests.
9. EEI'A CoUMI'RIES
For obvious reasons, the Community did not hoLd agr'icuLturaL negotiations with
the E. F.T.A. countries.
It shouLd be noted that jn the MTN SwitzerLand gave a favourabLe response
to the request (formrrLated on many occasions by the Commun'ity before these
negotiations) to put an end to the d'iscrimination between wh'isky and cognac/
arnagnac (to the Lat'ter productsrdisadvantage) as regards the monopoLy duty
changed (see Annex U 18).
I
I
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D. IMPLEMENTING MEASURES
ImpLementation by the Community of undertakings on agricuLture wi LL caLL
for the adoption of tar"iff amendments or fixed Levy quotas for cheese
and aLso Commission reguLations (for instance, amendments to sLuicegate
price coefficients and to Levies on turkey par"ts, the introduction of import o
export certificates, etc. ). The Commission has aLready begun to prepare
for impLementation as from 1 January 1980 by submitting the necessary pro-
posaLs to the CounciL or other competent bodies (Management Committees).
a
t
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DeveLoping countries
1. Tropical protlucts
The negotiations r:n tropical products 
- 
in. vrhich some 2) developing
countries took pa:rt 
- 
received, special men.tion as a matter of priority
in the Tokyo Declirration. The Comrmrnity put its own "tropical
productsrr offer i:nto operation on 1 January 1977 without asking for
partial reciproci'by at that stage of the negotia-bions. All the other
developed. countrir:s, bar the United States, adopted the same attitude.
Hammering out this offer was not easy. F'or one thingr apart from its
own economic worr:ies, the Comrmrnity had to take ieccount of the interests
of those d,eveloping countries with which it has r:oncluded. preferential
agreements, and tjrese interests were made clear cluring consultations
r,rith the countries concerned. Alsor it had to::econcile the requests -
in some instances contradictory - of the other d.eveloping countriest
some of which werr: asking for preferential reduc'bions and others for
red.uctions of general application (for example, -bhe south-east Asian
countries); such general cuts would have benefited. developed countries
in certain cases, or would. even have beetr chiefl;1 of benefi.t to those
countries. Last.Lyr the Corumrnity had to try to restrict the
negotiations to purely tropical agricultural proclucts in ord.er to
avoid. slipping grrdually into general negotiati-ons on a wider and rvid.er
range of products,,
fhe EECrs offers r:n tropical products involve four sets of measures
concerning prod.uc'bs falling r'rithin Chapters 1 to 24 of the CCT:
t
I
(i) 
" 
general red.uction in customs
green coffee (from l/" to 5i7"),
(from 11.rf, fo 5/, and. fron )/o
on, involving imports into the
$ loo nill:Lon in 1977;
duties on 2',?. products includ"ing
cocoa beans (ifrom 4f, to 3f"), tea
to OiL), pepper, cinnamon and so
Comrmnity to a total value of
(ii) improvement of the GSP by the add.ition of rrew prod"ucts (orohid.s,
fish, vegetables) or the improvemerrt of exjrsting arrangements
(red.uction <lf duty on tobacco, vegetable ojll, preserved. fruit,
etc.). A total of 1)0 agricultural- prod.uets were affected,
inports of which into the Comnn:.nity were valued at fil IOO million
Ln 1977;
I
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(ii:.) abolition of quantitative restrictions remaining in France and.
ltaly on certain acids, alcoholl industrial fats and glycerinel
(iv) an und.ertaking on the part of certain Member States not to increase
in future any domestic specific taxes on coffee, tea, cocoa a"r,rd spices.
In addition, in 1l'lp most agricultural inports frorn the least developed
countries vrere granted d.uty-free adn'ission.
The Comrmnityrs offer on tropical products obviously did not meet al1
the reguestsl it was nevertheless a very substantial oner especially
since it was not accompanied by a request for immediate partial
reciprocity from the recipient countries as a means of encouraging them
to assess the scope of the offer and to propose an appropriate
contribution rqhen the time was ripe. Tire United. States used a d.ifferent
approach in that it made its offer subject to a concument contribution
fron the developing countries,t
It is d.ifficult to assess the respective merits of these trso lines of
approach. The Community and its partners who followed the same li-ne
adopted. an open and trusting attitude toward.s the d.eveloping countriest
while the USA was able, in the final stages of the negotiationsr to
obtain concessions from recipients, partS-cularly on prod.ucts <lf interest
to the United States. The comrnercial advantages which the United. States
gained in thj-s r,,ray are probably not very gtreat but the approach d.id
oblige mar4y developing countries to change their expectant attitud.e, thus
encouraging them to think about their own contribution, at least as far
as the United. States wa6 concerned..
Zo EEC concessions
I
;
Tndustry
Drring the negotiations
into the possibility of
basis of the developing
on industrial tariff questions, the EEC looked
applying special, differential measures on the
countries I recmests and involwing prod.ucts of
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interest to those cour:.tries. lfhe EECts differential neasures could.
be of general application, includ.ing the creatjlon of tariff subheadingst
or consist in an inprovenent of the GSP' thus rnaking it possible to
choose the option best suited. to the developlng countriesf individ.ual
need.6.
Some twenty developing' countries and some of the coun.tries that have
conclud.ed. preferential agreements with the EEC sent in requestsr sone
of which were not presented until July 1!lB or even later, whereas tbe
Community had nade its inttial offer in Januar;r of that /€&ro Perusal
of these reguests, involving nearly 100 produolbsr revealed. guite wid.e
d.isparities in the developing countriest approa.ch. While sone of then
put forward. shor* lists of priority products (for exa,mple, Brazil and.
Mexico), others, such as India and especlatrly ltugoslavia, sent in very
long lists.
A relatively large nurnber of d.eveloping countri-es clid. not restrict their
requests to those prod.ucts they currently wished to export but also
includ.ed. those of possible interest in the future. Moreover, the
requests turned" out to be contradictory in maqf instances, with sone
d.eveloping countrles asking for smaller across*the-board cuts than the
formula offered, even going as far as to reguer;t exception for all prod.ucts (even
for exports that stood at zero) in or-d.er to sal'eguard their GSP rfmargintt,
whereas others were keen to obtain greater general red.uctionsthan
offered. under the fornula. In sone instances even, ,C.eveloping countries
that are small suppLiers of the Conrmnity requersted. greater general
reductions than offereC. under the fornula while large suppliers were
reguesting the total or partial" withdrarual of 't;he EECts offers. Lastly,
requests involving deviation from the forrmla often ran counter to the
issues involved in our negotiations r*ith certai.n developed. countries.
Ttre Connun:ity had to reject requests for withrlr'awa1 because of the
consequences it could .have had. on negotiations with tlne United States.
Conrerselyr it was not possible to go beyond. th.e formala on a systeuratic
basis with a vj-erv to d"ifferentiated. treatnent f'or prorlucts of which the
d.eveloped. countries we.re the chief suppliers. Al1 tinese reguests to
the Community from the devel"oping countries had. to be examined. in the
light of the interests of the countries benefit;ing fr,om preferential
access outsid.e the GSP, taking account alse Jlf each d.eveloping countryrs
I
o
I
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contribution to the negotiations.
The A.C.P. and other countries Linked to the E"E.C. by preferentiaL
agreements secured benefits on non-Community markets as weLL, and
where G.S.P. mar"gins were maintained, it was aLso possjtrLe to preserve
the prefenence in favour of the A.C,P- and other preferentiaL partners.
Because the d-eveloping cou-ntri-esr rertrnests were so diverse ii is not
possible to give a fu1l pi.cture of the application of both the
general forrmla ancl the d.ifferential measures. The following table
sums up the overall result. The figures are given in million EIJR
(it strould be noted. that, because of the effects of rounding offr the
average rates of redr:ction do not correspond exactly to the straight
calcul.ation on the basis of the col-umr:s of averaE;e rates before and
after the MI'N).
I
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Agriculture
In the context of the procedures adopted- by the Group I'Agriculturerr,
the Community exchanged lists of requests concerning agricultural
products with some 2) developing coirntries. Requests on which no
progress had been made in the offer on tropical products were generally
renewed and requests were made on new agricultural products'
The task of working out the Communityfs offer to the d.eveloping
countries in respect of agricultural products proved to be an
extrernely delicate one. Sj-nce the offer on tropical products was
the maxirrum the Conmunity oould offer (see the relevant section),
it was scarcely possible to go beyond it to satisfy the developing
countriest requests. In the case of a number of productsr the
d.ifficulties the Corunrinity was encountering in negotiations llith
our developed partners made the Community chary of making the developing
cogntries offers which could have benefited. our developed partners.
Lastly, most of the d.eveloping countries regarded these negotiations
as simply an extenslon of those on tropical products and, to say the
1east, they showed very little inclination to nake any contribution
themselves, however modes';.
Although the Communityfs final offer on agricultural products d.id. not
satisfy these countries, the fact renains that sone of their requests
hrere taken into consid.eration and they tlid derive add-itional benefit
from the negotiations among developed countries. Several countries
thus d.erived benefit from the EECrs offers on meatt tobacco, rice
and preserved fruit. Seven countries in particular derlved consid.erable
ad.d.itional benefitl Brazil, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Mexico,
Indonesia, India, the Philippines (especially fron the offer on
tobacco) and Uruguay (especially from the offers on bovine meat and rice).
In rnany cases the offers on agricultural products i-nvolve substituting
an ad valorem d.uty for avariablead.d-itional d"uty on the sugar content
or on specific maximal hence it is diJ{icult to calculate the average
rate of reduction in the'duties.
I
i
-88- P:'r't IIi
Scri j-r: l (l
These offers are {)f course in ad,d.ition to the improvements the
Connunity has madr: to the CSP in ord.er to help the least developed
countries.
The folloning tab.Le gives a cor.mtry-by-country sumnary of the
volume of trad.e orlver€d- by the EEC t s offer.
,
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3. Least d,eveloped. cguntries
In accordance with paragrapb 6 of the Tokyo Declaration, the Conrnunity paicl
special attention to the least d.eveloped. counllries. Given that nany of
these cowrtries were not present in Geneva 
- 
plus the faot that 1p of them
are ACP countries 
- 
specific bilateral negotiertions nainly concerned.
Bangladesh.
The Comrrunity r*as anr:ious to introcluce a g9ne::al neasure to help the cor:ntries
in guestion by making: then exempt wrder its GiiP from. arqr limitationr r*rether
in the forur of ceilings, maxinun amounts or quotas. They enjoy these
adva.ntageous ama^ngerrents in respect of all G$P products except tobaccot
preserved pineapples, cocoa butter and. soluble coffee. The negotiations
with Banglad.esh in pa.rticular on replacing the Conmunityrs rernaining
restrictions on certa,in jute prod.ucts by vohuttary restrajnt could. not be
brought to a successful conclusion in tine, but the ,EECfs offer renains a
vaLid one and it will be put fonrard again when the bilateral agreements
with Banglad.esh and lndia, which e:qpire on 31 Decernber, are renegotiated..
4. Exped.ited inplenentation of the tariff corrcessions by the EEC
At the meeting of the TNG on 11 and 12 April, the EOC stated that so far as
the Conrnunity was concerned the tariff negoti;r,tions had. been conpleted. a.nd.
it was read;r to consider, on the basis of speeific requests, the prior
implementation of certain concessions of intelest to the d.eveloplng countries.
The EEC has received. only a few requests, posr;ib1e reasons for this being the
adoption by the d.eveloping countries of a tacl;ieal position enabling them to
avoid improving their own offers or a lack of interest on the part of those
among them whose prinary concern is the GSP.
The oroposals concern (i) ttre erxped-ited. irnplementation of
industrial tariff concessions by the EEC in rerspect of 19 headings, mainly
to help Chile and the Philippines on accowrt of their contribution to the
MfNs, ana (ii) the grant of initial negotiatirrg rights to the Philippines,
Chile, Colombia a.nd Sri Lanka. The EEC was pr*'epared. to rnake the same gestures
vis-i-vis other d.eveloping cor.rrtries, subject to {rose countries improving
I
)
,their contribution, but this cond.ition was not; metr
I
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5o DevelooinE countxiesr contribution
Paragraph ! of the Tolryo Declaration states tha'b the d.eveloped. countries
tfdo not e:cpect the d.eveloping countries, in the course of the trad.e
negoti"ations, to make contributions uhich are inconsistent with their
ind.ivid.ual development, financial and trade need.sftn
Althougtr the principle of tfnon-reciprocityrr was stated. clearlyr the
developing countries nevertheless interpreted. it rid.ely, frequently to the
point of not offering any contractual counter-concession. This attitude
surfaced as early as 1976 when the United. States requested partial, but
irnrne6iate reciprocity in the course of the negotiations on tropical- prod.ucts.
For its partrthe Community showed flexibility in the matter of reciprocity
and. on a number of occasions, in both bilateral a,nd. nultilateral contextst
pointed" out that it eqpected. a partial but reasonable counter-concession frorn
the d-eveloping countries in due course, to be d.etermined. in the 1i8ht of their
development levels a^nd econonic situa.tions. With this in view, the Cornmunity
subnitted. to the countries in question indicative lists of requests for
tariff arrd non-tariff concessions in the agricultr::nal and industrial fieldst
these lists having been drawn up with sufficient flexibility to allow the
countries concez'ned the naximum degree of latitude in which to nake a choice.
Ini.bial or final offers started. to come in fron certain developing cor:ntries
in April "1978. The Connr:nity received, offers from 15 countries plus the
upmbers of, the And.ean Group and the Central Anerican Cornrnon Market, raking 2{
countries in a}I. Only a few of these countries participated actively and
systemtic;;rlly in the negotiations, as ihe others Lacked" the staff needed
to ensure an effeetive full-tine presence. Irnprovement of these initial
offers proved" difficult. Our requests for a corrtribution were generally
foLlowed. by coqnter-requests going beyond" the offers alrea{y nad.e by the
Communi"uir. fn 1116{} cases these requests were fowrd to be excessive or
r:nacceptal:le to other d.eveloping countries benefiting under preferential
agreemenis, o:: einply impossible to gra.nt in view of the lmprovements
or red"uetiqfts rgade to our offer a.s a result of or:r negotiations with
our devefoperi partn€pso trlioreover, our developing partners rilfully ignored.
I
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the gain resulting from the implementation oJ' the oilier o:l tropical prod-ucts,
which was worth nearljrTJl] fl + COC million a^nd. cove::etl a substantial share of
their exports to the Oomm.mityn Sone of them ,also rerfuseo tc take into
consideration the ffiCrs contributions in the form of the CISP. fuprovements
were nevertheless obt;r,ined, in certarn cases, but thel. ofte,n looked very
unreasonable alongsider the eco:iomic capacity o:f d.eve-i.oping; countries
individ.r:ally prepared. to rake commitnents on bindings; for 1986, when the
transitional period. end.s, and aiso by oomparj,s,un witir. "bheir concessions
to tlie United. States:.n exchange f'or concessi.orls L:r:'l; r'opic;al prod.ucts.
Examirration shows thal; in most cases tire deve' lrrFiir:i f-r1-'ruitille:E cont.ributions
fall short of the EEC|s requests both qualitaJi-.rer.r';rin"l g"uantitatLvely or
meet those requests in minor respects only, anr:i. b;'ii'Iic ::eLation to their
c,"ipaei-i;y to contributer. The various kinds of rlnl;i.ritrrrtions uray be s,:nmarized.
as follows:
(a) ttirree countries *"C*lcrnbia, ihe Philippinsrs and iliexico 
- 
have started.
negot;iations with a vj.er*" "i,* accessior:'Lo li3'i'i', a,nil a fourth 
- 
Thailand 
- 
is
considering provisione.I accession at thrs sta,gr:o Tlrj.s is in accorda.nce with a
the wishes o1l ti:re 0omnrunity, which tras repeateclly rrr€pd the countries in
question to acce{e, &s, a practical expressien of their willingness to accept
certain disci.pl-ines alld obli6ations 
- 
above aI.L in terns of tariff bind.ings 
-
conpatible wi'bh their level of devetrapment and cornparable to those wrd.ertaken.
by other cleveloping car:ntries whicii are at the sarne stage of d.evelopnent. At
present only the Phiiippines and Colombia have su,ccessfully conpleted
their accession negotlations, whlle the negotiations with Mexico are contrnuing.
These three countriesr contributions are a6 folLlowsl
In the tariff field, It{erico offered 112 agricul-tural and industrial head.ings,
the Philippines 52 a.nd Colombia 30 (only in inclustry, horr{ever, fer in
agri.culture this cor:ntry offered. orily to consol.ida'te rurilateral tariff cuts).
In nar:y oases the bindings are at hlgher levelsr than existing d.uties
t
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(which are often over J}dfo, notaf',i;1 in the case of Mexico)" In terms of
coverage of the lECts exports io the countries concernedl the offers
arnount to only 2.J,4" in the case of Mexico and !.5/" t" the case of Colornbia,
as agains+,?-Vq in the case of the Philippines. More often than not, these
offers d.o nct cover the positions requested. by the Coronunityr and in most
cases the EEC is not the principal supplier.
Although the Phitippinest tariff offers, and to a certain erbent Colonbiarst
nay be regardecl as reasonable in relation to their respective levels of
d.evelopnent, Mexicots cunent offer is low in GATT terms and insufficient
by conparj-son with its offer to its other d-eveloped partners. Sush an offer
contrasts with those made by o'bher developing countries at the time of their
accession to GATT, when their level of developnent was no higher thart
Mexicors is no!'1.
In the-non'.tar.!$ field, Mexico, in addition to its tariff offerr is binding
exernption frorn inport licensing proced.ures in respect of each product.
Exenption is subject ln certain cases, howeverl to a d-elay in application
(12 years). Colonbia is consoLidating autonomous measures introducing
flexibiLity into its licensing proced,ures for around 2O agricultural prod.ucts.
fhese countriesl intentions as regards acceptance of the Cod.es are not known
at this stage.
(U) Two d.evelopi.ng countries, Chile and South Korea, contributed. in varying d.egree
to the Tolcyo Round.
By offering to bj-nd its agricultural tariff in its entirety and virtually
the whoLe of its industrial tariff at a ceiling of qV" $ne Level- of the
duties applied has been 1f," since 1 June 1979), Chile has offered a nore
substantiaL contribution than the other d.eveloping cor:ntries. fn the
non-tariff fiel-d.r this aor:ntryts willingness to nake a conmitnent took the
for'n of sinplifying its custons Legislation.
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South Korea nade ia contritnrtion to the Tokyo Rou:d. in both the tariff
and non-tariff fields. ilith regard to agricultr::eal and. ind.ustriaL tariffst
its contribution ;yis-l-vis the ffiC covered J6 heradings offered. for bindingt
copespond.ing to ],5o1 of our totai. e:cports to the country in question.
These bindings are offered. at the l-evel of the drrties appliedl which havet
noreover, been ap.preciably reduced since 19?7 tlunough autononous llle&stlr€s.
C'enerally speakin,g, the bindings offered" do not:relatel to the ffiCrs requests
brut cover products in respect of which the EEe is not South Koreats principal
supplier.
In the non-tariff field, South Korea proposed. as its contribution the
liberalization of 1?1 tariff heading's, sorne of which correspond "0o our
r.equests. South l{oreats offer represents a cont:libuti.on whichr though not
insignificantl nust be assessed. in the li.ght of the cor:ntryts rapid. econonic
progress and the llact that it takes effect in 1)t16, the fina1 year of stagi-ng
of tariff cuts.
(") Ten or so developj-ng countries, which are less aclvanced" or in an internediate
position between i;he nost d.eveloped. and l.east derreloped. (but closer to the
latter), have either made no offers or onl,y tokerr oo€s. This group i.ncludes
inter alia the And.ean Group
a.r:d the Central American Common Market (wh:ich arer setting up connon customs
tariffs, the latte,r group having eLiminaterl the I'iscal conponents fron its
tariff protection mechanisms and adopted tlre Brusrsels Conventlon on the
valuation of good.sr for customs purposes) n Sri La,rka, whloh is abol"ishing
non-tariff measr:rers1 ?nd Pakistan, which is also abolishing non-tariff
neasures and makirrg autonornow cuts in d.ut:Les"
(a) A considerable nurrber of other d.eveloping courrtries either nade no contribution
or one which can only be regard.ed as insufllicient in relation to their econonic
capacity and given the extremeLy protective nature of their trade arrangemenrs.
t
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Singapore, for exanpl-e, has justi-fiecl. this by pointing to the very low
level of itg present tariff (which is not bowrcl - only one export duty is).
llhis cowrtry has refused. to offer the Community bindings even at cei Ling rates.
Brazilrs offer on ind.wtrial- productg covers only 1/o of ffiC erportsi the
effect of the offer is to lower by arounil 15/" tlne average duty leve7 of 3M" on the
head.ings oovered. 3razil considers, however, that its offer is satisfactory
in rel-ation to its situation and its future participation in the various codes
negotiatecL in the Tokyo Round,. Or:r rrrging that Bnazil shouJ.d. d-ispLay a
constructive attitude XigS=gig GATT by offering ceiling bind.ings produced.
no response, d.espite the fact that our offers on agricultural and tropicaL
products cover J!" of our d.utiable inports fron Brazil- and our ind"ustrial
offer nearLy )1/0,
Argentinars offer originaLly covered 86 agricultural and ind.ustriaL head-ings
(:B of whlch were of direct benefit to the EEC)r eqril.valent to !.{o of ovr
erports, The bind.ings offered were accompanied. by a 3V" cut in duties, althotrgh
their avera,ge level is still axowrd.'lflo. In the non-tariff fie1d., noreover,
Argentina d.id. not respond. to reguests for the liberalization of guantitative
restrictions. Yet, at the end" of the negotiationst Argentj,na nod.ified its
offer by reducing to three the nunber of head.ings of d.irect benefit to the
EEC (a1cohol); taking indirect benefits into account (concessions to the
United. States)1 Argentinats offet covers Q.J/o of our erports. Argentina
endeavoured to justlfy its attitude by the fact that the EEC had not taken
its interests into account, and. in particular had erod.ed its GSP margin by
its concessions.
Ind.onesiafs offer in both the tariff and. the non-tariff field.s was ninimal.
fn the non-tariff field., the ffiCrs requests for liberalization drew no response.
Indonesiats sole contribution in the non-tariff field. was the abolition of
certain registration charges on food. prod.ucts and beverages.
t
)
l
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llalaysiats offer was limited. to non-bound reductions of duty on 18
agricultural and. ind.ustrial headings account:Lng for 1f" of our total exports
to that country, nhj.ch explained its failure to offer bind.ings by referring
to the fact that it had abolished its quantitative restricti.ons,
Indiaf s contribution, despite its cumently :lavoura,ble erternal, financial
and trade sitr:ation, was very srnall. It marle no offer on agricultural
products in the tarj.ff fiel-d-. With regard. -bo ind.ustrial products, India
consolidated autononrous cuts in duties on 89 prod.ucts. ft backed. up
this contribution b;. offering bind.ings vis-i,-vis the Conrnunity for
14 products, equival.ent to 1.1/"of our exporbs to India. Some of these
bindings were offererd at ceiling levels and others at existing duty levels.
The 1eve1 of bind,in6; offered is over 36%. ,In the non-tariff field., India
presented as a general contribution to the MfNs a package of autonomous
neasLres liberalizing or abolishing import embargoers. So far as the
Comnunity t{as concelned, India rnet only one ,of o1rr reguests for
flexibility in its l.icensing procedures.
Yugoslavia, as its oontribution to the MINs, consolidated cuts of
around 4U5(/" in sir: sections of its tariff'; these reductions were
implemented autononously from 1 January 1978 onvard.s. Yugoslavia is
offering to bind. a nunber of head.ings drich were thLe subject of unilateral
cuts, correspond.ing to around Xrt of our expo:rts.
Romania, although it; offered. bindings in respect of over 1)0 products,
d.id. not meet our pri.ncipal requests concerni:ng its inport amangements.
The E.E.C. reserved its position on tariff bindings; in accordance with its
previous attitude rr:garding the signi fi cance of thii s countnyrs customs tari ff.
Orly Argentirra, Jamerica, Romania and. Yugosla'ria have annexed their lists
of concessions to ttre 1979 Geneva Protocol. At th.e appropriate tine
the other countriesr lists will be annexed to an additional tariff
prot ocol.
Korea and Uruguay have recentty Lodged tists of concessions.
I
*
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The follorring table gives an estimate of the overall value of the
d.eveloping cor:ntriesr offers on agricultural and ind.ustrial tariffs,
broken d.own by roain geo-political or geographical area. It is a
provisional, sunmary estirnate and should be regarded, with caution. It
is provisiorial inasmuch as the final contributions situation is not
known in aII casesr and because of the difficulty of assessing the
value of d.eveloping countriesr bindings (ceiling rates, supplernentary
charges, otc.). tastly, the contribution of a group of cowttries
nay be gar:ged. by the siae of the contribution fron only one of the
nembers of the group. Conparison of this evaluation r+ith the overall
agricultural and. ind.ustrial offers shows up fairly clearly just how
small the developing countries? contribution is.
t
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AGnEm/m{T' 0N TECHNICjIL BARRImS TO TRA}E
Well before the Multilateral Trad.e Negotiations were launched in Tokyo in
1973 the Committee on lndustrial Products had started. work on a draft
agreement und"er GATT to make new technical regulations or stand.ards
formulated by the contractj.ng parties more transparent. 0nce the ItrtINs
had got under way the Non-Tariff Barriers Group quite naturally set up
a specialized" sub-group for the negotiation of a code on technical
baruiers to trade. The Communityf s objective in this field. nas twofold.:
i. to ensure that j.ts trading partners did
not establish technical regulations or stand,ard.s which rnight hamper
Community exports or force Community ind"ustry to incur excessive
expend.iture in ord.er to adapt to those new rulesl
ii. to prevent, for very legitimate reasons,
our trading partners from havi.ng an excessive right of inspection
when the Community and the Member States were forced to creare new
technica,l rules or standards which in some cases had to be brought
into force urgently, for instance when public health was at stake.
This twofold objective was achieved, after very lengthy negotiations,
parti.cularly wi.th the United States and Japan, as obligations had to be
balanced between countries where technical regulations and standards
tend to be formulated by decentralized or private standards institutes
and countries where state action pred,orainates. In the end, the Agreenent
provides for two levels of obligation:
a
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i. central and federal governnents are directly responsible for the
technical rergulations and standards 'bhat they bring into forcel
ii. federa,l and central governments are :cesponsible for significant
d.isturbances, of international trade oonsequ.ential upon nevt technical
regulations or standards issued by dr:centralized standard.s institutes
and non-governmental bodies.
One of the most ir:tractable problems in thr: negotiations was that of
certification systems and reciprocity as regards access to certification.
The Commission feels that the solutions ad.opted. make it possible to enter
into bilateral consultations with trading partners to obtain true
reciprocity, failing which sanctions would be applied under the Cod.e
itself in respect of aqy country or countri.es not grantirrg reciprocity
as regard.s access to certification. Argr iolea of automatic participation
in certification s,ystems was eliminated frc'm the Agreement. This means I
that reciprocal recognition of certificates of cronformity issued by
public authori-ties or producers for a giverL t;pe of product between two
countries must be negotiated bilaterally between -bhose two countries.
The Agreement also provides for special, differen'bial treatment for the
developirrg countries. C1early, it was unacceptablLe that products exported
by the developing countries should fail to comply with the technical
regulations or standards irnposed by the developed countries. Special,
d"ifferential treatment therefore basically involvers technical assistance
to enable producers; in the developing countries to corne up to the
standards of the developed countries.
o
l
- 101 -
PARTIE III
Section 4
The Agreement is of the evolutive tlpe and. is to be the subject of a
general review after a trial period of three years.
There are special aspects to the dispute settlement machinery given the
very technical, even scientific, nature of technical regulations or
standards. Most disputes will therefore be brought before a group of
technical experts prior to any decision by the Committee of Signatories
or any meeting of a panel of trade erperts"
In the d.eveloped. countries hundreds or even thousands of technical
legulations, standards or ad-justments of existing technical regulations
and standards in line with technical progress will be published.. ff onr
erporters are to derive real benefit from the Agreenent the Menber States
and their Comrnercial Counsellors in the signatory countries must, in
conjunction with ind.ustrialists and their trade associations, examine
O carefully the pubiished drafts as the Commission cannot d.o this work in
der:th itself.
The Commission is aLso submitting proposaLs to the CouncjL for the impLement-
ation of th"i s Agr"eement at Community LeveL. As weLL as measures to ensure
neaL rec'ipr.ocity vis-A-vis the other parties'in appLication of the agreement'
these incLude pnovisjons covering information on draft technicaL reguLations
and standards, and a Commun'ity procedure for recognition of the certification
and checking systems of other par"ties to the Agneement.
t
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Governnent Procurrunqnt
Tlre search for an agreenent on the progressive opening up of
governnent proour,enent started within the oECD nearly ten years ago'
Ihe ain was to ab,clish laws or adrninistrative practices, such as the
Buy Anerican Act in the united states, which reserve governnent
contracts for national suppliers or give t;hem a price preference.
In the Connunity a corunon policy on public supply contracts was
adopted by the cor:ncil in Decenber 1976. The directive for the
harnonization of proce&ues for the award of public supply contracts
d.id not enter into force untl1 the mid'd'le of '1978' rn adopting this
*irective the Council decid.ed to seek, wii;hin the MTNs' a.n agreenent
for the progressive opening up of government procurenent to the
greatest number of partners possibLe.
The rnatter was stud.ied by a special sub-g:noup inL which a number of
d.eveloping countries participated. alongsirle nost of the developed"
countries. Indeerd, one of the most intra,:table problems was that
of the d.evelopingg countriest participatio:n in thre Agreenent. It was
acknowled.ged. thal; these countries night mrake arr offer which was
quantitatively arid. qualitatively inferior to theut of the developed
countries, and in ad.dition certain measures for d.ifferential treatment
were agreed (see below).
llhe Corununityrs objective in the negotiations was to secure the abolition
of all practices of reserving contracts for national suppliers arrd of
price preferences in their favour. fhis objectj-ve has 'been achieved
only partially because only central or federal {pvernnent entities are
entering into suoh a conmitrnent Ulsi-vis suppli:ers which are nationals
of signatory countries. It has been impossible to find" an equitable
solution for d.ecr:ntralj-zed entities or those whlrch do not cone directly
under central or fed.eral authorities, Thus the federated States in the
United. States, tJre provinces in Canada and the oantons in S'witzerlarrd
are not covered ioy the Agreennent. On the Comnu-rrity sid.e the scope of
the internationa.l Agreeurent covers only a small part of the field of
application of tl:e directive on public supply contraclg:-the l,Zinder'
regions, d6partments artd. rnunicipalities are excluded..
J
.
t
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Three major sectors of activity were also excluded from the scope of the
Agreement by the Community by atralogr vrith the directive. These were
public transport, eneTry production and distribution services' and
telecornmunications services (the postal senrices are subject to the rights
a:rd. obligations of the international Agreement).
The Comnunityts trading partners exerted strong ptessure for the scope
of the Agreenent to be extended to these three sectors and will contj-nue
to do so, Since the Agreenent is of the evolutive type and provides for
a general review after it has been applied" for three years we rnust
expect this question to remain open and pressi.rre fron the other signatory
countries to remain very strong for the scope of the Agreement to be
ertendeci.
The Agreenent provides for axrangements as regards proced.ures and the
transparency of those proced.ures which are not very far removed- from those
adopted by the Council in the Connwrity directive. Basically, invitations
to tender are to be published in newspapers and after the contracts have
been award-ed information is to be provid.ed. at the request of the
unsuccesst'ul tenderers or the other signatory governments, The Agreement
is sched.uled to enter into i.'orce on 1 January'1981, as in many signatory
countries it wilL be neces,;ary to amend certain eristing rules or laws.
Iliany d.eveloped. countries and. a nr:mber of developing countries (such as
Hong Kong, fndia, fsrael, Jamaica, Nigeria, Singapore a.nd South Korea)
have stated that they intend. to sign the Agreement.
fn order to enable or:r suppliers to trenefit fu11y frorn access to our
trading partnerst government contracts the Conmeroial Cortrsellors serving
in the signatory cor.mtries and the chanbers of cornraerce and industry or
trade associations must be nobilized in order to publicize widely
invitations to tender issued- in third. cowrtries. Community exporters
wil} themselves have to make an effort to lodge their tonders by the
required dates and to have thenselves included on the lists of approved
suppliers l*richnaX exist in certain signatory countries such as Japan
and. Canad.a. fhis is necessary if the Agreenent is to offer practical
benefits.t
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Special and. d.ifferential treatment is accorded lry the Code to the
d.eveloping countries. ftre least developed cowttr:ies1 €v€n if they are
not signatories to the Agreernent, and. suppliers established in those
countries nay be accord.ed spec5.a1 treatment in :eespect of products
originating in those countries. Moreover, sigtutory developing
cowrtries nay negotiater with other signatories ,ierogations fron the
Codets rules pertaining to both entities and products. This is what
has been done for instance with Indiar Jamaica and Singapore; the same
procedr:re will be poss:Lble after the Agreement enters into force.
t(
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The Commun'ity legisLation in force, nameLy the CounciL Directive of 21 Decem-
ber 1976 (77/62/EEC), onLy governs access to pubL'ic contracts at intra-Community
levet, and does not apply to products originat'ing in non-member countries suppLied
from those countries, as aLso transpi res from the Counci I ResoLut'ion of
21 December 1976.
The'impLementation of this Agreement is not th,enefore in itseLf enough to
change exist'ing CommunitY Law.
However, the Directiv13 cannot continue to appLy as it stands to the purchas'ing
entities covered both by it and by the Agreement without creating the possibiLity
of their becoming subject to two sets of irneconc'iLable arrangements.
AccordingLy, the Commission intends to submit to the CounciL a proposaL for
a directive amending the Directive of 21 December 1976 to bring it into L'ine
w'ith the requirements of the Agneement with nergard t,c the purchasing entities
covered by the Latter instrument.
I
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Aircraft
The id.ea of seeking an amangement on trade in civil aircraft has often
been raised over the past few years. The communityrs import
arrarrgements nere based. Iargely on Protocol No XVII to the E.E.c' Treaty
on List G (hence constituting an integral part of the Treaty of fome)
and on tariff suspensions or. exenptions adopted. each year or every six
months on the basis of Article 28 of the [beaty of Rome'
the lpll negotiating d.irectives provid.ed for the possibility of
negotiating the elimination of customs duties in certain sectors. The
aircraft sector was not cited. as an exa.urple but it was ag?eed. in the
course of 'Lhe dj.scussions to seek an agreement with the nain partners in
that field.
The real negotiations wlth the A.mericans and Japanese got off to a late
start I the arrangenent on the aircraft sector being referred. to for the
first time in the July 19TB Agreement. In the autumnr proper negotiations
I began on the basis of a prelirninary working paper presented by the
United. States and a oounter*proposal presented. irnned.iately by the
Conmunity independently of aqr fornal negotiating group; only certain
partners participated (Cana.da, the Conmunity, Japan, Sweden and the
United States). 0ther countries whose intentions brere sounded out -
Brazil, Norway and Switzerland 
- 
d.ecid.ed. not to take part in the
negotiations.
In April, only a feHi d.ays after the various ag?eements were ini-tialledt
the negotiating partners had the GATT Secretariat circulate what was
virtuaily a final document open for all the negotiating parties to sign.
The Comnunityts prime objective was the elimination of custons duties on
the United. States narket, which absorbs nore than half of world aircraft
production; the second. was to obtain the elinination of customs duties
in Japanl whose intention to d.evelop an aircraft industry behind. high
tariff ralls (of the order of L2%) had just come to light.
a
I
o
- 106 - PAF.t III, Section 6
Ihese objectives ha\re been attained and, und.er the Agreement on aircraft,
all signatories will bind. under GAFI exenption fron customs duties on
all aircraft, helicop'bers, gliders, engines snd nain parts a,ncl on-board
equipment intend.ecl fo:n the narrufacture, repair arrd. naintenalce of civil
aircraft. Via the nost-favoured-nation clause the elininatlon of
crrstoms duties will benefit non-signatory countries, including the
d-eveloping countrlesr among which Brazil is at present d.eveloping a helicopter
and light aircraft inrlustry.
In the non-tariff fie1d. the signatories are comnitting thenselves to linit
oonpensation purchases and. to prevent subsidiers to industry fron d.isturbing
international trade. The Connittee of Signatories nil1 be able to deal with
arly problen in the aircraft sector. ltre .A.greement also provides for the
possi.bility of intewention, right fron the start, in the event of any
enguiry to d"eternine the existence, degree ancl effect of a.r1y allegecl
subsid.yr vrith the ain of seeking a rnutually a6yreed. solution which wou1cl
obviate the need. to r'esort to countervailing n[easures.
Finallyr the Agreemen.t is of the evolutive type in that it provides for
the possibility of ar:mual exa.mination and a general review three years
after its entry into force. In particular, the scope of the Agteenent
could be wid.ened to incLude parts or sub-assernbll"ee i.n respect of ltrich
custons duties have er,lrea{y been abolished..
The nunber of signatories is likely to be fairly sna11. So far
Canadar the Comrnunittr'r l-Iorway, Sweden, the United. States and Japan have
announced. that they j.ntend to sign the Agreemrant. fiwitzerland may well
also sign and certain other countries such as Israel. night be interested.
troo.
In the Commission's viet^l, the impLementation of
LeveL does not requ.ire any specific steps other
exemption in the Common Customs Tari ff.
t h i s Ag reement at i nte r"na L
than entering the tari ff
I
I
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AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILIl\IG MEASURES
The Communityrs negot'iat'ing objectivse
In this poLiticatly sensitive sector of the muLtiLateraI trade negotiat'ions,
the Communityts negotiating objectives were relat'iveLy simpLe. In essence,
these were to ensure the uniform application of the relevant GATT ruLes in
this sector, and in particular GATT ArticLe VI conta'ining the "materjaL
injury" requirement, by aLL signatories and especially by the United States.
In order to achieve this aim, the Community decLared itseLf open to discussions
on the poss'ibLe up-dating of the 1960 GATT List of prohibited export subsidies
on industrial products and on'improving the existing GATT procedures for
dealing with the trade effects of subsidies.
2. Evolution of the negolijtions
It was cLear fnom the outset that agreement would not be reached in thjs
sector unless a number of majon issues wene settLed between the two principal
deLegations'invoLved - the Commun'ity and the United States. In particuLar,
in return for U.S. acceptance of the materiaL injury test, United Statesl
negotiators insisted on the acceptance by the Community of :
a) an i LLustrative List of internaL or domestic subsidies;
o
b) e nehr right of uniLateraL
tendi ng GATT Art i c les XVI
internationaL d'isPute sett
action aga'inst subsidi sed products, thus ex-
and XXIII, and in advance of the outcome of the
lement procedure; and
c) a re-inforced internationaL dispute settLement process in this fieLd in
particuLar"
DurinE negotiations the Commun'ityts position in cpposing these United States
demands hras supported by all other major deLegations and in particular by
those from the Nordi c countries, Canada and Japan.
Teh success with which the Community resisted the demands set out above'is
refLected in the tenms of the Agreement, a synoptic anaLys'is of which folLows-
t
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c) provrlsional measurgs - clear conditions are prescrjbed which must be
set before such measures can be taken. In part'icular,, the authorities
imposing the duty must have made preLiminary positive finding that a
subsjdy exists and must possess sufficient evidence of injury;
d) "materiaL iIrjury". - apart frcm the cardinaL importance of the accep-
tance of a materiaL'injury test by the United States, a number of im-
portant refinements have been made to the concept of materiaL injury
as it has prtrvioursLy been appLied by atl other signatories. These are:
t
L re-defidtion of cgusality - the 1968 l\nti-ciumping Code had required
that dunrping kre the ql'incipaL ctuse of injury. Henceforth, 'it must
be demonstrated that the subsidised imports are, through the effects
of the subsjdy, causing injury. Injurieg caused by other factors
are not to be attrjbute*d to the subsjdised inrpot"ts;
ref inement c_l-lnjury cLjterja - The determination cf injury wi lI
now invoLve a t:"rr'*tier examinetion of a) the voLume of the sub-
sidised inporls ancj their effect on prices in the domestic market
for Like products and b) the consequent'impact of these imports on
Comesti c producers of such prr:ducts;
'l'li
I
iii) regio.fql_;irotection - ALthough the u'ording of tlre Code provisions
reLating to regionaL protection have been sirnpLi fied, these
provisions are not noh, more restrictil,e of the Cornmunityfs power
to take anti-dumping action on behaLf of produsers in a regjon than
previously. 0n the contra?y, they enabLe such protection to be
appLied in a more flexible manner"
e) Subs'irlLqs in genera*l - the prov'isions of GATT Articles XVI and XXIII
have been eLaborated and set out in a more logicaL fashion, without
aItering in any biay their legaL nature;
f) subsidies on primary products * certain of the concepts aLready in-
herent in GATT /\rticLe XVI (3) have been soeLt out in more detail and
c{.arified in thr: new text;
;
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3. ResuIts of negoti ations.
i. Aggcp!snss-eJ-ghe-lue!eria!-inisrv--les!-bv-!he-Uni!ed-!!e!cs
The most positive benefit achieved for Community exporters in the Agreement
is undoubtedLy the fulL acceptance by the United States (and by aLL other
signatories) of a weLL-articuLated materiat injury test, wh'ich is a pne-
condition to the imposition of countervai Ling duties. against irnports,
This wiLL prcvide a much-needed buLwark against protectionist trends in
the United States. NaturaLLy - and the Community has made sure that this
is wel[-known by aLL concerned in the Admin'istrat'ion Congress and industry
in the United States - the greatest importance attaches to the fuLL and
accurate irnpLementation and apptication of the Agreement's provisions by
the Administration and the InternationaL Trade Commission.
ti. 9!bsr-Jse!urg:-el-!hs-Astee!9n!
0theLimportant features of the Agreement are set out beLow. However,
compared with the United States'appLication of the "materiaL,'injury"
test, the nest of the Agreementrs prov'isions do no more than to buiLd
upon existing principtes and ruLes inherent in GATT ArticLes VI, XVI and
XXIII. So far as domestic procedures are concerned, considerabLe inspira-
tion has been derived from the 1968 GATT Anti-dumping Code, which wiLL
itself be updated as a nesult of these negotiations (see Section 8).
a) dgmestic procedures - detaiLed proceduraL ruLes are Laid down regarding
the basis upon which an investigation may be opened and the procedure
applicabteto the conduct of cases. In particuLar evidence is to be
prov'ided on (i) the subsidy, (ii)'injury and (iii) the causal Link
between them. Evidence prov'ided on these points is to be considered
simuLtaneousLy by the invest'igating authonities;
[; administrative discretion in the iJnposition of counterva'i Ling duties -
the principle that such discretion is desirabLe is incLuded in the
Agneement/ even if it is untikeLy to be fully reatised in practice,
at Least jn the United States. Some de facto fLexibiLity may arise,
however, from the Agreementts provisions on the termination of cases
on the grounds that satisfactory assurances have been obtained, either
from the exporter of his government, such as to eLiminate further
injury;I
- 
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g) subsidies on norl:Jorimary products - the 1960 GATT Li st of proh ib'ited
export subsidies on non-primary products has be'en updated with add'itionat.
protection for the Commun'ity's particuLar interests being secured
through a confirmation of the ilLegitimacy of the DISC Leg'islation in
the USA. This arnangement does not enteri L, however, a paraLteL affirm-
ation of centa'in oisputed GATT PaneL find'ings concerning the tax- prac-
ti ces of certain Memben States;
h) digrute settlenient provisions - the Agreementrs provisions on this
subject have burilt on the existing Law and practice of the GATT under
ArticLes XXII arnd XXiII. Flexibi Lity has been safeguarded, notwith-
standing a certain tightening of the syritem by the incLusion of notionraL
time Iimits;
'i) deveLoping country export-subsidy pra.ctices -' sustained pressure by
some of the partic'ipants on certain mor,e industriatised deveLoping
countries (e.g" Brazil) produced a commitment by the Latter to phase
out certain of their more egregious export subsidy pnactices and thus
to accept some discipL'ine, although not the generaL prohibition on such I
subsidies whiclr is observed by deveLoped participants;
j) statg-trading countries - considerable fLex'ibi lity has been netained
in order to deaL equitabLy and reasonabLy with imports from those
state-trading countries which adhere to the Agreement.
4. ImpIementation
The new code requires an adaptation of the C;ommunity LeEisLation (ReguLat'ion
EEC 459168) the preparation of which is welt, under llay and wiLL shortLy be
submitted to the Ccunci[.
CONC LUS i ON
The Agreement provjdes a more ratjonal set of proceduraL ruLes, which is in the
interest of alI participants, to accompany the eLaboration of the principLes
contained in GATT ArtlicLes VI, XVI and XXIII. The imbaIance in rights and
obLigations which existed before this Agreemen't has new been removed. The
Commissjon considers that it wouLd be in the Communit;yrs interest to accept the
code.
t
;
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ANTI-DUMPlNG
The Communityrs essentiaL object'ive in the area of anti-dumping poLicy
vlas to eLiminate the'imbaLance which exists between contract'ing parties
in the appl'ication of rights and obligations under A.rt'icLe VI of the GATT
and the Ant'i-Dumping Code. Thene was a need, in particuLar, to ensure
that Ameri can anti-dumping procedures refLected the obLigations
'imposed by the Code.
Th'is objective has been pursued in two stages.
In the first stage progress was made on the basis of an inventory
of problems and issues in this fieLd which had been pnepared by the GATT
Secretariat. From the inventory a priority list of e'ight topics was
chosen on which papers were presented and in depth discussions were heLd.
FortunateLy, the viet^rs expressed in the papers presented by the Community
were foLtowed to a Large extent by the major signatories and this
enabled a common positjon to be adopted by them on the main
probLems invoLved.
The Community has aLready taken advantage of the common position reached
in this stage by amending'its basic anti-dumping reguLation EEC No 459/68
to refLect the principLes agreed. The amendment, contained in Council
ReguLation No 1681/79 makes fundamental changes in the ruLes to be folLowed.
The main changes invoLved when estabL'ishing the extent of dumping reLate
to the treatment of the alLowances
to be made for sales on the home and export markets, the criteria to be
applied to imports from state trading countries and the tneatment of profits,
especiaLly when saLes on the domestic market are made at a loss. The
amendment aLso changes the criteria to be appIied when assess'ing the 'injury
caused and cLarifies the Communityrs procedures concerning the discLosure
of information obtained during an investigation.
The second stage cons'isted of a re-negotiation of the Anti-dumping Code,
the need for which arose from the need for parity with simiLar provisions
in the new Subsidies and Countervai['ing Code. In fact the Commun'ity
negotiators in the subsidies fieLd were abLe to infLuence the drafting of
new Code in a way which assisted the solution of the probLems existing in
ant i -dumpi ng area .
I
the
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The main imorovement obtained in the re-negotiation of the Antt-dumptng
Code were:
Re-def i ni t i on-oL Causa L i tv
The requi rement 'in the 1968 Code that dumpirrg had demonstrabLy to be
the principal causer of injury before anti-dr.rmping measures couLd be
appLied 1nras the source of a fundamentaL disagreement between the USA
and other signator'ies of the Code,
i^lhereas the requi rement had to be stri ct Ly observed in Community
procedunes it had trot been incorporated'into US and Canadian taw'
The rev'ised requinr:ment is that injury has to be caused
by dump'ing and that injury caused by other factors shouLd not be
attributed to the dumped imports. This prov'ides a more reaListic
baLance in that it wiL{"'impose a minimum constraint on the
Communityrs trading pantners whi le neleasing the Community itself
from the harsher constra'int whi ch had hitherto been observed '
Refinement of lljcrry- Criteria
The determination of injury wiLL now invoL've a two tier examination
of (a) the voLume of the dumped importS ahd their effect on prices
in the domesti c market of the irnport'ing country and (b) the
consequent impact of these prices on the domest'ic industry
in the import'ing,:sun1rt.
SiguLtanei ty
The new rutes require evjdence of jnjury and dumping to be examined
simuLtaneousLy at aLL stages of the investigation i.e. at the initiation
stage, when pnovisionaL duties are imposecl and when a finat finding
is made. This means that in future the USI\ wiLL have to conduct
meaningfuL examif:ations of the injury evi<Jence from the very beg'inning
of an investigation.
t
J
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Regional protection
ALthough the wording of the Code provi sions relat'ing to regionaI protect'ion
have been simpL'ified, these provisions are not nob, more restrictive of
the Community's power to take anti-dumping action on behaLf of producers
in a region than prev'iousLy ; on the cont rary, they enable such protect'ion
to be appL'ied in a more fLexibLe manner.
Prov'i s'iona L Measures
Under the revised Code there must be a positive preIim'inary finding of
dumping and corrsequent jnjury before provisional measures can be appIied.
This wi[[ remove a majn bone of contention between the Communjty and the
USA who, up to now, have taken prov'isionaL action after a most cursory
investigation of injury.
Price Undentakings
The revised Code recognises the growing importance of price undertak'ings
in the anti-dumping fieLd. It Lays down new ruLes for their acceptance,
monitoring and review which puts them on a par with anti-dumping duties.
These netg rutes refLect the fLexibLe poLicy adopted by the Communjty in
this area and wiLt encourage Canada and the USA, who are beginning to see
the vaIue of undertakings, to overcome their refusaL or reLuctance to accept
them.
Ret roact i vi ty
The new ruIes admit the retroactive appLication of an anti-dump'ing duty
onLy in exceptionaL circumstances i.e. in case of sporadic dumping or the
v'ioLatjon of an undertaking. Thjs means that the USA has renounced its
right to impose the duty retroactiveLy to a period of 120 days before the
appLication for anti-dumping action was made-
The L.D.C.s have considered that the new Antidump'ing Code as negotiated
by the Signatories of the.1968 Code does not take suffic'ient care of their
specific interests and they have proposed a different version of the
Antidumping Code to the acceptance of Contracting Parties.
In order to soLve this problem negotjations.have been undertaken and stiLL
o
;
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The provisions of new code impose the need on a[[ signatorjes to make
their proced une more transparent, a change wh'ich is cIearIy desirabte
in generaL and which, for the Community, had aLso become necessary in
view of recent op'inions issued in the EuropearCount of Justice. The new
code therefore reoLuires an adaptatjon of 8,.C. Ant'idumping reguLation
(EEC 459/68), the preparation of which is weLL advanced and wiLL shortLy
be submitted to tl^re CounciL.
o
t
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IMPORT LICENSING PROCEDURES
1. Background
Di scussions on import Li censing procedures started aLmost ten
years ago/ prior to the lvlTN, and the dr"aft of an Agreement had been
prepared by a GATT work'ing party in 1972. This text however did not
attempt to resoLve extreme di fferences of view between deLegations, in
particuLar with regar"d to the substantive issue whether automatic Licensing
shouLd be consider ed as a barrier to trade. At the beg'inning of the MTN
the US and other part'icipants took the extreme position tf,at alI
automati c Li censing systems shouLd be eLiminated from a certain date,
and no substantive progress raras made on this point untiL the finaL
stage of the MTN in Late 1978.
2. Negot i at i ng ob j ect'ives
Contrary to the US pos'ition, the communityrs objective in the area
of Licensing was to preserve the status quo and in particuLar to oppose
"proceduraL" requ'irements which wouLd in fact have substantive consequences,
e.g. if it lvere no Longer possibLe to appLy automatic Licensing to seLected
sources onLy or if proceduraL provis'ions couLd be used to reinforce attacks
in GATT on remain'ing discrim'inatory quantit.-.ative restri ctions.
3. Results of the negotiations
The resuLt of the negotiatiors is an Agreement which covers automatic
and non automatic import Licensing procedures. The Commission considers
that this Agreement meets fuLLy the Community objective and protects our
i nterests.
In particular, the Agreement contains the fotlowing e[ements :
- The use of automatic Licensing is recogn'ized as being necessary in certain
cases and the Agreement does not contain any proceduraL requirements which
wouLd go beyond Ant. I or XIII of the GeneraL Agreement.
t
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- The Agreement wiLL bring benefits to tr"aders in that adherents are
subject to more p"ecise discipLines in the licens'ing procedures
wh'ich importers h,eve to foLLow in obtaining a Licence, and these
procedures must br: made public more fuLLy than in the past.
- The Agneement, by its definition of automatic Licensing, makes
it cLear that suclr systems shouLd not have de facto restni ctive
effect s .
- FinalLy, it is'important to note that th'is Agreement ciontains a number
of eLements of di'tferent'iaL tneatment for developing countries, in
particular a tempclrary derogation of two years for those deveLoping
countries wh'ich have par^t'icuLar difficuLti,es to compLy with substantive
obl'igations in connection with appLicat'ions fon automatic Licensing.
4. ImpLementation
The Commi ssion has examined whether the
existing Community reguLations in the area of Li cens'ing, in parti cuLar
reguLat'ion EEC I'lo 926/79 and centa'in requLations in the iaqricuLturar
sector/ have to be erdjusted. It has been concLuded that no orovision
of the Aqreement is incomoatibLe with the regutations of the Comrnunity.
I
I
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CUSTOMS VALUATICN
Nennt i at'i nn ^hi pCt i veSrrsvvr rss r'rY vr!
1. The Community started the negotiations on customs vaLuation w'ith a
number of detaiLed objectives. The main aims were to eLiminate certain
specific and arbitnary protectionist features in the Linited States and
Canadian vaLuation systems, incLuding the "American SeLL'ing Price (ASP)"
System; to Limit the scope for "aggressive" vaLuation by th'ird countries;
to simpLify and cLarify the Community's ot^rn vaLuation Laws in the context
of the negotiations; and to bring about the maximum possibLe degree of
internationaI simpLification and harmonization consistent w'ith the
other objectives.
EvoLut'ion of the negotiations
2. InitiaLLy, the United States hras reLuctant to negotiate on customs vaLuation
because of the poLiticaL sensitiv'ity of its rASPr and 'FinaL Listl
provisions and its unfortunate experience in the Kennedy Round when the
bargains which its negotiators had struck were not honoured by Congress.
Canada t^las aLso unw'iLLing to contempLate major changes in its system
because of the poLiticaL sensitivity of the subject and Japan r"las reLuctant
to negotiate in this fieLd because of the difficuLty of getting any
necessary Legislative changes through its parLiament. The Nordic countries,
on the other hand, adopted an open-minded approach from the start. Even
within the Community, there was initiaLLy considerabLe reLuctance 'in some
sectors to contempLate any significant changes in the Communityrs vaIuation
Laws because of existing fi'rm commitments to the BrusseLs Definition of
Va Lue (BDV).
3. SubsequentLy, the United States and Japan t^lere per"suaded of the benefits
of trying to arnive at a new set of internationaL vaLuation ruLes in the
MTN and agreed to study Community proposals. The Nondic countries gave
their active support to Community initiatives. Canada, however, remained
on the sideLines,
4. Aften wide consuLtations with representatives of industry and commerce,
it was recognised that the Communityrs negotiating objectives could best
be met by moving away from the "notionaL" concepts of the BDV and intro-
duc'ing a "positive" internationaL system of vaLuation. Th'is impLied redefining
I
t
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the methods of va Luation currentLy used within the Comrrnun'ity, without
substantiaLly changing the basic methods themseLves, and introducing greaten
discipLine in their appLication. The Community pnesented to the GATT a draft
refLecting its new approach and this was accepted as the basis for the
negot i at i on of t he va Luat'ion aE reement .
5. Agreement was finaLLy reached amongst deveLoped countriies on a vaLuation
agreement which foLLowed cLoseLy Communjty thinking. This Agreement
was pubLished in document MTN/NTM/W/229, rev. 1.
ResuLts of the negotiations
6. It now seems LikeLy that the Community's main deveLopecl trading partners,
with the possibLe excLusion of South Africa, wiLL be s'{gnatoriesof'the
Agreement. The Community and the United States wiLl appLy the Agreement with
effect from 1.7.80. under a bi Later"a L arrangement " Most other s ignatori es
are expected to appLy the agreement from 1.1.81 although Canada is expected
to defelits implernentation unti t 1.1.85. As a resuLt the ASP system and
the US 'FinaL Listr wiLL be eLiminated and theso baLLed "Fair Manket VaLue"
(vaLue based upon the saLe price of goods on the domestic market of the
country of exportation ) wiLL disappear fnom the Canadian and certain other
vaIuation systems. Customs vaLue w'ilL generaLLy be based upon the quantities
of goods actuatLy imported rather than on "usuaL whoLesaLe quantit'ies",
and, very'importantLy, arb'itrary adjustments upwands o1'the invoice price
to cover costs of,advertis'ing and "abnormaL discounts" wiLL no longer be
possibLe. Furtherm,rre, the Commun'i tyrs net"t vaLuation Laws, based upon the
Agreement, wiLL be cLearer and more precise and, as a result, should resul.t
in a greater unifonmity in practice. Thee nLy one of the Community's initiaL
specific objectives which it has not been possibLe to meet is the eLimination
of the use of "cost of production" as a normaL basis of vaLuation. Even here,
however, the methorJ has been pLaced Last in the sequence of normaL methods
and its use has ber:n so constrained that it wiLL,'in practice, onLy be
possible to appLy the method w'ith the fuLL agreement of the producer" of the
gooos.
DeveLoping countries
7. The VaLuation Agreement conta'ins a section on'speciaL and diffenential
treatment' fon devr:Loping countries. This errabLes develop'ing countries
which sign the Agneement to deLay impLementing its main provisions for
a
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f ive yeans, with the possibi Iity of a deLaying the implementation of
the prov'isions reLating to rcomputed va[uer for a further three years.
There'is also pt'ovision for the deveIoping countries to neceive technical
assistance with the impLementation of the Agreement.
8. The Agreement is not at the moment compLeteLy acceptabLe to devetop'ing
countries because they fear that, because of the genenaL[y high LeveLs of
their customs tariffs and the new d'iscipLines'imposed by the agreement on
customs officihLs, its impLementation couLd resuLt in significant losses
of customs revenues and aLso increase the scope for fraud on the revenue.
They have, therefore, produced a modified version of the agreement which
gives them the right to deLay impLement'ing the agreement for 10 years,
g"ives them powers to incLude in the customs vaLue centain eLements which
are not incLudibLe under the provisions of the version agreed amongst
deveLoped countries and generaLLy Sives greater fLexib'ility to their
customs. Discussions are being heLd with deveLoping countries, hot^tever, in
an attempt to find ways of making the Agreement acceptabLe to them.
There ane indications that a number of the more advanced ones wiLL be able to
accept the Agreement, subject to a Ljm'ited number of technicaL reserves which
. 
are not contrary to its ma'in concepts or its spirit. Discussions are stiLla' continuingrhowever. to see whethen a compromise settLement can be neached
which wouLd enabLe a Langer number of deveLoping countries to become
earLy s'ignatories. Whatever the outcome of these further discussions, it seems
unLikeLy that the developjng countries will wish in the end to pursue the idea
of a second GATT vaLuation aoreement.
Imp t ement at i on
9. The Commission is making proposaLs for a CounciL ReguLation to impLement
the Agneement with effect from 1 JuLy 1980, and replace ReguLation EEc No
803/68. In order that necessary appLication reguLations can be adopted in
time for the'impLementation of the Agreement by 1 JuLy 1980, it is essentiaL
that the basic Counc'iL ReguLation shouLd be adopted with the utmost speed.
a
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ConcLusion
10. Given the initiat difficuLties and the poLiticaL sensitivity of
customs valuation in certain countries, the Commission considers
that, overaL L, the negotiat'ions in this area have been successfuL.
ALL of its main objectives/, except the elimination of cost of
production as a basis of value, have been met so fan as deveLoped
countries are concerned. The position of deveLoping countries is
Less cLear but it wouLd not be unre;lsonabLe to except that the
new GATT agreement wi L L repLace the BnusseLs Definition of Va lue
(BDV) in tl'e short or Longer term as the basi s of deveLoping
country vatuation systems.
t
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COMMERCIAL COUNTERFEITING
Negotiat'ing Objectives
1. The conclusion of an agreement on measures to discourage the'importation
of counterfeit goods h/as not amongst the Communityrs initiaL negotiatin
objectives. The subject taas intnoduced at a very Late stage in the MTN
by the United States. The Community recogn'ised, however, that it shared
a common'interest with the United States in the discouragement of such
unfair practices and, accordingly, agreed to try to reach an agreement
on this subject.
Evolut'ion of the negotiations
2. The initiaL United States appnoach was, in effect, to require aLL imported
countenfeit goods to be tneated as contraband and to r"equine their
seizure by the customs authorities. t^lh'iLst such an approach was acceptabLe
to some Member States, it was cLear[y unacceptabIe to others where
protect'ion of inteL LectuaL property rights was based upon compLa'int to,
and action by, the judiciaI authorit.ies. A simiLar situation appLied in
the case of other countries parti cipat'in9 in the negotiations.
3. It was therefore necessary to agree with the United States that the
counterfeit agreement wouLd have to provide for two ma'in, aLternative
methods of controL - one based upon customs intervention, the other
resuLting from action in the courts. It was aLso agneed that the agreement
should not modify substantive nationaL or internationaI Laws on the
protection of inteL LectuaL property rights as these r,lere aLready the
subject of negotiation in the WorLd InteLLectuaL Property 0rgan'isation
(t.JIP0)- It was further agreed that the agreement would initiaLLy cover
onLy the counterfeiting of trade marks.
ResuLts of negotiations
4. An agreement t.ras reached with the United States on measures to d'iscourage
the importation of counterfeit goods. This was pubLished by the GATT as
document L 4817. Because the agreement adopts a fLexibLe approach to the
probLem it is IikeLy to be acceptable to other countries as welL.
Further discussions are currentLy under ray in order to widen the acceptance
of the agreement.
{t
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5. The resuLts of the negotiations in this fieLd are admittedLy modest.
NevertheLess, they do represent a usefuL step forward in direction of
curbing unfair practices which prejudice the interests of Community
producers both in home and export markets. The main benefits are as
fo t Lows:
5.1 This is a new agreement in the internationaL trade context which is
designed tr) compLement the obIigations which merny governments have
aIready adopted in the inteLLectuaL property fieLd. Given the right
sort of pullLicity it shouLd heLp to deter jnternational tnade in
counterfeit: qoods.
5.2 The agreemeRt is based on the principLe that those invoLved in the
importation of counterfeit goods shouLd be deprived of the econom'ic
benefits o:F their transaction. It thus provides for" action to be
taken against counterf e'it goods, ei ther di rect Ly by customs servi c;es
or through the courts and incorporates firm rules with regard to their
subseouent di soosa L.
5.3 The agreemernt pnovides for" cLoser crloperation between the responsibLe
authoritiesi and an exchange of information on specific cases of
internatiorraL trade in counterfeit goods and on new frauduLent
techniques or practices. This shoul<J significantLy heLp to improve
controL ove'r international tnade in counterfeit qoods.
5.4 The agreeme,nt provides for consuLtations between signatories on matters
affecting the operation of the agreelment and a commitment to work
towards mutuaLLy satisfactory soIut'ions. This wilL enabLe the
possibi Lities of strengthening controLs to be explored in the Longer
term in cases where it cen be shown that controL systems are ineffective
and that, as a consequence, the objerctives of the agneement are
be'ing pre j udi ced.
{}
I
,l
5.5 fhe agreement aLso has an evoLutionary cLause under which its provisions
can be extended to other inteLlectuaL property r ights.
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DeveLoping countries
6. The Agreement makes no prov'ision for special and differentiaL treatment
for deveLoping countries since derogations from its obLigations wouLd
be inappropriate. InteL LectuaL property rights are aLready protected
by the Paris Convention, to which many deveLop'ing countries have
subscribed, and the main objective of the Agreement is to reinforce in
the area of internationaL trade the protection envisaged by that Convention-
It is unLikeLy that many deveLoping countries wiLL have an interest in
signing the Agneement but, on the other hand, they could not cLaim that
their Legitimate interests t^rene being prejudiced.
Conc Iusion
7. Because of the Late introduction of the subject into the MTN and of LegaL
and institutionaL compLexities, the resuLts of the negotiation in this
fieLd have necessar.i Ly been modest. However, the agreement represents a
O usefuL step forward in the struggLe against unfair commerciaL practices
and wiLL represent a worthwhile resuLt if, in addition to the United States
and the Community, other major trad'ing powers decide to adopt it.
o
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LEGAL FRAI'0I1iORK
Tn I)16, in response to a Brazilian initiative backed. by numerous d.evelopir:g
countries and also sr:veral developed ones, a ttlegal. trbameworkttGroup lras
set up. It has nego'biated. a number of adaptations of the rules of the
General Agreement (sr:e MTN/FR/6) which are, by and large,, positive in irnpact
and., in particular, answer a number of points of concerrr to the d,eveloping
countries.
Despite initially wirle d.ifferences of opinior: as to the llmportance, value
and significance of the points under d.iscussion, agreement was reached, on a
a paper (t'fnU/fn/6) rr:presenting the outcone of negotiations in this sector.
The negotiated" terbs in uruf'nl6 cover the forlowin6i poirrts:
Differential and morer favourable treatment (er:abling clau.se), reciprocity agl
The enabling clause 
€rccommodates a vital point of concerrr to the d.eveloping
countries.
o
;
ter particlpation by develo countries uatiori clause
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ft incorporates in the General Agreement a 1egal basis for preferences, and
thus makes it unnecessary to derogate in ord"er to grant the d.eveloping
countries d-ifferential treatment in the fields of: (i) CSp tariff preferences,
(:.i) norrtariff rneasures governed by the codes negotiated under GATT, (iii) ttre
tariff and,, in some circurnstances, non-tariff preferences rohich d.eveloping
countries grant each other under regional or general trad"e arrangements, which
cannot come uncier Articte XXIV, and (iv) preferences for the Least devetoped
countries.
The d.ifferential treatrnent accord.ed in the form of GSP preferences or under
the cod"es can be mod.ified. to take account of the changing needs of the
developir:g countries. The clause also provid.es for consultation proced.ures.
A clause expressly allowing GSP benefits to be shared. out equitably among the
rf orro'l oning countries met with opposition from the most advanced d.eveloping
countries, arrd was opposed. by the Nordic countries as implying the acceptance
of quantitative limits on the GSP.
I The reciprocity provisions explicitly reaffirrn the und.ertakir:g given by the
developed countries in Part fV of GATT not to seek concessions, in the course
of trad.e negotiations, that are inconsistent with the d.evelopir€ countries
needs; this applies particularly to the least d.eveloped. countries.
Linked. to the enabling clause is its logical corollary, the rrgraduationrl
'l
clause-. This issue posed najor problens, as a number of developing countries,
some of them among the most advanced economically, refused arly formal
-[he clause reads as follows:
rrThe concessions ard contributions made and the obligations assumed. by
developed. and less-d.eve1oped. contracting parties und.er the provisions of the
General Agreement should. promote the basic objectives of the Agreenent,
includ.ing those embod.ied. in the Preamble and. in ArticLe nO(W. Less-developed
contracting parties expect that their capacity to nake contributions or
negotiated. concessions or take other mutually agpeecl. action und.er the provisions
and procedures of the General Agreement would inprove with the progressive
development of their economies aad iraprovement in their trad.e situation and
they r,'o':ld accordingly expect to participate more fully in the framework of
3"'iclts and obligations under the General Ag:reemerrtrrr
o
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acknowled.gement of this basic principle of erpity ard common sense. The
clause states that d.eveloping countries l,'oulrl be expected. to participate
more full-y in rightsr and obligations under the General Agreernent as their
capacity to contrilu.te increasedl the greate:: degree of participation
would reflect the plogressive development of their economies. Numerous
d.eveloping countries other than the most ad.vanced ones had. no d.ifficulty
in accepting that principle, but a number of others, J-ed. by Indiar were
opposed to the clause, which they felt would. allow the d"eveloped countries
to take arbitrary action ageinst them and. would vieaken developing country
sol idarity.
Trade measures taker for balance-of-payments purposes
This issue lias brought into the negotiations by the United States, supported
by the GATT Secretatiat and some other developed countries.
The text sets out the principles and cod.ifies; the practices and procedures
relating to the use of trade measures to maintai'n or restore balance-of-payments
equilibriurn" Special" attcrr'L;ion is paid. to the situation of the d.eveloping
countries and there are speclal procedures for dealing with measures adopted
by them to sa,fegua.rcl their payments balances,,
Restrictive trade measures are described. as rrin general an inefficient meansrr
of resolving external equilibrium problems. It is recognized that the developed
countries t?should avoicl the imposition of res;trictive trad"e measures for such
purposes to the maximum extent possibler'. This r..ias the more fl exible
reirunciation formula on which the d.eveloped countries ma.naged" to reach an
agreenent, although Japan and. the United States, among o'lhers, would have
preferred a stronger formula. Where a d.eveloped. country is compelled to
apply restrictive measures, it nay exempt prod.ucts of export interest to
d.evelopj-rrg countries. The special needs of the d.eveloping countries are
also taken into account vrith regard. both to the appli-cation of these measures
and. to the type of measure'selected. (quaptitaJi.ve restrictions, import
surcharges and deposits, etc.).
o
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The procedures for the exarnination of quantitative restrictions applied
for balance-of-payments purposes (stipulated. by GATT Article XII and XWII)
and. the cond.itions for the application of such measures wiII also cover all
other balance-of-pa;rments measures (surcharges and import d.eposi-ts). fhe
trEC opposed regulating measures other than quantitative restrictions in the
GATT lest this encourage recourse to such measules, md secured the
incorporation of the words rrthe provisions of this paragraph are not
intend.ed, to nod.ify the substantive provisions of the General Agreement'r.
this meals that measures other than quantitative restrictions remai.n
strictly i-llegal under GATT rrrles.
I'lith its aclcrowledgement of the developing countri.esr special balance-of-
pa;rments situation and its improvenent of the procedures for examining any
problems they may encounter in this field., (includ.ing external factors
likely to contribute to inbalance), ttre text introduces an equitable basis
for participation in the nachinery for adjusting the General Agreement.
Safesuartls for development purposes
ttris terb offers the d.eveloping countries a broader 1egal basis than
Article XVI]I for d.erogations from other GATT provisions. It coneerns
Sections A (allowing developing countri-es to nod.ify or withdraw tariff
concessions) and C (allowing them to adopt neasures not consistent with
the GATT, e.g. quantitative restrictions) of Article XVIII. l'ihereas
gnd.er present rules d.eveloping cor:ntries may only take measures ained at
promoting the establishnent of a particular industry, they nay now take
action in support of wid.er d.evelopnent aims. In taking such action, the
d.eveloping countries are required. to have due regard. to the objectives of
the General .Agreenent and to the need to avoid. unnecessary d.aurage to the
trad.e of other contracting parties.
I
I
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Notification. consultation, dispute settlement and surveiLlqrcg
Dispute settlenent was one of the nost controversial areasl of the negotiations,,
because the attitude of the ffiC (favouring the traditional. GATT pragmatlsm
and the practices whioh have nade it possible for the conoiliation machinery
to develop successfull-y, given the level of international cooperation in
trade relations) clasired. with the general approach oll nost; of our d.eveloped.
partners, which was to prefer a strict, quasi-jurisd.ictiorral cod"ification
of d.ispute settlenent procedures.
The'ragreed. d.escription" of past practice accompar$rirrg this terb sets out
the relevant GATT praotices; this will make i't easier to see in advance
the implications of rercourse to the procedures in querstion., and the partiesr
rights and. obligationsr wiil be rnore clearly d.e.iined.
Trad.itional GATT practice tri1l be maintained, lbut will be clarified on
certain points:
i. The proeed.ures f'or notification of trade measures and for consultations
have been mad-e n,ore specific: in addition to their promise to respect
existing obligations, the contracting pa::ties und.ertake rto the naxinurn
extent possible'r to give notice of the arloption of trade measupes
affecting the operation of the General ^fu3reement. The ffiC is preparerl
to subscribe to this new und"ertaking arrd abide by it, prov'ided it is
accepted and observed by a |. I the Contract.ing par t ies.,
ii. l{ith regard. to conciliation and d.ispute srettlement, there are d.etailed.
provisions on the establishnent of specieul panels to investigate
conplaints, and on the composition, prerogatives anrd. function of those
panels. In particular, with regard. to t;he establishnent of panels
(our parbners haC. wanted. automatic recogrLition of thre right to a panel)
the text requires a positive d.ecision by the contracting parties on its
establishnent |ti:n accord.ance with stand.inrg prac'ticert (on this point
the rragreed. descriptionrr notes that 'rsincte I)JZ, panels have become
the usual practicen).
]:II
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There are also rtrles governing the submission of the panelsr findings
and the way they should. be dealt with, and the action to be taken on
their recomnendations.
1I1 o
I
iv. A number of provi-sions are specially concerned with the problems and
interests of the d.eveloping countries, which are to receive special
attention d.uring consultationsl also, the proced.ures for the
settlenent of d.isputes between d.eveloping and d.eveloped corrntries are
reaffirmed.
v. I'Iith regard to surveillance, the contracting parties a€ree to conduct
a regular and systematic review of d.evelolments in the international
trading systen.
Export restrictions and charses
The results of negotiations in this field are nodest. Throughout the ta.lks
Canada and Australia, for tactical reasons, nad.e a close Link between market
access and access to reso[rcoso The d.eveloping countries, for their part,
emphasized. that it was necessarTr for then to use their resources in whatever
way they felt was nost appropriate for their d.evelolnent need.s, with due
regard. for their sovereignty.
In the a4reed. tert, the parbicipants invite the CATT contracting parties,
as a priority task to be taken up.:after the tll{s are concluded, to reassess
the GATT provisions relating to export restrictions and. charges in the light
of the international trading system as a whole, taking into account the
developnent need.s of the developing cowrtries. This tert is supplenented.
by a statement of the existing GATT provisions in this field..
Fbrther action and conclusions
the question of the status of the negotiatetl terts (d.ecision or declaration
by the contracting parties, nemor€undun, etc.) a"rd their fo:mal incorporation
in the General Agreement will be discussed by the contracting parties at
their annual session in Novenber'
The Commission proposes that the Counc'iL agree to the texts aooroved bv the
Frantewonk Grnr rn
I
